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Abstract - English 
 
Responses on psychological tests or questionnaires are not always determined by mapping 
the trait directly on a response scale as they can also be influenced by numerous other 
variables (person, test, and situation related) resulting in context effects, which might 
sometimes harm the measurement. Intentional response distortion (impression 
management, faking good, socially desirable response behaviour) in personality 
questionnaires and the effects of different test orders can both be described as such 
contexts effects. The current thesis consists of three scientific articles (papers) and an 
additional study, which investigate the effects of different strategies (such as different 
response formats, instructions, limited response time, and questionnaire length) to decrease 
socially desirable response behaviour, as well as the effects of different test orders on the 
test performance in objective personality tests and cognitive ability tests, by examining 
applicants. Their findings are completed by two further scientific articles (papers), which 
investigate the effects of different response formats on impression management and the 
effects of different test orders on test performance once again, however with different 
samples and partially different questionnaires and tests. Results provide evidence for the 
hypothesis that response scales with a higher number of response alternatives (analogue 
scales or 6-point rating scales), instructions with warnings (that fakers can be detected), 
and items positioned at the end of a questionnaire lead to less socially desirable responses 
than response scales with only two response alternatives (dichotomous response formats or 
2-point rating scales), instructions without a warning, and items positioned at the beginning 
of a questionnaire. These strategies seem to make it more difficult for test-takers to fit their 
responses to a faking schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & 
Popham, 1992) or to influence test-takers’ motivation to fake (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). 
A limited response time was shown to lead to less socially desirable responses as well, but 
only in combination with an analogue scale or a warning instruction. The effects of the 
different strategies were either not consistent within or across the different studies, which 
leads to the assumption that there is an interaction between person related variables and the 
content of the questionnaire scales or item wording. Moreover, different test orders 
influenced the test performance in objective personality tests but not in cognitive ability 
tests. Test-takers, who worked on cognitive ability tests first and on objective personality 
tests second, were shown to be more decisive and to have a lower tolerance to frustration 
in the objective personality tests than test-takers, who had worked on objective personality 
tests first. Again, results were not consistent across the different studies. Altogether, 
evidence is provided for the theory that faking is a variable of individual differences 
(Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), and for the 
theory that context effects depend on differences in test-takers’ motivation and cognitive 
ability (Schwarz, Hippler, & Noelle-Neumann, 1992).  
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Abstract - Deutsch 
 
Das Antwortverhalten in psychologisch-diagnostischen Verfahren wird nicht 
ausschließlich durch die entsprechenden Eigenschaften oder Fähigkeiten bestimmt, 
sondern von zahlreichen anderen (personen-, verfahrens- und situationsspezifischen) 
Variablen beeinflusst. Diese resultieren in so genannte Kontexteffekte, die die Messung 
mitunter negativ beeinflussen können. Absichtliches Verfälschen („impression 
management“, „faking good“, sozial erwünschtes Antwortverhalten) in 
Persönlichkeitsfragebogen und Effekte unterschiedlicher Testreihenfolgen können beide 
als derartige Kontexteffekte bezeichnet werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich aus drei 
wissenschaftlichen Artikeln zusammen, die den Einfluss unterschiedlicher Strategien 
(unterschiedliche Antwortformate, Instruktionen, limitierte Bearbeitungszeit und 
Fragebogenlänge) auf sozial erwünschtes Antwortverhalten, sowie den Effekt 
unterschiedlicher Testreihenfolgen auf die Testleistung in Objektiven Persönlichkeitstests 
und kognitiven Leistungstests an Bewerbern untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse der Studien 
werden ergänzt durch zwei weitere wissenschaftliche Artikel, die wiederum die Effekte 
unterschiedlicher Antwortformate auf sozial erwünschtes Antwortverhalten und die Effekte 
unterschiedlicher Testreihenfolgen auf die Testleistung untersuchen, jedoch an anderen 
Stichproben und mit teilweise anderen Verfahren. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen die 
Hypothese, dass Antwortskalen mit einer höheren Anzahl von Antwortalternativen 
(Analogskalen oder 6-kategorielle Rating-Skalen), Instruktionen mit der Warnung, dass 
Verfälscher entlarvt werden können, und Items, die am Ende eines Fragebogens platziert 
sind, zu weniger sozial erwünschtem Antwortverhalten führen, als Antwortskalen mit nur 
zwei Antwortalternativen (dichotome Antwortformate oder 2-kategorielle Rating-Skalen), 
Instruktionen ohne Warnung und Items, die am Beginn eines Fragebogens platziert sind. 
Diese Strategien scheinen für Testteilnehmer die Adaption ihrer Antworten an ein Faking-
Schema zu erschweren (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 
1992) oder deren Motivation zu verfälschen zu beeinflussen (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). 
Eine limitiere Bearbeitungszeit führte ebenfalls zu einer Reduktion sozial erwünschten 
Antwortverhaltens, allerdings nur in Kombination mit einer Analogskala oder einer 
Warninstruktion. Die Effekte der einzelnen Strategien waren entweder innerhalb der 
einzelnen Studien oder über mehrere Studien hinweg nicht konsistent, was zu der 
Annahme führt, dass es eine Interaktion zwischen personenspezifischen Variablen und 
Skaleninhalten oder Itemformulierungen gibt. Weiters gibt es einen Einfluss 
unterschiedlicher Testreihenfolgen auf die Testleistung in Objektiven Persönlichkeitstests, 
nicht jedoch auf jene in kognitiven Leistungstests. Testteilnehmer, die zuerst an kognitiven 
Leistungstests und danach an Objektiven Persönlichkeitstest arbeiteten, zeigten eine höhere 
Entscheidungsfreude und eine geringere Frustrationstoleranz in den Objektiven 
Persönlichkeitstests, als Testteilnehmer, die zuerst an Objektiven Persönlichkeitstest 
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arbeiteten. Wiederum waren die Ergebnisse über mehrere Studien hinweg nicht konsistent. 
Insgesamt unterstützen die Ergebnisse die Theorie, dass individuelle Unterschiede das 
Verfälschen beeinflussen (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, 
& Ones, 1999) und die Theorie, dass Kontexteffekte von Unterschieden in der Motivation 
und in kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Testteilnehmern abhängen (Schwarz, Hippler, & 
Noelle-Neumann, 1992).  
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1. General Introduction 
 
When we measure traits (characteristics, beliefs, abilities) by using psychological measures 
like questionnaires or tests, we should always be aware of the fact that responses are not 
always determined by mapping the trait directly on a response scale. As the relevant traits 
are predominantly not directly observable, we measure behaviours and reactions (provoked 
by psychological measures) that are assumed to be manifestations of these latent traits 
(Kubinger, 2009a). But in addition to these traits there can be other variables that influence 
or moderate the observable reactions by affecting the response process in different ways. 
Such moderator variables can be the presented content, the quality of test items, person-
related variables (e.g. ability, motivation), or situation-related variables. They may result in 
numerous so called context effects, making measures more or less accurate or reliable. 
Intentional response distortion (in personality questionnaires or interviews) and order 
effects (with respect to all kinds of psychological measures) can be described as context 
effects because they result in altered response behaviour of test-takers that obscures the 
latent trait which was actually intended to be measured. Although the motivation behind 
understanding the causes of context effects is the desire to control their influence or to 
avoid their occurrence, context effects can also provide information about the processes 
involved in the generation of behavioural responses in experiments and surveys, and thus 
about human though processes (Bodenhausen, 1992). Therefore, the investigation of 
context effects can provide an important contribution to personality and social research. 
However, context effects can also harm the process of psychological assessment, 
particularly when it comes to situations where test results have consequences, like in 
personnel (or student) selection, where test scores of applicants are compared in order to 
identify the most qualified candidates.  
 The current thesis investigates both intentional response distortions (faking good, 
impression management) in personality questionnaires and order effects with respect to 
different orders of tests within a test battery. Because the majority of previous studies with 
regard to impression management and order effects have primarily used non-applicant 
volunteer samples, the studies of the present thesis use real job-applicants in personnel 
selection. The aim is to investigate different aspects of context effects in order to provide a 
contribution to personality research and social theories, as well as to models of response 
behaviour. Another aim is to investigate possibilities that could improve or optimise 
psychological assessment in personnel selection. Paper 1 (as well as an additional study, 
presented below) investigates the effects of limited response time, response format, and 
warning instruction on intentional response distortion (impression management) in 
personality questionnaires. Paper 2 addresses possible influences of questionnaire length 
on impression management. Paper 3 is concerned with the effects of different test orders 
on test performance in cognitive ability tests and objective personality tests. Additionally 
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to these 3 papers, which form the current thesis, two additional papers are presented which 
expand their findings. Paper 4 again investigates the influence of different response 
formats on intentional response distortion in personality questionnaires with respect to 
different kinds of rating scales. Paper 5 attempts to discover whether the findings of 
Paper 3 can be replicated. All five studies comprise experiments that were conducted in 
selection situations to investigate the response behaviour of real applicants.  
 
 
1.1. Faking 
 
1.1.1. Faking good, faking bad: a definition of the common terminology 
 
The term “faking” in psychological research is widely used to describe intentional 
response distortion in personality scales through the conscious, intentional description of 
oneself in a way that does normally not apply (cf. Franke, 2002). With respect to personnel 
selection, where it is assumed that applicants distort their responses to describe themselves 
in a positive way, we refer to the terms faking good, impression management, or social 
desirability. Contrarily, faking bad or simulation, where responses are distorted to present 
oneself in a negative way or to present an unrealistically negative impression, is rather 
assumed to occur in clinical settings or in forensic psychology (Franke, 2002; Kubinger, 
2009a). The aim of both faking good and faking bad is to obtain a benefit or to avoid 
negative consequences. But the phenomenon of faking might not always be ascribed to 
intentional response distortion. It can also describe an unconsciously incorrect self-
presentation due to a lack of self awareness or self perception, unconscious personality 
characteristics (cf. Franke, 2002), unclear instructions, or unclearly phrased test items. 
Moreover, faking good or socially desirable responding could be the result of a 
socialisation process where people are trained to present themselves in appropriate ways 
(Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007). According to this theory of impression management, 
faking represents socialized behaviour and occurs due to the fact that people might 
understand social norms better than their real disposition, measured by personality 
measures that mostly sample socialized adult behaviour. Therefore, faking good or socially 
desirable responding can be divided into self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) or self-
deceptive tendencies, where test-takers believe in their positive self-reports, and 
impression management (IM) or self-favouring tendencies, where test-takers consciously 
distort their responses (Li & Bagger, 2006; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Pauls & Stemmler, 2003). 
Both tendencies can further be divided into an egoistic bias, where respondents see 
themselves as exceptionally talented or socially prominent, and a moralistic bias, where 
respondents see themselves as exceptionally good members of society (Paulhus & John, 
1998; Pauls & Stemmler, 2003). While the egoistic bias (or Alpha; with the motive “need 
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for power”) is assumed to be more related to self-deceptive enhancement and dimensions 
like “dominance”, “extraversion”, “openness”, “neuroticism” or “emotional stability”, 
“ambition”, and “intellect”, the moralistic bias (or Gamma; with the motive “need for 
approval”) is assumed to be more related to impression management and dimensions like 
“dutifulness”, “nurturance”, “conscientiousness”, and “agreeableness”. According to 
research on impression management in interviews, impression management can be divided 
into different tactics used by applicants (Levashina & Campion, 2006): self-promotion 
tactics (where applicants intend to show that they possess desirable qualities for the job), 
ingratiation tactics (where applicants intend to evoke interpersonal liking and attraction), 
and defensive tactics (where applicants intend to protect or repair their image).  
 
 
1.1.2. Faking good on personality questionnaires in personnel selection 
 
Intentional response distortion (faking good, impression management) in personality 
questionnaires in a socially desirable or job-related desirable way is an interesting 
phenomenon in terms of how response behaviour is affected by different contexts resulting 
from situation-related (e.g. personnel selection), person-related (motivation and ability to 
fake, personality traits), and measure-related variables (e.g. content, presentation mode). 
Why personality questionnaires seem to be particularly vulnerable to response distortions, 
why organisations nevertheless show a growing interest in including personality 
questionnaires in their selection processes, what problems accompany this interest, and 
why research shows such controversy with regard to these problems, are questions 
discussed in the introductions of Paper 1, Paper 2, and Paper 4.  
 That applicants do fake is a well-documented phenomenon (Birkeland, Manson, 
Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004; Kanning & 
Holling, 2001; Karner, 2002; Kury, 2002; Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007; Thumin & 
Barclay, 1993). Considerable research has shown that even voluntary participants are able 
to intentionally fake good when instructed to empathize with a selection candidate (Krahé 
& Hermann, 2003; Kubinger, 2002; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & 
Powel, 1995; Winkelspecht, Lewis, & Thomas, 2006; Zickar & Robie, 1999) or to conform 
to a given job profile (Hoeth, Büttel, & Feyerabend, 1967; Lammers & Frankenfeld, 1999). 
But it was revealed that faking bad instructions lead to greater distortions than faking good 
instructions, and that applicants do not fake as much as volunteers under faking 
instructions (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Hough, Eaton, 
Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Stumpf & Steinhart, 1981; Viswesvaran & Ones, 
1999), though they obviously fake more than incumbents (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 
1998). It was also shown that applicants do significantly elevate their scores when applying 
for a job in contrast to non-selection situations (Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). 
The different findings due to the use of applicant and non-applicant samples could be 
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explained by findings which reveal that test-takers show different faking styles or response 
patterns (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). Instructing 
test-takers to fake generally leads to a highly socially desirable answer pattern across all 
items (and universally inflated mean scores) instead of affecting items differently 
depending on their content; this might not be an adequate approach to investigate effects of 
faking (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001). Hence, findings of studies that used faking 
instructions on volunteers, instead of investigating applicants, might not be generalised to 
real-world selection settings. There are also concerns in using applicant-incumbent-
comparisons to study faking, since no differences in personality scales between these two 
groups (Robie, Zickar, & Schmit, 2001) or an overlap of different response styles across 
these groups were found, with some applicants appearing to respond honestly and some 
incumbents appearing to fake their responses (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). It can also 
be assumed that incumbents are less motivated to avoid careless responses in comparison 
to applicants (Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006). Furthermore, it was shown 
that faking effects varied substantially across outcomes and selection situations; this leads 
to the suggestion that the extent to which faking might be a problem depends on test-
takers’ intentions and circumstances (Converse, Peterson, & Griffith, 2009). Thus, 
fakability is assumed to be a variable of individual differences (Mueller-Hanson, 
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). The introductions of Paper 2 
and Paper 4 describe models which try to explain faking behaviour by showing how 
different moderating variables are linked together and interact with one another.  
 There are findings showing that faking in a personality questionnaire may be 
accompanied by the perception of its fakability (Steinmayr & Kersting, 2008). Therefore, it 
is possible that the perceived fakability of a measure leads to a low acceptance, and the low 
acceptance in turn leads to intentional response distortion. According to this theory, an 
increase of acceptance could lead to less intentional response distortion. For example, 
some authors argue that personality questionnaires in situations like personnel selection 
should be conceptualised as workplace simulations (Blickle, Momm, Schneider, Gansen, & 
Kramer, 2009). This assumes that, due to certain goal of self-presentation (work-self), not 
only responses to personality scales but also daily interactions at work are a “function of 
the interaction between the strength of the motives to get ahead and along and the degree 
of individual social skills”. This assumption is further accompanied by findings that the 
criterion-related validities of work-specific contextualized personality scales were higher 
among incumbents instructed to respond as if applying for a very attractive job than among 
those instructed to respond honestly. Maybe the conceptualisation of personality 
questionnaires as workplace simulations is a way to enhance its acceptance.  
 
 
 - 9 -
1.1.3. Strategies to deal with faking 
 
Strategies were revealed to deal with faking good, such as the identification of response 
distortion (with the use of response-time latencies or social desirability scales), the 
discouragement of test-takers from faking (with warning instructions that faking can be 
identified or will have negative consequences), or efforts to make personality 
questionnaires less fakable (through adjustment of the response format, the method of 
administration, or the position of items). Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 4 try to provide a 
contribution to such strategies and to models of impression management by investigating 
different administration methods. Their introductions also give an overview of the most 
interesting strategies with respect to the current thesis. Because strategies for dealing with 
impression management are of interest in the current thesis, a more detailed description of 
these strategies is provided in the following2.  
 The aim of identifying response distortion is either to exclude applicants from the 
further selection process, or to control social desirability by correcting personality scores, a 
method that has no empirical evidence justifying its use (Goffin, & Christiansen, 2003) and 
that does not improve validity (Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, & 
Schmitt, 2007). Actually, it was shown that the correction of personality scores was not 
able to reproduce the initial rank-order under honest answer conditions (Herzberg, 2004). 
Appropriate strategies are the use of response time latencies (Esser & Schneider, 1998; 
Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken & Popham, 1992; Hsu, Santelli & Hsu, 
1989; Kuntz, 1974; Robie et al., 2000; Schneider & Hübner, 1980) and the use of specific 
scales to assess patterns of response distortion like social desirability, impression 
management, faking good, defensiveness, or self-deception (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; 
Edwards, 1957; Hoeth, Büttel & Feyerabend, 1967; Paulhus, 1991; Schneider-Düker & 
Schneider, 1977). Both strategies are debateable as they do not necessarily identify 
intentional response distortions and participants who respond honestly could be eliminated 
as well (Hülsheger, Spinath, Küppers, & Etzel, 2004). Besides, social desirability scales 
(impression management as well as self-deceptive enhancement scales) are also fakable 
(Kury, 2002; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Pauls & Crost, 2005), which throws their usefulness to 
detect faking into question. It was also found that the score of a social desirability scale 
was not associated with lower agreement between self ratings and informant ratings 
(roommates, parents), but that it provided substantive trait information and should 
therefore not be used to determine the validity of measures or the veracity of self ratings 
(Kurtz, Tarquini, & Iobst, 2008). Moreover, not all social desirability scales seem to 
measure impression management tactics, but rather personality-related tendencies to view 
                                                 
2 Some of the corresponding text passages are taken from the introductions of the Papers 1, 2, and 4, but  
  supplemented with additional or more detailed information. 
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oneself positively, which suggests the need for validity studies of such scales (Reid-Seiser 
& Fritzsche, 2001).  
 To discourage test-takers from faking, warning instructions (that faking can be 
identified or will have negative consequences) were used but were not altogether effective. 
Either significant effects on faking were limited to specific types of warnings (Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003), no effects of warning instructions were revealed at all (Kury, 2002), or 
warnings affected only particular kinds of measures (Ramsay, Schmitt, Oswald, Kim, & 
Gillespie, 2006). A warning about the presence of a socially desirable response subscale 
was shown to be effective (Honkaniemi & Feldt, 2008), while repeated visual presentations 
of different combinations of warning instruction and self-focused attention (presentation of 
the picture of an observing eye combined with a warning instruction) in a computer-based 
questionnaire were ineffective (Hülsheger, Spinath, Küppers, & Etzel, 2004). It was shown 
that a warning of response verification was associated with slower item response latencies, 
as it might have increased the complexity of response decisions (Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & 
McElreath, 2005). According to findings that test-takers’ perceptions of the situation were 
strongly related to intentions to fake, it was hypothesised that the effects of warning 
instructions might be strengthened by altering perceptions about the importance of faking 
(e.g. “high scores are not necessarily desirable”), the efficacy of faking (e.g. “good 
detection methods are in place and fakers will be caught”), and subjective norms about 
faking (e.g. “faking is unacceptable”; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton III, 2006). 
However, findings of lower mean scores in experimental conditions using a warning 
instruction may not necessarily reflect improved validity due to reduced intentional 
response distortion, but conservative responding instead (Converse et al., 2008; Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003). Another kind of instruction is to ask test-takers to answer accountably 
(which means to prove answers through behaviour in the future). There are findings 
showing that such an accountability instruction produced higher scores in the scales 
Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability in a big five measure, and it was hypothesised 
that higher validities of measures might be achieved with such an instruction (ter Laak, 
Leuven, & Brugman, 2000), a theory which needs to be supported by further research. 
 Strategies to make personality questionnaires less fakable focussed on aspects of how 
questionnaires are administered by adjusting the method of administration, the item 
positioning, or the response format.  
 Comparing computer-based questionnaires with paper-pencil questionnaires, or 
verbal with non-verbal questionnaires, revealed no differences (Amelang, Schäfer & 
Yousfi, 2002; Menghin & Kubinger, 1996; Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, & Drasgow, 
1999).  
 Certain questionnaire scales (“neuroticism” and “conscientiousness”) showed 
themselves to be less susceptible to socially desirable responding when items were 
randomly placed instead of grouped together (McFarland, Ryan, & Ellis, 2002). With 
respect to the effects of item position, it was shown that test-takers were more likely to 
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fake their answers at the beginning rather than at the end of a questionnaire, suggesting that 
they might have forgotten the faking instructions over time (Seiwald, 2002).  
 Covert item content or particular dimensions that have some positive as well as some 
negative sides, like “extraversion” (in contrast to dimensions that have almost negatively 
associations, like “neuroticism”), are assumed to be more difficult to fake (Furnham, 
1986). Reducing specific contents of items in personnel selection which are particularly 
relevant to a job (like reducing the college relevance of items within a college selection 
process) are intended to make the items less fakable (Ramsay, Schmitt, Oswald, Kim, & 
Gillespie, 2006).  
 In contrast to items with a single-stimulus response format (or rating scale), items with 
a forced-choice response format are assumed to minimize faking tendencies, as they make 
it more difficult to respond desirably (Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000). These types 
of response formats may influence the perceived opportunity to fake, which in turn 
moderates the actual faking behaviour (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; 
Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Single-stimulus response formats are normative formats 
where the degree of agreement has to be marked on a rating scale (e.g. 1 = very inaccurate 
to 5 = very accurate); they allow interindividual comparisons (Heggestad, Morrison, 
Reeve, & McCloy, 2006). Forced-choice formats present two or more statements which 
appear equally attractive in order to assess different traits (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006), and 
are either ipsative or partially ipsative response formats (Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, & 
McCloy, 2006). Ipsative response formats, where response alternatives have to be rated in 
relation to one another by marking one statement that is most and one statement that is 
least like another, only allow intraindividual comparisons. Partially ipsative response 
formats allow intraindividual as well as interindividual comparisons, as they provide 
characteristics of both ipsative and normative formats.  
 When test-takers were instructed to respond like applicants (fake good conditions), less 
faking was revealed for binary and quartet forced-choice formats, as well as ipsative and 
partially ipsative forced-choice formats, while single-stimulus response formats were more 
vulnerable to response distortions (Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000; Martin, Bown, 
& Hunt, 2002). Nevertheless, it has been shown that test-takers are able to distort their 
responses using a forced-choice format (Lammers & Frankenfeld, 1999). The forced-
choice format was additionally shown to be a better predictor of personality and job-related 
abilities in fake good conditions than the single-stimulus format (Jackson, Wroblewski, & 
Ashton, 2000; Wright & Miederhoff, 1999). It was also revealed that both types of 
response formats were susceptible to response distortions, that subjects with higher 
cognitive ability were able to distort their answers more by using the forced-choice format 
than subjects with lower cognitive ability, and that a forced-choice response format was 
not better at retaining the rank ordering of individuals in comparison to a single-stimulus 
response format (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, 
& McCloy, 2006). However, items with the forced-choice format showed higher construct 
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validity under fake good conditions (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005). With 
respect to criterion-related validity, no difference between these two response formats was 
revealed (Converse et al., 2008). As the samples in these studies consisted of volunteers 
(mostly students), the results still need to be demonstrated in real selection situations. In 
fact, one study compared real applicants with volunteers while applying different item 
formats (problem solving items, rote knowledge items, forced-choice items, self-
description with rating scales, situational judgement items) and showed that participants 
could only distort items with a rating scale to their own advantage (Kanning & Kuhne, 
2006)  
 Some research suggests that using analogue scales (in which participants mark the 
extent of their agreement along a continuous line between two alternatives) as a response 
format may be less prone to faking than a dichotomous (participants have to choose one of 
two alternatives) response format (Kubinger, 2002; Seiwald, 2002). It has also been 
suggested that a dichotomous response format provokes a kind of reactance resulting in 
untypical or arbitrary responses that do not describe the subject’s true character (Karner, 
2002).  
 
 
1.2. Context effects  
 
An overview of different context effects like carry-over and backfire effects or consistency 
and contrast effects, sequence or position effects, initial frame of reference effects, fatigue 
and learning effects, priming effects, clarifying and redefinition effects, logical connection 
effects, and focus effects is given by Smith (1992). Context effects are mainly investigated 
with respect to item and task order in questionnaires and achievement or cognitive ability 
tests. Order effects refer to the phenomenon that different orders of questions (or tasks) or 
response alternatives may influence test-takers’ responses in a systematic fashion (Strack, 
1992). The extent of this influence depends on the degree to which the content of the 
question, task, or response alternative determines the response. Prior items can determine 
how respondents interpret subsequent questions, thereby influencing the appropriate 
answers (Tourangeau, 1992). Of course, not only prior items themselves, but also how one 
responded to prior items may influence responses to later items (Smith, 1992). The 
interaction between prior responses and item order is called conditional order effect. 
However, there is hardly any information about the effects of different test orders within 
test batteries. Therefore, Paper 3 and Paper 5 investigated the influence of different test 
orders on test performance. An overview of the few findings about the influence of 
different test orders (most studies which deal with this topic are unpublished) is given in 
the introductions of Paper 3 and Paper 5. Particularly carry-over effects, priming effects, 
and learning effects, which involve the transfer of prior content, meaning, or behaviour and 
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influence subsequent reactions, not to mention fatigue effects, might take place when using 
different test orders.  
 Carry-over effects (also termed consistency effects or assimilation effects) occur if prior 
items provide an interpretative framework for subsequent items during comprehension 
(Tourangeau, 1992). Later items are assumed to deal with the same topic or are drawn 
from the same category as previous items, even if there is no relation between the item 
contents. Such effects occur if topics are unfamiliar or stimuli are ambiguous. In contrast, 
if previous items do not provide an interpretative framework for a general item, intended as 
an overall summary of the more specific previous items, backfire effects (also termed 
inconsistency effects or contrast effects) may occur. This means that respondents think that 
the general item does not include material which was already covered by previous items 
(even if the test authors intended to include this material), maybe because of a desire to 
avoid redundancy. Backfire effects also appear if comparisons that lead to contrary 
judgements are made salient. For example, respondents might rate their present lives as 
less happy if they have recently recalled positive events from their past, or vice versa. Such 
backfire effects are termed retrieval-based backfire effects. There are also retrieval-based 
carry-over effects, where responding to prior items leaves material that is relevant to later 
items accessible to retrieval.  
 Priming effects occur if accessible categories (fuzzy sets of features organised around a 
prototype) or schemas (cognitive structures that represent knowledge about people, events, 
roles, the self, and the general processing of information) in memory are activated by 
features of a stimulus domain, directing attention and influencing how information is 
processed (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008; pp. 62-63). If a category is primed, stimuli are 
encoded by interpreting them in a category-consistent manner, but only if people do not 
know that they are primed or if they do not detect the cue (category). Otherwise, stimuli 
are interpreted in a category-incongruent manner. With regard to order effects, for 
example, the influence of previous questions on the responses to later questions can be 
understood as a priming event with an activation and information function (Strack, 1992). 
The activation function increases the accessibility of the activated information (resulting in 
an assimilation effect in the judgement) and does not require the respondent to be aware of 
the priming episode. The information function, in contrast, requires the respondent to be 
aware of the priming episode and to perceive an episodic relationship between the two 
questions (or that they share the same conversational context), resulting in assimilation or 
contrast effects. If the episodic relation between the questions is not perceived, but the 
respondent is aware of the priming episode, no assimilation or contrast effect might occur.  
 Learning effects are revealed when item reliabilities increase towards the end of a 
personality questionnaire (Hamilton, & Shuminsky, 1990; Hartig, Hölzel, & Moosbrugger, 
2007; Knowles, 1988; Knowles & Byers, 1996; Knowles et al., 1992), or when higher test 
scores or lower item difficulties are observed towards the end of a cognitive ability test 
(Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Moriarty Gerrard, 2007; Kubinger, 2009b). It has also 
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been shown that respondents do not only form a latent representation of psychometric 
instruments, but they do so very quickly (Ostrom, Betz, & Skowronski, 1992). This in turn 
guides their responses to the remaining items in the test. Fatigue effects due to later item 
positions result in more blanks towards the end of a questionnaire (Kraut, Wolfson, & 
Rothenberg, 1975), or they lead to slower reactions or increased errors in cognitive ability 
tests (Földényi, Tagwerker-Neuenschwander, Giovanoli, Schallberger, & Steinhausen, 
1999). Item orders may influence a four-stage process (interpretation, retrieval of 
information, rendering a judgement, selection of a response) underlying response 
behaviour (Tourangeau, & Rasinski, 1988), which may not be limited to item order but 
may also extend to test order. 
 Order effects might interact with one another (Smith, 1992) and depend on a complex 
interaction of serial position, presentation mode, item attributes (e.g. plausibility, 
complexity, and extremity of the wording), and respondents’ ability and motivation 
(Schwarz, Hippler, & Noelle-Neumann, 1992). Most of the studies focusing on order 
effects have not considered these variables and hence have not provided a satisfying 
explanation of order effects. Paper 5 tried to take such variables into account by regarding 
differences in subjects’ motivation and ability.  
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2. Contribution of the current doctoral thesis 
 
2.1. Methodical approach 
 
The methodical approach is an experimental one. Because studies which use faking 
instructions on volunteers might not be an adequate approach to investigate effects of 
intentional response distortion (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001), all studies presented in 
the current thesis are based on experiments that were conducted in personnel selection or 
comparable situations (cf. Paper 3 and Paper 5) to investigate the response behaviour of 
applicants. Specific variables (response format, time limit, warning instruction, 
questionnaire length, questionnaire content, test order) were varied and combined to 
investigate their effects on response behaviour and test performance. Applicants and test-
takers were randomly assigned to the different experimental groups. Multivariate analysis 
of variance and Welch tests were conducted to compare the means of the experimental 
groups. In order to calculate the sample sizes needed to fulfil a priori precision 
requirements (type-I, type-II-risk, and relevant effect size) the program CADEMO 
(http://www.biomath.de) was used (the sample sizes for multivariate analysis of variance 
were calculated according to an analysis of variance design). All methods, analyses, and 
results are described in detail in the single papers (see 5.1., 5.2., 5.3., as well as 
Appendix 2). Summaries and additional literature are presented in the following.   
 
 
2.2. The effect of speededness (time limit), response format, and warning 
instruction on impression management in personality questionnaires 
 
2.2.1. Paper 1 and Paper 4 
 
Because efforts to identify response distortions are debateable, Paper 1 (Khorramdel & 
Kubinger, 2006; published in Psychology Science, latterly: Psychological Test and 
Assessment Modeling; see 5.1.) and Paper 4 (Khorramdel & Kubinger; submitted to the 
Journal of Personality Assessment; see Appendix 2) concentrated on approaches to 
discourage test-takers from faking and on approaches to make personality questionnaires 
less fakable. According to Rothstein and Goffin (2006), even a small degree of ability to 
fake combined with the motivation to do so, as well as a small degree of motivation to fake 
combined with the ability to fake could already lead to response distortion. Therefore, an 
approach to reduce faking might be more successful if both ability and motivation to fake 
are considered. Such an approach was made in Paper 1 by influencing subjects’ ability to 
fake with an analogue scale as response format (in contrast to a dichotomous response 
format) and a set time limit (per questionnaire page) for response selection, as well as by 
 - 16 -
influencing subjects’ motivation to fake with a warning instruction (in contrast to a 
standard instruction) in a completely crossed 2x2x2 design. Then, Paper 4 again 
investigated the influence of different response formats (rating scales) on the ability to fake 
good. Both papers deal with different strategies to reduce impression management (or 
intentional response distortion).  
 In Paper 1, it was hypothesised that both a limited response time and an analogue scale 
as response format may decrease intentional response distortion by decreasing test-takers’ 
ability to adjust their responses to a faking good schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, 
Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992). That a warning instruction might increase the 
complexity of response decisions was shown by Vasilopoulos, Cucina, and McElreath 
(2005). The reason for this could be that responding more honestly might be more difficult 
and complex than matching responses with a stereotype faking schema. Furthermore, it 
was hypothesised that a repeated warning instruction (that faking can be detected) may 
lead to less response distortion by decreasing test-takers’ motivation to fake. That a time 
limit can decrease the ability to fake is supported by the findings of Robie, Brown, and 
Beaty (2007) showing that faking responders take more time to complete their responses 
and make more corrections than honest responders. While Paper 1 used forced choice 
items (MBTI) as well as single-stimulus (or normative) items (FKK) to investigate the 
difference between presenting them with an analogue or dichotomous scale, Paper 4 used 
only single-stimulus items, as they are mostly used in personnel selection (because of their 
normative qualities, and because of fewer costs during their construction compared to 
forced-choice formats). The aim was to find out if the susceptibility of items with a single-
stimulus response format (Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000; Martin, Bown, & Hunt, 
2002) can be decreased by using a higher number of response alternatives (6-point rating 
scale) instead of using a minimum of two (2-point rating scale).  
 The multivariate analysis of variance in Paper 1 revealed a significant main effect of 
the factor response format and significant interaction effect of the factors response format 
and response time.3 Additional analyses (Welch tests)4 of the scales “extroversion”, 
“introversion”, “feeling” and “thinking” (which were shown to be significant using 
Levene’s test and therefore had to be excluded from the multivariate analysis of variance) 
revealed no significant effects (p = .465; p = .535; p = .757; p = .882). The multivariate 
analysis of variance in Paper 4 revealed a significant main effect of the factor response 
format as well. See all results in more detail in Paper 1 and Paper 4.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The means and standard deviations for all scales are given by experimental condition completely in Table 4  
  in Appendix 1; the table in the published article is not complete because of an editorial mistake.  
4 As the results of the Welch tests are not provided in Paper 1, they are demonstrated in this text. 
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2.2.2. Additional Study 
 
As 113 of the 208 participants of Paper 1 were no real job-applicants (the remaining 95 
participants are applicants from two personnel and management consulting companies), 
additional data of 27 job-applicants (of the same companies) were gathered by conducting 
the same experimental design (with the same measurements), and to repeat the analysis 
with the 95+27 = 122 applicants. The aim was to have a minimum 10 subjects in each 
experimental group, as a multivariate analysis of variance with α = .05 and β = .20 is then 
able to detect a mean difference of δ ≥ 2/3 σ  (the standard deviation of the test scores). 
The sample consisted of 74 women and 48 men between the age of 17 and 54 years; 24.8% 
of the applicants had a “lower” education (apprenticeship) and 75.2% had a “higher” 
education (general qualification for university entrance or university degree). They applied 
for different positions such as administrative, medical, and management positions. The 
applicants were distributed in the experimental groups of Paper 1 as follows: Group 1, 
Group 2, Group 5, and Group 8 had 10 subjects each; Group 3 had 35 subjects; Group 4 
had 11 subjects; Group 6 had 15 subjects; Group 7 had 21 subjects. Again, a multivariate 
analysis of variance was conducted to investigate the effects of the experimental conditions 
response format (analogue scale vs. dichotomous response format), response time (time 
limit vs. no time limit), and instruction (warning instruction vs. standard instruction), with 
additional attention to possible interaction effects of these conditions.  
 
 
2.2.2.1. Results (Additional Study) 
 
The means and standard deviations of all scales in each experimental condition are given in 
Table 1 in Appendix 1. After deleting the FKK scale “self concept of own competences”, 
which was significant in the Levene’s test (p = .001), Box’s M-Test for testing the 
homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrix proved to be not significant (p = .421). 
That is, the resulting F-values of multivariate analysis of variance can be interpreted fairly. 
The multivariate analysis of variance showed a significant main effect of the factor 
instruction (p < .037; F = 1.985; η2 = .174). The separate invariate analyses of the factor 
instruction for each single scale revealed significantly different means between the 
experimental groups in the two MBTI scales “feeling” (p = .002) and “thinking” 
(p = .005); the respective means are given in Table 2.  
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Table 2: 
Means and standard deviations of the scales “feeling” and “thinking” at the different levels of the 
significant factor instruction 
 
Scale Instruction Means SD 
Feeling No Warning 7.511 2.989 
 Warning 8.961 2.957 
Thinking No Warning 11.155 3.281 
 Warning 9.532 3.246 
 
Moreover, the multivariate analysis of variance showed a significant interaction effect 
between the factors instruction and response time (p < .001; F = 3.121; η2 = .248). The 
separate invariate analyses of each single scale with regard to this interaction effect 
showed significantly different means among different experimental groups on the three 
MBTI scales “intuition” (p = .004), “sensing” (p = .024), and “introversion” (p = .011). See 
the respective means in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: 
Means and standard deviations of the scales “intuition”, “sensing”, and “introversion” at the 
different levels of the significant interactions of the factors  
instruction and response time 
 
Scale Instruction Response Time Means SD 
Intuition  No Warning No Time Limit 7.650 2.739 
  Time Limit 7.040 2.850 
 Warning No Time Limit 5.803 2.925 
  Time Limit 8.904 3.793 
Sensing No Warning No Time Limit 10.050 3.590 
   Time Limit 10.840 3.891 
  Warning No Time Limit 12.767 4.134 
   Time Limit 9.523 5.297 
Introversion No Warning No Time Limit 6.150 3.674 
   Time Limit 8.200 5.147 
  Warning No Time Limit 8.375 4.236 
   Time Limit 5.904 3.534 
 
To additionally investigate the effects of the factors response format, response time, and 
instruction on the FKK scale “self concept of own competences”, which was removed 
from the multivariate analysis of variance, two-sample t-tests for unequal variances (Welch 
tests) were applied: while no significant effect occurred with regard to the factor response 
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format, significant effects were revealed with regard to the factor instruction (p = .005) and 
the factor response time (p = .020). The respective means are given in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: 
Means and standard deviations of the scale “self-concept of own competences” at the different 
levels of the factors instruction and response time 
 
Scale Instruction / 
Response Time 
Means SD 
Self-concept of own competences No Warning 1.266 1.483
 Warning 2.181 2.030
 No Time Limit 2.131 2.061
 Time Limit 1.369 1.481
 
Altogether, the multivariate analysis of variance revealed a main effect of the factor 
instruction and interaction effects between the factors instruction and response time. While 
the main effect of the factor instruction can be ascribed to significantly different group 
means in the two MBTI scales “feeling” and “thinking”, the interaction effects of the 
factors instruction and response time concerns the three MBTI scales “intuition”, 
“sensing”, and “introversion”. The following scores could generally be described as 
socially or occupationally desirable (see the descriptions of all MBTI scales in Table 1 of 
Paper 1): lower scores in the scales “feeling”, “intuition”, and “introversion”, as well as 
higher scores in the scales “thinking” and “sensing”.  
 According to the factor instruction, it was revealed that applicants who responded to 
the items of the scale “feeling” after receiving the warning instruction showed higher mean 
scores than those who received no warning instruction. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
the warning instruction led to less desirable responses compared to the standard instruction 
(no warning).  
 Through the interaction of the factors instruction and response time, it was shown that 
applicants who received a time limit as well as a warning instruction received higher scores 
in the scale “intuition” and lower scores in the scales “sensing” and “introversion” than 
applicants of the other experimental groups. With regard to the mean scores of the scales 
“intuition” and “sensing”, it can be assumed that the combination of the time limit with the 
warning instruction led to less desirable responses than the other three combinations of the 
factors instruction and response time did (time limit with standard instruction, no time 
limit with warning instruction, no time limit with standard instruction) in the scales 
“intuition” and “sensing”. In the scale “introversion”, less desirable responses were 
revealed in the experimental group that received a warning instruction without a time limit.  
 The results of the Welch tests revealed that applicants who received a warning 
instruction or no time limit showed higher scores in the scale “self-concept of own 
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competences” than applicants who received a standard instruction or a time limit. As 
higher scores of this scale might be more desirable than lower scores, it can be assumed 
that applicants distorted their responses less when receiving a time limit than when no time 
limit was applied. However, the warning instruction showed no such effect. In contrast to 
the main effect of the multivariate analysis of variance, less desirable responses were 
revealed when no warning was applied.  
 
 
2.2.3. Discussion and critical reflection (Paper 1, Paper 4, Additional Study) 
 
Paper 1 showed that an analogue scale led to less socially (or occupationally) desirable 
responses than a dichotomous response format. Results of Paper 4 revealed that a 6-point 
rating scale showed the same effects in contrast to a 2-point rating scale (less socially 
desirable responses) in most of the scales of another questionnaire. Comparing the findings 
of Paper 1 with those of Paper 4, it is obvious that response distortions decrease with an 
increasing number of response alternatives. A higher number of response alternatives seem 
to make it more difficult to fit one’s responses to an adopted faking good schema (Holden 
& Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992). Interestingly, three scales of 
the questionnaire in Paper 4 showed the opposite effect as a 2-point rating scale led to less 
socially desirable responses than the 6-point rating scale. In the discussion of Paper 4, it 
was theorised that there might be an interaction between the kind of response format and 
the item content as well as item wording. Furthermore, it was assumed that a 2-point rating 
scale could lead to an underestimation of the actual trait, thereby distorting the 
measurement.  
 In response to the hypothesis that a limited responding time might decrease response 
distortions in contrast to no time limit, Paper 1 revealed that this is true only if the time 
limit is combined with an analogue scale. Considering the fact that in Paper 1, single-
stimulus (or normative) items, as well as forced-choice items, were used, either presented 
with an analogue or dichotomous scale, it seems interesting that the effects of the factors 
response format and response time occurred only in questionnaire scales with single-
stimulus items (FKK), while no effects occurred in scales with forced-choice items 
(MBTI). It might therefore be assumed that items with a single-stimulus response format 
(or rating scale) are less susceptible to faking when presented as an analogue scale than 
when presented as dichotomous items. But these two presentation types did not affect 
response behaviour when items were of a forced-choice-type format. Paper 4 supports the 
findings of Paper 1, once again showing that rating scales (single-stimulus response 
formats) are less susceptible to impression management when more response alternatives 
are provided.  
 Contrary to the assumption that a warning instruction might reduce the motivation to 
fake and therefore decrease response distortions, results of Paper 1 showed no effects. 
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However, the Additional Study, where the data of those subjects who were not real 
applicants (unemployed persons) were replaced with the data of additional real applicants, 
did. In this study, a warning instruction led to less socially desirable responses in two 
scales of the MBTI, while the reverse effect occurred in one scale of the FKK (“self-
concept of own competencies”), where a standard instruction led to less socially desirable 
responses than a warning instruction. According to Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and 
Thornton III (2006), as well as Rothstein and Goffin (2006), the combination of a warning 
instruction with other strategies might strengthen the effect of the warning on reducing 
intentional response distortion by altering test-takers’ perception of the efficacy of faking 
or their ability to fake. Though there were no interaction effects between the factor 
instruction and the factor response format or response time in Paper 1, these effects were 
found in the Additional Study. An interaction effect was revealed between the factors 
instruction and response time, showing that the combination of a warning instruction with 
a time limit led to less socially desirable responses in three scales (two scales of the MBTI 
and one scale of the FKK) than a warning instruction without time limit.  
 Beyond this combined effect, there was again no main effect of the factor response 
time. According to the group means of one scale (the MBTI scale “introversion”), a 
warning instruction with no time limit led to less socially desirable responses. Thus, the 
effects found in the Additional Study were not consistent. It is possible that different 
strategies to decrease impression management work differently, depending on the content 
of the questionnaire scales. In this respect, it might be important that the two scales 
(“introversion”, “self-concept of own competencies”) where either the time limit or the 
warning instruction did not work as hypothesized might have a higher affinity to somewhat 
clinical contents than the other scales, which were affected by the factors instruction and 
response time.  
 Apart from that, it is noticeable that the factor response format showed no effect on 
subjects’ response behaviour in the Additional Study like it did in Paper 1, and that the 
effects of the warning instruction and the time limit occurred mainly in scales of the MBTI 
while the effects of Paper 1 occurred only in scales of the FKK. This might be additional 
evidence for the assumption that such effects might depend on the content of the scales. 
Another explanation for the different findings might be, of course, the different samples; 
the subjects of Paper 1, who were not real applicants and who received a faking 
instruction, might have biased the results. The warning instruction (that intentional 
response distortion can be detected) in Paper 1 might not have worked because these 
subjects did not have to expect negative consequences of their test results – in contrast to 
the subjects of the Additional Study, where the warning showed significant effects. While 
these differences between samples might explain the different findings of the effects of a 
warning instruction, they do not really explain the different findings with respect to the 
response format.  
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 However, both the results of Paper 1 and the results of the Additional Study have one 
similar effect in common: they showed that effects of time limit occurred only in 
combination with other strategies (either a particular response format or a warning 
instruction). According to the findings that respondents do form a latent representation of 
psychometric instruments very quickly (Ostrom, Betz & Skowronski, 1992), the time limit 
used in Paper 1 and the Additional Study might not have been short enough to show an 
effect on response behaviour on its own. Further research could investigate other, more 
extreme time limits.  
 
Conclusions  
 
The current findings provide evidence for the models of impression management, which 
describe faking behaviour as an interaction of different variables (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006). The effects of 
a 6-point rating scale or an analogue scale, as well as the effects of a warning instruction 
on intentional response distortion might be strengthened by other variables, or might 
enhance their effects. But this might not be true for all scales, as these effects seems to be 
bound to the scale or item content, as well as item wording. This assumption is supported 
by other studies which have found that items or scales are affected differently by 
intentional response distortion (or to a different extent), depending on their content 
(Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001) and on different faking or response styles (Zickar, 
Gibby, & Robie, 2004). The content of items or measurements as well as the kind of 
sample, should be given more consideration in further research on intentional response 
distortion, and items should be developed and used very carefully in personnel selection 
(with regard to their content and wording).  
 
Limitations and implications for further research 
 
The discussion of Paper 1 mentions some limitations, which have to be considered with 
respect to the Additional Study as well. It should be noted that using an analogue scale or a 
6-point rating scale is no guarantee for preventing intentional response distortions; they 
might only reduce the level of those distortions. As the effects of these response formats 
were either not consistent within and across the different studies, or occurred only with 
respect to particular scales of the questionnaires, they probably work in only a few settings 
or on specific personality questionnaires. The same limitations apply to the effects of the 
warning instruction and the time limit. Moreover, there is the opinion that lower mean 
scores due to warning instruction may not necessarily reflect improved validity due to 
reduced intentional response distortion, but conservative responding instead (Converse et 
al., 2008; Dwight & Donovan, 2003).  
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 The assumption that these strategies work more or less depending on the item or scale 
content and on the type of sample is supported by different models of impression 
management (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; 
Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999), but should 
be investigated further, for example, by varying the sample type and questionnaire content 
systematically. This might, however, be difficult with respect to the collection of data from 
applicants. As mentioned in the discussion of Paper 1, the unemployed participants, who 
were tested as part of a job application training programme, might have biased the results 
of Paper 1, even if they carried out a job application and had the possibility of 
experiencing how they would have performed in a personnel selection setting. This might 
also be an explanation for the different findings in the Additional Study, where the data of 
these participants were replaced with the data of applicants. The sample in Paper 4 also 
constitutes a limitation to the results, as it is very unique (men who had all applied for the 
same training and who all came from the same institution); future research should 
investigate if the same effects can be found in other samples.  
 Future research should also identify item types or personality dimensions for which 
multidimensional scales (like an analogue scale or a six-point rating scale), a warning 
instruction, and a time limit work to reduce impression management. In this context, it 
would be interesting to study how different kinds of warning instructions (e.g. positive 
versus negative wording) and time limits (e.g. a time limit for each individual item versus a 
time limit for a set of items) affect response behaviour. The usefulness of limited response 
times is discussed in Paper 1, as a time limit might change the constructs being measured 
by a personality questionnaire.  
 The interpretation of scale means of the experimental groups might be a sufficient 
approach to studying response distortions if the aim is investigation of the effects of faking 
on different scales, given that item-level and scale-level analyses have identified effects on 
the same scales (Henry & Raju, 2006). In order to find out more about variables underlying 
or moderating response behaviour or different response styles, however, analysis on item-
level would be interesting. After all, faking is a variable of individual differences (Mueller-
Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), and test-takers show 
different response or faking styles (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001; Zickar, Gibby, & 
Robie, 2004). Future research should apply IRT-based analysis or Mixed Rasch Models, if 
a higher number of applicants is available; Latent Class Analysis would also be interesting. 
 Another point of critique could be seen in the fact that we did not use a control group. 
The most appropriate control group with respect to applicants would, of course, be 
incumbents who already have the job that applicants are applying for. But there are 
actually concerns about using applicants and incumbents to study faking, as no differences 
in personality scales between these two groups (Robie, Zickar, & Schmit, 2001) or an 
overlap of different response styles across these groups were found; some applicants 
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appeared to respond honestly and some incumbents appeared to fake their responses 
(Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004).  
 
 
2.3. Questionnaire length and impression management 
 
2.3.1. Paper 2 
 
While Paper 1 and the Additional Study investigated the influence of a limited response 
time on response behaviour in questionnaires, Paper 2 (Khorramdel, Kubinger, & Uitz; 
submitted to International Journal of Selection and Assessment; see 5.2.) investigated the 
influence of item position with respect to the questionnaire length. The aim is to provide a 
contribution to research on intentional response distortion, in particular regarding the 
influence of different contexts on impression management. Furthermore, the influence of 
the length of a questionnaire on different kinds of questionnaires with either work-related 
(BIP) or no specific work-related contents (NEO FFI, NEO PI-R) was the focus of interest. 
A questionnaire with a 6-point rating scale consisting of 516 items from different (well 
known) questionnaires was administered to 84 applicants from the Federal Armed Forces, 
who had applied for pilot training. The positions of the 516 items were varied to test if 
responses are affected by an overlong test length.  
 It was hypothesised that socially desirable response distortion would either increase or 
decrease towards the end of a very long questionnaire as learning or fatigue effects might 
occur (Hartig, Hölzel, & Moosbrugger, 2007; Knowles, 1988; Seiwald, 2002) making it 
more or less easy to adjust responses to a faking good schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; 
Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992). It was assumed that increasing response 
distortion towards the end of the questionnaire (learning effects) would result in decreasing 
scale reliabilities as responses of the sample become more stereotypical, and that 
decreasing intentional response distortion towards the end of a questionnaire (fatigue 
effects) would result in increasing scale reliabilities as responses of the sample become 
more variable and less stereotypical. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that a questionnaire 
that measures the big five dimensions might be more vulnerable to response distortion than 
a questionnaire with work-related content, as socially desirable responding seems to affect 
particular dimensions like Neuroticism, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Rosse, 
Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).  
 Results from the multivariate analysis of variance showed a significant main effect of 
the factor item position. The reliabilities of most of the scales showed higher reliabilities at 
the end of the questionnaire than when they were applied at the beginning of the 
questionnaire, except for two scales. See all results in more detail in Paper 2.  
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2.3.2. Discussion and critical reflection (Paper 2) 
 
In line with literature (Seiwald, 2002), the findings of Paper 2 showed that a fatigue effect 
might have occurred due to the extensive length of the administered questionnaire, 
decreasing the concentration or alertness towards the end of the questionnaire, thereby also 
decreasing the applicants’ ability to adjust their responses in questionnaires to an adopted 
faking good schema. Although, only one scale (“conscientiousness”) was shown to be 
affected by the extensive test length, almost all scales, except for two, show a common 
trend: their scale reliabilities tend to be higher at the end rather than at the beginning of the 
questionnaire, showing that socially desirable responses decreased towards the end of the 
questionnaire (fatigue effect). The results of the two scales (“agreeableness”, “angry 
hostility”), which showed a different trend, were interpreted as a kind of frustration effect 
rather than as an expression of faking tendencies (or learning tendencies). Again, it seems 
as if not all scales or items are affected by intentional response distortion to the same 
extent, which is supported by other studies showing that items or scales are affected 
differently by intentional response distortion (or to a different extent) depending on their 
content (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001) or different faking or response styles (Zickar, 
Gibby, & Robie, 2004). 
 Furthermore, (again in line with common literature) it was revealed that the big five 
dimension “conscientiousness” from the NEO FFI seems to be more vulnerable to 
intentional response distortions than other big five dimensions or the work-related scales of 
the BIP. This finding might, of course, also be an artefact, but with regard to the literature 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & 
Levin, 1998) it can rather be assumed that the items of the dimension “conscientiousness” 
might be more transparent with regard to the measured content than items from other big 
five dimensions, making it more easy to choose socially desirable responses at the 
beginning of a questionnaire when concentration and alertness are still given. However, 
this does not mean that the scales of the BIP are not affected by intentional response 
distortion.  
 
Limitations and implications for further research 
 
The discussion in Paper 2 discloses certain limitations that future research should address. 
One limitation is, like in Paper 4, the sample, which is very unique (men, who had all 
applied for the same training and who all came from the same institution). Therefore, the 
findings might not apply to other groups, such as women, or other occupational groups. 
Future research should investigate if the same effects can be found in other samples.  
 As already discussed above (with respect to the findings from Paper 1, the Additional 
Study, and Paper 4; see 2.2.3.), we cannot maintain that all applicants distorted their 
responses or that all applicants actually distorted their responses to the same extent. Using 
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a control group of incumbents to find out if the applicants did fake might not be a 
satisfying approach because incumbents fake as well (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). 
Again, item based analysis, such as an IRT analysis or Mixed Rasch Models, but also a 
Latent Class Analysis, would be interesting in further research (if a larger sample size is 
available) as more information might be revealed with regard to response behaviour or 
different response styles.  
 Furthermore, the discussion in Paper 2 mentions the need to ascertain the hypothesis, 
that fatigue effects decrease the ability to fake by making it more difficult to fit responses 
to a faking schema, in further research by measuring item response latencies. Finally, the 
findings might have more relevance for research than for practice in personnel selection, as 
it is not clear if such fatigue effects alter the constructs measured by questionnaires by 
reducing the ability to give information about one’s real characteristics. 
 
 
2.4. The effect of test order on test performance (with special regard to 
objective personality tests) 
 
2.4.1. Paper 3 and Paper 5 
 
While other measures such as situational judgement tests (Peeters & Lievens, 2005), 
interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2006), and biodata (biographical information) 
measures (Kluger, Reilly, & Russell, 1991; Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009) are 
fakable as well, objective personality tests sensu R. B. Cattell (e.g. 1958) present a 
promising alternative to personality questionnaires with respect to their use in selection 
settings as they are less vulnerable to intentional response distortion (Baldinger, 2006; 
Hofmann & Kubinger, 2001; Ziegler, Schmidt-Atzert, Bühner, & Krumm, 2007). One 
reason might be that the computation of test scores is not transparent to test-takers. 
Objective personality tests are experiment-based assessments of behaviour, which assess a 
personality construct by observing the subject’s behaviour when working on a performance 
or ability task, while the behaviour is observed and registered on a computer (Kubinger, 
2009c). They could be described as individual computerised assessments, which oftentimes 
include computer simulations of job-related tasks. Paper 3 (Khorramdel & Frebort; 
accepted for publication in European Journal of Psychological Assessment; see 5.3.) and 
Paper 5 (Khorramdel & Frebort; submitted to European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment; see Appendix 2) investigated if objective personality tests are vulnerable to 
other context effects than impression management like different test orders. The use of 
different test orders within test batteries is a common practice for different reasons (see the 
introduction of Paper 3), but not well explored or proven to be without consequences for 
the test results. Therefore, Paper 3 presents an experiment where the sequence of objective 
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personality tests and cognitive ability tests was varied within a computer based test battery. 
The sample consisted of 66 managers in an industrial corporation (an automotive supplier) 
in “higher management positions” (business managers, department chiefs, and team 
leaders), who underwent an analysis of their professional potential which resembles a real 
selection situation. In Paper 5 the same experiment was performed by testing 64 
incumbents of the same corporation, who were in “lower positions” (shift foremen and 
machinery adjusters) but who still had managerial responsibilities. In contrast to Paper 5 a 
different matrices test was administered. The aim was to investigate the effects of a varied 
test order in different kind of samples with respect to possible differences in cognitive 
ability, achievement motivation, and resilience.  
 It was hypothesized that carry-over and priming effects, as well as fatigue and learning 
effects might occur. With regard to the model from Petty and Cacioppo (1986), as well as 
that from Schwarz, Hippler, and Noelle-Neumann (1992), it was further assumed that 
effects of test order might occur depending on differences in subjects’ cognitive ability and 
motivation. 
 The multivariate analysis of variance in Paper 3 showed a main effect of the factor test 
order, which could not be replicated in Paper 5, where no main effect of the factor test 
order occurred. See all results in more detail in Paper 3 and Paper 5.  
 
 
2.4.2. Discussion and critical reflection (Paper 3, Paper 5) 
 
It was revealed that different test orders have a significant effect on test performance as 
subjects who worked on ability tests first and on objective personality tests second showed 
increased “decisiveness” and lower “frustration tolerance” scores in the objective 
personality test Work Styles in comparison to subjects who worked on objective personality 
tests first (showing fatigue effects on the one hand, and the vulnerability of particular kinds 
of resilience measured with tasks on the other hand). However, these effects only occurred 
in the sample from Paper 3, which exhibited higher cognitive abilities and status, as well 
as higher aspiration levels and lower resilience (in the objective personality tests) than the 
sample from Paper 5. Moreover, the effects of the test order only occurred in subtests with 
very simple tasks (such as the Work Styles), while more complex tasks (such as AMT, 
SPM, IST 2000 R) were not affected. The discussion in Paper 3 provides a comparison of 
the findings with similar findings in literature. The discussion of Paper 5 provides possible 
explanations for the different findings in Paper 3 and Paper 5, such as differences between 
the two samples as well as differences in the two test batteries (in Paper 3 the AMT 
matrices test was administered, while the SPM matrices test was used in Paper 5).  
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Limitations and implications for future research 
 
In the discussion in Paper 3 and Paper 5 some limitations regarding the findings are 
discussed and implications for further research are provided. The findings of both studies 
in these papers might not apply to other groups apart from the investigated samples, or may 
not be generalised, as the samples were again unique ones (most participants were men and 
the participants were all managers in a particular industrial corporation). The interactions 
between sample, task type, and content of the test should be further explored. For example, 
it was revealed that different test orders affected only particular kinds of resilience 
measured by tasks, as corresponding scores in the Work Styles were affected but none of 
the scores in BAcO. The possible effects of the different matrices tests on the test scores 
from Work Styles should be investigated separately from other moderating variables (such 
as differences in motivation or cognitive ability). Furthermore, it would also be interesting 
to investigate possible order effects by varying the order of different objective personality 
tests; their order was held constant in the current experiment.  
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3. General Discussion and Prospects 
 
Altogether, the different studies in the papers showed that response behaviour in 
personality questionnaires and reactions in objective personality tests are influenced by 
different contexts, such as different presentation modes (response format, instruction, 
response time, questionnaire length) and different test orders. Response scales such as 
analogue scales and rating scales with a higher number of response alternatives (6-point 
rating scale) showed less socially (or job) desirable responses in questionnaires than 
response formats with only two response alternatives (dichotomous response format, 2-
point rating scale). Decreased response distortion was also revealed by using instructions 
which include the warning that fakers can be detected, in comparison to instructions 
without such a warning. A limitation of response time (per questionnaire page) showed 
similar effects but only when combined with an analogue scale or a warning instruction, 
which leads to the assumption that a time limit might strengthen other strategies, but has no 
effect on its own. Moreover, an extensive questionnaire length was shown to result in 
fatigue effects, reducing test-takers’ ability to fake. The latter finding might have more 
relevance for research than for practice in personnel selection, as it is not clear if such 
fatigue effects alter the constructs measured with questionnaires by reducing the ability to 
give information about one’s real characteristics as well. Similar limitations can be 
assumed when the response time is reduced in questionnaires. Further research should 
investigate if a time limit reduces the comprehension of items or disadvantages test-takers 
who are less resilient (working under pressure, coping with stress). Moreover, the findings 
were either not consistent within and across the different studies, or occurred only with 
respect to particular scales. Therefore, the different strategies might probably work in only 
a few settings or personality questionnaires because items or scales are affected differently 
by intentional response distortion (or to a different extent) depending on their content 
(Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001) or different faking styles (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 
2004). Objective personality tests are less vulnerable to intentional response distortions 
than personality questionnaires (Baldinger, 2006; Hofmann & Kubinger, 2001; Ziegler, 
Schmidt-Atzert, Bühner, & Krumm, 2007), but seem to be affected by different test orders 
with regard to particular scores such as “decisiveness” and “frustration tolerance” (Work 
Styles). Again, the findings were not consistent across different studies.  
 There are, of course, certain limitations with regard to the different findings, which are 
discussed in the papers as well as in the text above. As the studies, which are presented in 
the different papers, were conducted in a personnel selection situation (Paper 1, Paper 2, 
Paper 4, Additional Study) or similar situations (Paper 3, Paper 5), the advantage, being 
that applicants and not volunteer test-takers were investigated, allows conclusions for the 
use of personality questionnaires and objective personality tests in selection situations.  
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 Although, the context of a selection situation was given in all studies, the differences 
between the samples (and maybe the different selection situations) had a noteworthy 
influence on the findings as results were not consistent across the different studies. 
According to Zickar, Gibby, and Robie (2004), a variety of faking styles might have 
occurred in Paper 1, Paper 2, and Paper 4, influencing the current results. Therefore, 
evidence is provided for the theory that faking is a variable of individual differences 
(Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), which also 
depends on the kind of situation and circumstances (Converse, Peterson, & Griffith, 2009). 
Likewise, the findings of Paper 3 and Paper 5 provide evidence for the theory that the 
appearance and the extent of context effects depend on differences in subjects’ motivation 
and cognitive ability (Schwarz, Hippler, & Noelle-Neumann, 1992). Moreover, the current 
findings allow the assumption that the contents of the measurements are affected 
differently by the experimental conditions because particular questionnaire scales and test 
scores appeared to be more vulnerable to intentional response distortion or test order 
effects. Hence, one important finding of the current thesis is that there are nameable 
interactions between sample (person related variables), measurement (test related 
variables, such as task type, item content, and wording) and situation related variables that 
should not be neglected. There are different strategies to deal with intentional response 
distortion which seem to be promising, but do not solve the problem of rank order changes 
in personnel selection due to intentional response distortion as they do not seem to work 
equal for all scales or all persons, so that no general conclusions can be drawn. In fact, it 
seems as if every strategy and combination between different strategies would need to be 
investigated in all interesting samples and situations for all interesting questionnaires. The 
same applies for the effects of different test orders. Future research should address the 
influence of different person related variables and the content of different personality 
measures.  
 The problem with faking might not be faking itself, but differences in the extent of 
faking between applicants who show different faking styles (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 
2001; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004); some might even respond honestly, depending on 
variables such as their ability and motivation to fake, or on their real personality 
characteristics (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, 
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Different faking or response 
styles, due to differences in the motivation to fake, mean that each applicant has a different 
starting point. This, in turn, means that the measurement is, of course, not fair. According 
to the belief that intentional response distortion is an expression of social competence that 
could predict job performance (Marcus, 2003a, 2003b; Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, 
Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007) and the idea that personality questionnaires should 
be conceptualised as work place simulations (Blickle, Momm, Schneider, Gansen, & 
Kramer, 2009), there might be a possibility for the use of personality questionnaires in 
personnel selection anyhow. Applicants should have the possibility to start from the same 
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point, which could be achieved by avoiding different motivations to respond to personality 
questionnaires. Personality questionnaires should be introduced as measures to assess the 
“knowledge of which behaviour is appropriate or desirable in work or society, or the 
“knowledge of which behaviour is successful in work”. Therewith, rank order changes 
would only depend on the applicants’ knowledge and ability, which might be variables that 
predict job performance. In addition, scales should be used which measure job-related 
traits and which are transparent with regard to their measured content as personality scales 
might provide substantial criterion validity in personnel selection if the measured traits are 
matched to the nature of the job (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Of course, questionnaire scales 
would then not measure the “choice to perform” or “will do” aspect (Goffin & Boyd, 2009) 
but rather the “knowledge of performance” or “know how to do” aspect. They might also 
measure whether applicants have a realistic expectation of the job, which might also be a 
factor of success. Further studies should investigate possible benefits or problems of such a 
procedure in personnel (or student) selection and the effects on the validity of measures. 
 An interesting alternative to the use of questionnaires is still objective personality tests, 
with their advantage of measuring the “capacity” to perform. However, they have the 
disadvantage of only being able to assess particular personality characteristics. When using 
objective personality tests it needs to be taken into consideration that order effects may or 
may not occur, depending on the sample, the kind of objective personality tests or tasks, 
and other measurements which might be included in the same test battery. As there is 
hardly any knowledge of the effects of different test orders on the test scores in objective 
personality tests at present, it might be advisable to hold the test order of test batteries, 
which comprise objective personality tests or comparable computer simulations, constant 
for all participants. This might be particularly relevant in personnel selection, where the 
test scores of applicants are compared in order to identify those who are most qualified. On 
the other hand, if certain effects due to test order are intended, they might be controllable 
and therefore beneficial, if more is known about their occurrence.  
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The effect of speediness on personality questionnaires:  
an experiment on applicants within a job recruiting procedure 
LALE KHORRAMDEL1 & KLAUS D. KUBINGER 
Abstract 
The authors conducted an experiment to determine how a particular design of personality 
questionnaires influences applicant responses on personality scales. A completely crossed 2 
x 2 x 2 design was carried out with real-world applicants and individuals in a job application 
training program in which speed (with or without a time limit), response format (dichoto-
mous or analogue), and instructions (neutral standard instruction or a repeated warning that 
people who fake can be detected) were manipulated. Two hundred eight participants com-
pleted the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory and a German Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC)-
based questionnaire. Although providing a warning showed no influence, response format 
and the interaction between speed and response format showed a significant effect for some 
scales. 
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Personality questionnaires are the best known and the most popular tools used to measure 
personality. However, personality questionnaires often show a high transparency; that is, it is 
often evident to the test-taker what constructs the test measures. Because test-takers can infer 
what constructs items may measure, they may distort their responses in order to present 
themselves favourably. This may be particularly problematic in the context of personnel 
selection, where applicants may “fake good” in an attempt to secure a job offer (cp. Kanning 
& Holling, 2001; Karner, 1999, 2002). 
Considerable research has shown that even voluntary participants are able to intention-
ally fake good when instructed to empathize with a selection candidate (Kubinger, 1996; 
2002) or to adapt to a given job profile (Hoeth, Büttel, & Feyerabend, 1967; Lammers & 
Frankenfeld, 1999). Krahé and Hermann (2003) found similar results when analysing the 
susceptibility of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) to systematic response tenden-
cies. Because of these potential faking effects, data from self-descriptions should always be 
regarded carefully (Deller & Kuehn, 2003).  
Faking tendencies in real-world selection situations, however, are actually fewer than in 
simulated situations. Some studies show that adjusting personality scores based on social 
desirability scores does not decrease the validity of a test (Hough et al., 1990; Moorman & 
Podsakoff, 1992; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Ones, Viswesvaran & Schmidt, 1993), 
and there is even an established opinion that personality questionnaires are valid methods for 
personnel selection despite their high transparency (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; cf. also Mar-
cus, 2003). However, the extent to which validity is decreased by the influence of social 
desirability bias is unknown (Kanning, 2003). Furthermore, because candidates who fake are 
more likely to be selected than those who answer honestly, faking may make selection sys-
tems unfair (Ellingson, Sackett & Hough, 1999; Hough, 1998). Therefore, test-users should 
take precautions to prevent or reduce applicant faking on personality questionnaires (Hough 
& Ones, 2002; McFarland, 2003).  
Past research has explored whether it is possible to detect individuals who may be faking. 
Two means of detection have primarily been used: measuring/analysing response latencies 
(i.e., the time between item responses; Esser & Schneider, 1998; Holden & Hibbs, 1995; 
Holden, Kroner, Fekken & Popham, 1992; Hsu, Santelli & Hsu, 1989; Kuntz, 1974; Robie et 
al., 2000; Schneider & Hübner, 1980) and imbedding social desirability scales (a.k.a., lie 
scales) within personality measures (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1957; Hoeth, 
Büttel & Feyerabend, 1967; Paulhus, 1991; Schneider-Düker & Schneider, 1977). In the 
detection literature using response latencies, the general assumption is that response latencies 
indicate the fidelity of the response. Response latencies may indicate whether a participant’s 
response reflects their self-concept (i.e., an honest response) or a response style (i.e., a faked 
response). In addition, response latencies may indicate that a test-taker has responded at 
random (which would affect the reliability and validity of a score; cp. Wagner-Menghin, 
2002). Holden and colleagues (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Po-
pham,1992) proposed a model of personality test item response dissimulation. In their 
model, a respondent attempts to compare test item content to either a relevant cognitive self-
schema or to an adopted schema (for example, faking good represents an adopted schema). 
They found that responses congruent with self-schemas are faster than when answers are not 
congruent with self-schemas. These results suggest that adopting the schema to fake good 
may produce longer response latencies, which can be used to identify fakers. However, the 
authors acknowledge a number of limitations in their research. First, their research has fo-
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cused on dimensions of maladjustment rather than personality scales. Second, longer re-
sponse latencies are associated with items that have relatively extreme social desirability 
levels, have extreme endorsement proportions, and are predominately positively-keyed 
(rather than reverse-keyed). Third, their design compared the response latencies of volunteer 
participants instructed to fake versus to volunteer participants instructed to answer honestly. 
Indeed, the results of other response latency studies have produced discrepant results. Kuntz 
(1974) found significantly longer latencies under both “fake bad” and “fake good” instruc-
tions than under standard conditions. In contrast, Hsu, Santelli and Hsu (1989) found shorter 
latencies under both faking conditions.  
The benefits of social desirability (lie-) scales or repeated items to check for consistency 
(control items) are debatable, mostly, because of their high transparency (Seiwald,2003). 
Even control items, if recognized, decrease the participant’s motivation to answer honestly. 
Moreover, the validity of lie scales seems doubtful, because they measure not only the par-
ticipant’s tendency to fake but also a personality trait. Attempts to use social desirability 
scales to statistically adjust personality scores decreases rather than increases the criterion-
related validity of the personality measures (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 
1983; Ones et al., 1996; Piedmont et al., 2000; cf. also Hülsheger et al., 2004). Hülsheger et 
al. (2004) argue that even the attempt to identify and exclude invalid profiles with these 
scales is a poor strategy because honestly-responding participants may also be erroneously 
eliminated. Test-takers who have high social desirability scores are not necessarily faking; 
indeed, high-scorers might simply have answered the questionnaire honestly but have a high 
degree of the trait measured by social desirability scales. Thus, correcting questionnaires for 
faking is particularly concerning given that such corrections may have considerable influ-
ence on who receives a job offer, yet there is an absence of empirical evidence to support the 
use of these corrections (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003).  
 
 
Efforts to suppress faking good  
 
Recent attempts have aimed at making personality questionnaires less fakeable by adjust-
ing aspects of how they are administered. These attempts include adjusting the response 
format, method of administration, and item positioning. In a summary of this research, no 
general conclusions could be drawn for these adjustments as the effects appear to be influ-
enced by many moderating variables (Kubinger, 2003a). However, some research suggests 
that using analogue scales (in which participants mark along a continuous line to indicate the 
extent of their agreement) as a response format may be less prone to faking than a dichoto-
mous response, multiple-choice, or Q-Sort format (cf. Seiwald, 2002). Questionnaires ad-
ministered with either paper and pencil or with a computer have not shown any difference in 
fakeability, nor have verbal as opposed to non-verbal questionnaires (cf. Amelang, Schäfer 
and Yousfi, 2002). With respect to the effects of the item-positions, it has been shown that 
test-takers are more likely to fake their answers at the beginning rather than at the end of a 
questionnaire.  
In addition, researchers have attempted to limit faking by adjusting the instructions given 
to test-takers (Mummendey, 1999). Typically, personality measures are administered with 
the instruction to answer “as candidly and honestly as possible.” A warning instruction goes 
beyond this by informing test-takers that the test administrator can detect intentional re-
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sponse distortion. Hülsheger et al. (2004) found no effect of the warning that “untruthful” 
response patterns can be detected; however, their sample consisted only of student volun-
teers. Most research, though, has suggested that these warnings are effective at reducing the 
prevalence of faking, although the effects are weak (Hoeth & Köbler, 1967; Braun & La 
Faro, 1968; Dwight & Donovan, 2003). In particular, warning applicants that faking can be 
detected with an imbedded social desirability scale or by analyzing the response latencies 
decreases faking (Doll, 1971; Kluger & Colella, 1993; Nias, 1972; Robie et al., 2000; 
Wheeler, Hamill & Tippins,1996). However, McFarland (2003) calls attention to certain 
practical consequences of this procedure. Warning the applicants in personality question-
naires tends to provoke negative reactions by the applicants (e.g., Rosse, Miller & Stecher, 
1994; Smither et al., 1993; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996). Hence, such a warning may make 
applicants feel that the employer distrusts them or that applicants cannot present themselves 
as they would like to be seen. On one hand, this negative reaction may make the most quali-
fied applicants self-select themselves out of the selection process (cf. Ryan, Sacco, 
McFarland & Kriska, 2000). On the other hand, the applicants’ test-taking motivation could 
be decreased. Hence, such test perceptions may affect selection decisions (Chan et al., 1997), 
and the validity of the questionnaire (Schmit & Ryan, 1992). Overall, McFarland did not 
find any negative reactions affected by warnings in her study; however, her sample was 
limited to voluntary participants who were instructed to imagine a job-application situation.  
An indirect method to decrease faking is to exert a time pressure on a participant. Some 
authors assert that test-takers need more time in order to fake, so adding time pressure may 
decrease faking tendencies. For example, Bartley (1958) suggested that overly long reaction 
times are caused by a test-taker searching for substitute responses that will mask his/her 
initial reaction. Answering without manipulating one’s own attitudes takes less time than 
reflecting some prototypic attitudes in responses. Indeed, the most prior studies support the 
idea faking causes longer response times; but these have used inadequate samples (such as 
volunteers rather than job applicants). On the other hand, in an early study, Sutherland and 
Spilka (1964) have demonstrated that time pressure can result in responses in the direction of 
what is socially approved. However, they used voluntary students as participants, as well, 
and the decision for a response interval of 2 seconds per item is neither explained nor evi-
dent. The results of Krämer and Schneider (1987) are similar, but, instead of using real time 
pressure, the participants were only given the instruction to answer quickly and spontane-
ously. Again, only volunteers served as participants, and, furthermore, the sample was con-
siderably small. Neubauer and Malle (1997) likewise use a speed instruction, and the results 
show a lower mean neuroticism score in the Eysenck-Personality-Inventory (EPI). Again, 
however, the study is based on volunteers, and there was no real time pressure.  
 
 
Aim of the current study 
 
Although the results of some previous studies aiming to reduce applicant faking have 
been encouraging (particularly the analogue scale), the majority have primarily used non-
applicant volunteer samples. The present experiment uses real-world applicants to test the 
effects on faking of manipulating speed, response format, and instruction. 
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Hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis is that a limited response time may decrease the phenomenon of fak-
ing good in real-world selection situations. We expect this decrease in faking because the 
time pressure will preclude the test-taker from thinking about the best (most socially desir-
able) answer and force the test-taker to answer spontaneously. The second hypothesis is that 
an analogue scale response format might lead to a more honest self-presentation than would 
a dichotomous one. We expect that an analogue scale is more difficult to fake because it is 
more difficult to determine what intensity is socially desired but not suspect of indicating a 
faked response. The third hypothesis is that a warning instruction may lead to less socially 
desirable answers.  
To detect possible fakers within the scales of the personality questionnaire used, we as-
sume that it is more advantageous for a participant in selection situations to show high values 
for certain scales and low values for other scales. We expect that fakers would inflate their 
scores on the scales Self-Concept of Own Competences, Internality, Extroversion, and 
Thinking, whereas we expect that fakers would provide lower ratings for the scales Powerful 
Others Control, Chance Control, and Introversion (a description of the personality tests used 
is given below). Test-takers with such scores might try to present themselves in a socially 
desirable manner. These predictions are guided by what is commonly believed to be desir-
able in the jobs for which the applicants in our sample applied (office managers, salesmen/-
women, tradesmen/-women, and middle echelon managers). For the scales Feeling, Judging, 
Perceiving, Intuition, and Sensing, it is not clear whether high or low values would indicate 
faking because the scales are not clearly indicative of desirable traits for these specific jobs. 
 
 
Method 
 
Design 
 
To test whether time limitations, scale response format, and warning instructions affect 
applicant faking, participants completed personality measures in a completely crossed 2 x 2 
x 2 design. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of eight groups, representing a 
combination of the three factors, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also provides the informa-
tion about the sample size in each of the eight groups. Manipulations of each independent 
variable are described below.  
Response Time and Speed. As is often the case with ability and achievement measures, 
we constructed a speeded questionnaire. The participants either received an overall limited 
response time for the items (per page of items) or they received no time limit. The time limi-
tations were based on the results of a pilot test with 10 participants between the age of 18 
and 56 who came from different educational backgrounds (primary and secondary educa-
tion). Each of the 10 participants completed the personality questionnaires as quickly as 
possible. The time per page each participant needed was recorded, and the means were cal-
culated. Thus, we chose time limits between 45 seconds and 1 minute and 40 seconds for 
each page of the questionnaire (depending on the number of items per page). Three filler 
items were presented at the end of each page, which served to guarantee that the time limit  
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Figure 1:  
Experimental design 
 
 
Note: part. = participants 
 
 
did not preclude slower test-takers from completing all relevant personality items. Test-
takers were instructed to start with the first item on each page, and not to leave a single item 
out.  
Item Response Format. As in previous experiments, participants completed personality 
questionnaires with either a dichotomous response format or an analogue scale response 
format. That is, participants with a dichotomous response format decided between total 
agreement to the given statement of an item or total disagreement (“yes“ or “no,“ and “true” 
or “false”); participants with the analogue scale response format indicated their response by 
making a mark on a continuous line. There were at least 39 invisible points on a line in ac-
cordance with the length of the 39 mm line, a length based on the layout of the answer sheet. 
However, the analogue scale was scored dichotomously, so that marks on the left half of the 
line indicated “true/agree” and marks on the right half indicated “false/disagree.”  
Instruction. All participants received a conventional, neutral instruction. Those in the 
warning group also received an additional warning that faking can be detected. The warning 
was given once at the beginning of the questionnaire and once again in the middle of the 
questionnaire to ensure that the participants did not forget.The standard instruction was: 
 
There are no correct or incorrect answers in this questionnaire. Your answers merely pro-
vide information on how you see things or how you normally make a decision. 
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The additional warning instruction was:  
 
Afterwards your answers will be checked by a complex computer-based evaluation pro-
gramme, in order to ascertain whether your answers are given in an honest manner. 
Therefore, it does not pay off to fake the questions. You would then simply be asked to 
answer the questionnaire again. 
 
 
Measures 
 
It seemed important that the questionnaire be neither too short (to avoid giving the im-
pression that little effort was required), nor too long (to avoid making participants fatigued 
or frustrated). The final questionnaire set was a battery of well-known paper-pencil personal-
ity questionnaires.  
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) – German edition. The MBTI (Bents & Blank, 
1991) is based on Jung´s personality typology and consists of 90 items. The scales are: Ex-
troversion, Introversion; Sensing, Intuition; Thinking, Feeling; Judging, Perceiving. Descrip-
tions of these scales are provided in Table 1. Because the fifth item of the MBTI originally 
has three response categories, it was necessary to remove the middle category to create a 
dichotomous response format for this item. Reliability coefficients were calculated for each 
scale and range from .007 to .639 (see Table 2).2 
Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC)-based questionnaire. The German IPC-based question-
naire (FKK; Krampen, 1991) consists of 32 items that measure the “locus of control of rein-
forcement” concept from J.B. Rotter´s social learning theory of personality (Rotter, 1982; 
Rotter, Chance & Phares, 1972; Rotter, Seeman & Liverant, 1962). The scales are: Self-
Concept of Own Competences, Internality, Powerful Others Control, and Chance Control. 
Descriptions of these scales are provided in Table 1. The items from the FKK also originally 
had six response categories; therefore, only the categories “right” and “wrong” were used. 
The split-half reliabilities of the FKK scales presented in its test-manual range from .63 to 
.79 (see Table 3). 
As explained before, we added three additional items at the end of each page of the ques-
tionnaire – altogether 42 items – to guarantee that almost all interesting items (the items of 
the MBTI and the FKK) are actually answered by each participant, despite having a time 
limit. These filler items were not analysed. In addition, neither measure originally had an 
analogue scale. Therefore, we had to establish one. Altogether, the resulting questionnaire 
consisted of 164 items, of which 122 were actually analysed (omitting the 42 filler items), 
This questionnaire was presented either with a dichotomous response format or an analogue 
scale.  
                                                                                                                         
2  We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we note the links between all the scales and the Big 
Five dimensions of personality. Because there is no empirical evidence of such links between the FKK and 
the Big Five dimensions, we simply give some plausible correspondence in a separate column. However, the 
links between the MBTI and the Big Five dimensions are based on the findings of McCrae and Costa 
(1989), which were supported by the findings of Furnham, Moutafi and Crump (2003). 
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Table 1: 
Description of the scales of the personality questionnaires 
 
Scales Description Correspondence to the Big Five 
dimensions of personality  
(McCrae & Costa, 1989;  
Furnham, Moutafi, & Crump, 2003) 
MBTI:   
extroversion  external orientation, extrovert 
attitude 
extroversion (E) 
introversion  internal orientation, introvert 
attitude 
extroversion (E) 
sensing  sensual perception; perceptual 
processes by means of the five 
senses; orientation on experiences 
in the present (here and now) 
openness to experience (O) 
intuition  intuitive perception; perception of 
possibilities, meanings and rela-
tions which happens by insight 
openness to experience (O) 
thinking  analytical judgment; judgment 
due to logical linked imaginations 
agreeableness (A) 
feeling  emotional judgment; judgment 
due to personal and social values 
agreeableness (A) 
judging  judging attitude; focus on deci-
sions and planning of action 
sequences  
conscientiousness (C) 
perceiving  perceptual attitude; focus on 
receipt and perception of infor-
mation  
conscientiousness (C) 
German IPC-based 
questionnaire 
(FKK): 
 Plausible correspondence to the  
Big Five dimensions of personality 
self-concept of own  
competences 
generalized expectation to have 
action possibilities – at least one 
– at disposal in life of action 
situations  
neuroticism (N) 
internality  subjectively noticed control of 
own life and events of the person 
specific environment 
openness to experience (O) 
powerful others 
control  
generalized expectation that 
important events in life depend on 
the influence of others 
agreeableness (A) 
chance control generalized expectation that life 
and important events in it depend 
on destiny, fortune, bad luck and 
chance 
neuroticism (N) 
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Table 2: 
Cronbachs alpha and split-half reliability (Spearman-Brown) of the MBTI-scales  
(from the current data; n = 208) 
 
MBTI-scales Cronbachs Alpha Spearman-Brown 
extroversion  .268 .244 
introversion  .322 .348 
sensing  .274 .387 
intuition  .007 .188 
thinking  .074 .040 
feeling  .047 .146 
judging  .631 .639 
perceiving  .639 .608 
 
 
Table 3: 
Split-half reliability (Spearman-Brown) of the FKK-scales (Krampen, 1991) 
 
Study N self-concept of 
own competences 
internality powerful others 
control 
chance control 
1 62 .79 .74 .72 .73 
2 258 .70 .67 .75 .78 
3 152 .72 .63 .65 .67 
4 38 .71 .64 .70 .76 
5 248 .72 .68 .70 .69 
6 2028 .71 .64 .67 .70 
 
 
Sample 
 
Two hundred eight participants completed the personality questionnaire. Initially, we in-
tended to use only test-takers who were actual job applicants being recruited. Participant data 
was gathered from two separate sources. First, 113 of the participants were recruited from a 
special job-application training course consisting of long-term unemployed individuals 
within a re-education programme. Near the end of this programme, participants were as-
sessed as part of the course training to prepare for real-world job-applications. That is, for 
this group of participants, the questionnaire was administered as a simulated-selection proc-
ess. This testing was part of an evaluation of the effects of the training programme. The 
participants received personal feedback regarding their individual results. Second, 95 par-
ticipants were real-world job applicants whose data were taken from two personnel and 
management consulting companies. 
Altogether, 96 women and 112 between the age of 18 and 56 with various educational 
backgrounds were tested by seven test instructors. These instructors had received an exact 
verbal instruction and written guide describing how to instruct the participants. The test-
takers were randomly assigned to the eight experimental conditions; however, their sex and 
original institution were noted to ensure that men, women, and participants of each of the 
three institutions are represented adequately in each of the 8 experimental groups.  
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Because data collection occurred as an on-going process at different locations, it was not 
possible to assign exactly the same number of participants to each group. That is, we had to 
conform with the routine of the different institutions. As a result, 116 participants filled out 
the questionnaire with the dichotomous response format, and 92 participants filled out the 
questionnaire with the analogue scale response format. Eighty-two participants were given 
the questionnaire without any time limit, and 126 participants were given the questionnaire 
with the time limit described above. Eighty-four participants were given only the standard 
instruction, and 124 were additionally given the warning instruction. The participants of the 
special training course were tested in groups (with a maximum of 15 persons per group), 
whereas the job applicant sample was tested individually. 
 
 
Results 
 
The means and standard deviations for all scales in each experimental condition are 
given in Table 4. In addition, Appendix A shows the intercorrelations between all scales for 
the given data. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to compare means across con-
ditions (α = .05). With a sample size of 208/8=26 and α = .05, a MANOVA has adequate 
power (.80) to detect a mean difference of 2/3 standard deviations (Rasch & Kubinger, 
2006). To test the homogeneity of variance across cells, a Levene’s test was calculated for 
each scale. However, four MBTI scales (Extroversion, Introversion, Thinking, and Feeling) 
failed the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance (p = .047, .006, .018, and .013, respec-
tively). Hence, only the scales Judging, Perceiving, Intuition, and Sensing from the MBTI 
and the scales Self-Concept of Own Competences, Internality, Powerful Others Control, and 
Chance Control from the FKK are taken into consideration in the following. Box’s M-Test 
for testing the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrix was conducted on the remain-
ing scales but was not significant (p = .239), indicating that the resulting F-values of multi-
variate analysis of variance may be interpreted. Table 5 shows the results of the MANOVA 
testing the main and the interaction effects of the three factors. The multivariate analysis of 
variance shows a significant effect of the response format (dichotomous vs. analogue), and a 
significant interaction effect between response format and time (limited time vs. unlimited 
time).  
To more clearly understand these significant effects, each scale was considered individu-
ally. Tables 6 and 7 present the result of univariate factorial ANOVAs, the associated effect 
sizes, and their confidence intervals. Either a (significantly) higher or lower score (dependent 
on the meaning of the particular scales) may be interpreted as indicating faking good. 
Table 6 and 7 show that only one scale (Internality) showed significantly different means 
across response format groups (p = .038). However, for the time x response format interac-
tion, Self-Concept of Own Competences (p < .001), Powerful Others Control” (p = .008), 
and Chance Control ( p < .001) showed significant interaction effects. To determine the 
direction of significant differences, we examined the means of the scores (see Tables 8 and 
9).  
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Table 4: 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for all scales by experimental condition  
(8 experimental groups) 
 
 
Note. Within each row, means are presented above and standard deviations presented below in paren-
theses. 
 
 
 
The additional warning instruction not to fake did not influence the level of the score 
(see Table 5). However, the kind of response format does have an influence (see Table 6), 
although only for a single scale, Internality. Table 8 shows that if the dichotomous response 
format is used, a slightly higher tendency towards Internality is exhibited than when an ana-
logue scale response format.  
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Table 5: 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance – including the scales “judging”, “perceiving”, “intuition”, and 
“sensing” from the MBTI and the scales “self-concept of own competences”, “internality”, 
“powerful others control”, and “chance control” from the IPC-like questionnaire (FKK)   
 
Effect  Value F Hypothesis
df 
Error 
df 
Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
format Pillai's Trace .088 2.307 8 191 .022 .088 
instruction Pillai's Trace .022 .526 8 191 .836  
time Pillai's Trace .019 .465 8 191 .880  
format * instruction Pillai's Trace .060 1.528 8 191 .150  
format * time Pillai's Trace .181 5.277 8 191 .000 .181 
instruction * time Pillai's Trace .044 1.095 8 191 .368  
format * instruction  
* time 
Pillai's Trace .071 1.826 8 191 .074  
 
 
Table 6: 
Scale-wise F-values with respect to the factor Format 
 
Dependent Variable df F Sig. Effect Size Confidence- Interval 
     lower bound upper bound 
judging 1 .098 .755    
perceiving 1 .058 .809    
intuition 1 .274 .601    
sensing 1 2.171 .142    
self-concept of own competences 1 .439 .508    
internality 1 4.343 .038 .3444 .0674 .6214 
powerful others control 1 2.845 .093    
chance control 1 .600 .440    
 
 
Table 7: 
Scale-wise F-values with respect to the factor Format x Time 
 
Dependent Variable df F Sig. Effect Size Confidence- Interval 
     lower bound upper bound 
judging 1 .291 .590    
perceiving 1 .956 .329    
intuition 1 .654 .420    
sensing 1 .025 .875    
self-concept of own competences 1 16.614 .000 .2191 -.1707 .6089 
internality 1 .195 .660    
powerful others control 1 7.120 .008 .3402 -.0693 .7497 
chance control 1 33.696 .000 .0955 -.3114 .5023 
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Table 8: 
Means of scores at the different levels of the significant factor “Format” 
 
Dependent Variable Format Mean 
internality dichotomous 2.297 
 analogue scale 1.853 
 
 
Table 9: 
Means of scores at the different levels of the significant interactions of factor “Format”  
and factor “Time” 
 
Dependent Variable Format Time Mean 
self-concept of own  dichotomous no time limit 1.718 
competences  time limit 2.905 
 analogue scale no time limit 2.700 
  time limit 1.542 
powerful others control dichotomous no time limit 5.901 
    time limit 5.333 
  analogue scale no time limit 4.659 
    time limit 5.613 
chance control dichotomous no time limit 5.921 
    time limit 4.333 
  analogue scale no time limit 4.009 
    time limit 5.795 
 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Furthermore, three of the eight scales show a significant interaction effect between re-
sponse format and time pressure (see Table 7). For the scales Powerful Others Control and 
Chance Control, the dichotomous response format produced a higher mean when paired with 
no time limit, whereas the analogue scale response format produced a higher mean when 
paired with a time limit. On the contrary, the scale Self-Concept of Own Competences, 
showed the opposite pattern (higher means were observed when the dichotomous format was 
paired with a time limit and when the analogue format was paired with no time limit). Sup-
posing the participants think of a high degree of Self-Concept of Own Competences as being 
highly socially desirable and being low on convincement of external control, these time x 
response format effects point in the same direction: the answers to personality questionnaires 
are faked good if there is either a limited administration time and a dichotomous response 
format or if there is no limited administration time and an analogue scale response format. 
That is, participants were more likely to give a socially desirable answer if the time was 
limited on a dichotomous scale, and they were also able to answer in a more socially desir-
able manner if they had plenty of time to respond to an analogue scale.  
Again, there is additionally an occasional trend of answering in a socially desirable man-
ner if a dichotomous response format is used (see Table 8); this is true in so far as high In-
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ternality is socially desirable. However, there is no main effect for time pressure (see Table 
5).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The current experiment used applicants from a job recruiting procedure to examine the 
effects of time pressure, response format, and warnings on faking. Forty-six percent of the 
sample consists of such job applicants, and 54% of the participants came from a special job-
application training course. Of past research examining the effects of such administrative 
adjustments on personality questionnaire faking, very few studies have been designed like 
our experiment. That is to say, the current study does not apply a faking good instruction and 
test the respective effect only on volunteers. Nor is it an experiment that considers different 
administration conditions using only volunteers. Instead, the current study examines how 
these adjustments affect personality scale responses by actual job applicants. Furthermore, 
two factors of potential inflationary influence on item responses (good) are considered here: 
the influence of a warning instruction on the one hand, and the influence of a speeded ad-
ministration on the other hand. Finally, the benefit of using an analogue scale response for-
mat was investigated once again, because evaluations so far have not disclosed any un-
equivocal results. 
Although the observed results do not provide a clear and consistent method of adminis-
tering personality measures that prevents applicant faking, the results do suggest several 
conclusions. There is some evidence that an analogue scale response format tends to be 
superior to a dichotomous response format if the psychologist is aware that the faking good 
phenomenon might occur. However, using an analogue scale response format is not in any 
way a guarantee for preventing faking good; this response format probably works in only a 
few of the conceivable personality questionnaires’ scales. Furthermore, the response format 
effect of the analogue scale might be enhanced by imposing a time limit for answering the 
questionnaire items, whereas the dichotomous response format shows the same effect with-
out imposing a time limit. Indeed, three of the eight scales tested produced such an interac-
tion effect (cp. Table 7).  
Again, no means have been discovered that prevent faking good in any case of personal-
ity scales. Unfortunately, warning applicants that faking can be detected did not work at all. 
Future research should investigate the effect of imposing a time limit for each individual 
item rather than for a set of items. This manipulation may make future results even more 
pronounced than those observed here. In addition, future research should identify a specific 
class of personality dimensions and personality questionnaires for which the analogue scale 
response format works to prevent faking good.  
The current study has several limitations that future research should address. First, our 
sample was not a homogeneous set of job applicants; rather it contained both real job appli-
cants and unemployed individuals participating in a job application training programme that 
simulated applying for a job. However, the latter group did actually carry out a job-
application and had the possibility of experiencing how they would have performed in a real-
world selection situation. Furthermore, these individuals had recently been through a similar 
selection procedure, making a real applicant setting salient. Thus, these factors suggest that 
these individuals completed the personality measure in a setting quite similar to real-world 
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job candidates. Nonetheless, there is still the possibility that they may not have had the moti-
vation to distort their responses, or their distortions may be based on generic social desirabil-
ity of traits rather than traits relevant for a particular job (as would be the case for actual 
applicants).  
Second, it is unclear whether limiting response time (speed testing) changes the con-
structs being measured by a personality questionnaire. For example, such time limitations 
may mean the questionnaire also measures the ability to work under pressure, the ability to 
cope with stress, the motivation to deliver exceptional performance (i.e. trying to be as fast 
as possible), or the ability to understand the contents of a question quickly. Hence, certain 
participants may have been handicapped--namely, those who would need more time to un-
derstand the meaning of a question and who therefore may have not been able to answer in a 
manner representing their real behaviour or attitudes. In this case, individuals may have 
misunderstood items or answered at random. Thus, future studies should also conduct pre-
tests of verbal comprehension and examine the baseline reaction times.  
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Abstract 
 An experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of questionnaire length and 
questionnaire content on socially desirable response behaviour. It was hypothesised that 
socially desirable response distortion would either increase or decrease towards the end of 
a very long questionnaire as learning or fatigue effects might occur making it more or less 
easy to adjust responses to a faking good schema. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that 
particular questionnaire contents are especially vulnerable to response distortion. Eighty-
four applicants filled out a questionnaire consisting of 516 items, whose item positions 
were varied to test if responses are affected by an overlong test length. Results provide 
evidence of decreased alertness or concentration towards the end of the questionnaire as a 
result of fatigue effects. 
 
Key words: faking good, fatigue effects, impression management, item 
position, psychological assessment, personality questionnaires, 
personnel selection, questionnaire length, social desirability  
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Introduction 
 Intentional response distortion (faking good, impression management) in personality 
questionnaires in a socially desirable or job-related desirable way is an interesting 
phenomenon in terms of how response behaviour is affected by different contexts like 
situation related (e.g. personnel selection), person related (motivation and ability to fake, 
personality traits) and measure related variables (e.g. content, presentation mode). It is also 
a frequently discussed and investigated topic (cf. Rothstein & Goffin, 2006) particularly 
with respect to personnel selection where research shows a lot of controversy.  
 Whether intentional response distortion should be prevented at any cost as rank order 
changes take place influencing which applicant gets hired (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 
1999; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 
2003; Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Winkelspecht, 
Lewis, & Thomas, 2006), or whether it is a form of intelligent adaptation to situations, 
socially adaptive, or an expression of social competence that could predict job performance 
(Marcus, 2003a, 2003b; Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 
2007) has not been clarified yet and cannot be generalised for all situations and test-takers.  
 Some researchers argue (mostly with meta-analyses) that construct validity or 
criterion-related validity of self-reported personality measures are barely affected by 
intentional response distortion (Bradley & Hauenstein, 2006; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, 
Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001; Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992; 
Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Ones, 
Viswesvaran & Schmidt, 1993; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). It was also shown that the factor 
structure of a Greek big five measure remained intact when used in personnel selection 
(Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2001). Another study was able to show that faking affected the 
construct validity but not the criterion validity of a big five measure by modelling faking as 
a measurement error that is caused by an interaction between context and test-taker 
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(Ziegler & Bühner, 2009). Moreover, there is the opinion that personality tests can provide 
substantial criterion validity when used in personnel selection if the measured traits are 
matched to the nature of the job and are measured precisely enough (Goffin & Boyd, 
2009).  
 Other researchers assume social desirability to be a serious problem and that self-
reported personality scales have a lot of shortcomings when used in selection (Stark, 
Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001; Winkelspecht, Lewis, & Thomas, 2006) as 
criterion-related validity is affected at the high end of the predictor distribution (Mueller-
Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). Furthermore, slightly lower reliabilities of 
questionnaire scales were revealed in applicant samples than in non-applicant samples, and 
it was shown that the underlying constructs of a questionnaire were measured differently 
across these samples harming the construct validity (Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & 
Drasgow, 2001). It was shown that hiring decisions are more sensitive to faking than the 
validity of a questionnaire is (Marcus, 2006). Both depend most importantly on variance in 
faking, and decision overlap decreased considerably as the variance of faking increased. 
Given a small selection ration even a small variance of faking can influence the number of 
decisions significantly.  
 Strategies to deal with faking good, like the identification of response distortion 
(with the use of response time latencies or social desirability scales), the discouragement of 
test-takers to fake (with warning instructions that faking can be identified or will have 
negative consequences), or efforts to make personality questionnaires less fakable (by 
adjusting the response format, method of administration, or item positioning) have 
provided inconsistent results, and no general conclusions can be drawn for these 
adjustments as the effects may be influenced by many moderating variables (Dilchert, 
Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006).  
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 However, the current paper defines socially desirable response distortion as a context 
effect moderated by different interacting variables, which is shown by the different models 
of impression management, whose investigation could provide an important contribution to 
personality research and social theories. 
 Models of impression management have been proposed to explain faking behaviour 
by showing how different moderating variables are linked together and interact with one 
another. The main key aspects of these models are described in the following. Then context 
effects which are not considered in these models but which could influence the extent of 
the faking behaviour are additionally discussed.  
 
Models and theories of impression management 
 Because some individuals are more capable of faking than others it can be assumed 
that fakability is a variable of individual differences (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & 
Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), and individuals who have knowledge of the 
aspired job and the appropriate desired behaviours may be able to fake their responses 
better (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). 
Faking behaviour also seems to occur with different faking styles, for instance slight versus 
extreme faking (Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004).  
 Models, which try to explain the process which underlies the intentional response 
distortion, describe faking behaviour as an interaction of the ability and motivation to fake 
(Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999), the opportunity to fake depending on the test-takers true 
score (McFarland & Ryan, 2000), the perception of the situation (belief in the importance 
of faking, perceived behavioural control and beliefs about subjective norms), and general 
personality characteristics like Conscientiousness and Emotional stability (McFarland & 
Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006). The theory that cognitive 
ability (general intelligence) is related to the amount of faking, to the ability to perceive the 
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situational requirements, to the ability to recognize the meaning of items, and to the ability 
to fake in line with the situational requirements has actually been demonstrated (Pauls & 
Crost, 2005). A further model expanded these aspects by suggesting that faking is likely to 
vary depending on the specific nature of the personality item (instead of considering the 
entire personality test), and including the factor “perceived ability to fake” which is more 
relevant to the motivation or intention to fake than the true ability to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 
2009).  
 Two further theories, described by Hogan, Barrett, and Hogan (2007), are the self-
report theory of faking and the impression management theory. The self-report theory 
describes the process of faking as inaccurate reports about the match between the content 
of an item and the content of memory, and assumes that a socialisation process involves 
training people to fake. The impression management theory argues that faking involves 
distorting the way one normally “communicates about oneself” (Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 
2007) as people try to maximize acceptance and status and minimize rejection and the loss 
of status during social interaction. According to this theory the socialisation process 
involves training people in appropriate forms of self-presentation. Therefore it seems 
impossible to distinguish between faking and socialized behaviour if personality measures 
are administered that basically sample socialized adult behaviour and if (according to this 
theory) people know social norms rather than their real disposition. While the self-report 
theory predicts that the personality scores of people who are honest will be more consistent 
than scores of people who are dishonest, the impression management theory predicts that 
scores or people with good impression management skills will be more consistent than 
scores of people with poor impression management skills. While there is no evidence in 
research for the self-report theory (and it is inconsistent with research regarding how 
memory works as well as with modern theories about the nature of communication), there 
is support for the impression management theory (Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007). 
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 Regarding the information processing, it is suggested that intentional response 
distortions rely on the comparison of the item content with an adopted schema (instead of a 
self-schema) like a schema of favourable impressions (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, 
Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992). A systematic relationship between the presence of a 
schema and response time latencies is proposed. Thus, schema-congruent responses (e.g. 
socially desirable responses by adopting a fake good schema) are given faster than schema-
incongruent responses (e.g. socially undesirable responses with regard to a fake good 
schema). But the resulting response latencies may also be influenced by item 
characteristics (item length, item ambiguity, item extremity, number of alternatives) and 
multiple person variables (reading speed, verbal ability, motor speed) (see also Holden, 
Fekken, & Cotton, 1991). Furthermore, it was shown that test-takers who were instructed 
to fake good on a personality questionnaire used job stereotypes (or schemas) however 
with negative aspects removed, as well as stereotypes about general aspects of personality 
(Mahar, Coburn, Griffin, Hemeter, Potappel, Turton, & Mulgrew, 2006; Mahar, Cologon, 
& Duck, 1995). The latter was assumed because training test-takers had no impact on the 
use of stereotypes in contrast to test-takers who were not trained.  
 
Context effects and faking 
 Models of impression management show, that faking good can be defined as a 
context effect moderated by different interacting variables. We assume that faking good 
can also be moderated by other context effects (like fatigue or learning effects). With 
respect to the current experiment where the effects of an extensive test length (containing 
different contents) on intentional response distortion is investigated, context effects 
concerning item position, as well as learning and fatigue effects are supposed to occur and 
interact with the context effect of faking behaviour.  
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 By investigating effects of different administration modes on intentional response 
distortion by instructing test-takers to fake good, it was revealed that test-takers were more 
likely to fake their answers at the beginning rather than at the end of a questionnaire 
(Seiwald, 2002). It was suggested that they might have forgotten the initial faking 
instructions over time. Another study revealed that certain questionnaire scales 
(Neuroticism and Conscientiousness) were shown to be less susceptible to socially 
desirable responses when items are randomly placed instead of grouped together 
(McFarland, Ryan, & Ellis, 2002).  
 According to the content of the measure, faking behaviour varies depending on the 
scale used (Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004), and it seems as if specific dimensions (of 
the big five) are vulnerable to intentional response distortions like Neuroticism or 
Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Moreover it was shown that 
some of these scales correlate highly with socially desirable responding (Ferrando, 2008; 
Kurzt, Tarquini, & Iobst, 2008; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 
1996; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & 
Drasgow, 2001). It was assumed that many of the items included in these dimensions are 
of socially desirable nature and therefore transparent to the test-takers. Conscientiousness 
has received the most attention in personnel selection literature and seems particularly 
susceptible to context effects (Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004; Henry & Raju, 2006), 
but it also seems to be a strong predictor of job performance (Gill & Hodgkinson, 2007). 
As Conscientiousness, like Emotional Stability (or Neuroticism), is believed to be job-
relevant (Ziegler & Bühner, 2009) it might be more important to test-takers to gain a 
beneficial score in these scales. Likewise, the dimension Order seems to be, maybe even 
more so, obviously job-related and was shown to be highly susceptible to impression 
management as well (Henry & Raju, 2006). This leads to the hypothesis that scales with 
obvious job-related content primes individuals to engage in impression management. It 
 9
was further assumed that traits or dimensions that have some positive as well as some 
negative aspects, like Extraversion (in contrast to dimensions that have almost negative 
associations, like Neuroticism), are more difficult to fake (Furnham, 1986). Faking did also 
appear to differ across facets of the Openness to Experience measure (Griffin, Hesketh, & 
Grayson, 2004), which was expected to be the least fakable measure of the Big Five 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Scales that are perceived by applicants to be important to job 
performance are more likely to be faked than scales that seem to be less related to job 
performance (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). It was shown that items with a context (e.g. 
work- or school related contents) specific wording (e.g. “at work” or “at school” tags) led 
to more positive responses than items with no context specific wording (without these 
tags); but items with context specific wording were also shown to have the highest 
criterion validity in a “behave-like-applicant” condition in contrast to a honest condition, 
than items without context specific wordings (Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powel, 1995). It 
was therefore assumed that giving applicants a frame of reference might enhance the 
validity of a measure.  
 Some studies found increased reliabilities towards the end of a questionnaire (by 
investigating volunteers) which could be interpreted as a kind of learning effect because 
test taking induces self-awareness, or the respondents gain more knowledge about the test 
construct, or both (Hartig, Hölzel, & Moosbrugger, 2007; Knowles, 1988).  
 
Aim of the current experiment 
 The aim of the current experiment is to provide a contribution to the research of 
intentional response distortion by investigating the influence of a context factor on this 
behaviour which has so far not been investigated: the item position with respect to the 
questionnaire length. Due to the question of whether different questionnaire contents or 
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dimensions are affected differently, the  questionnaire used comprises items from three 
different questionnaires with items from the big five dimensions and job related items.  
 
Hypotheses  
 According to the findings of learning effects towards the end of a questionnaire in 
non-applicant studies (Hartig, Hölzel, & Moosbrugger, 2007; Knowles, 1988) we assume 
that test-takers’ ability to adjust their responses in a questionnaire to an adopted faking 
good schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992) might 
increase towards the end of a questionnaire if learning effects occur with respect to the 
content of the questionnaire scales. But in contrast to increasing item reliabilities in non-
applicant studies, we assume that learning effects in selection situations lead to a decrease 
in scale reliabilities because the more applicants learn about the content of the 
questionnaire or get used to this kind of test, the higher the possibility that they can fit their 
responses to a certain stereotype might be (more equal or extreme responses within the 
sample towards the items). We therefore formulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a: Intentional response distortion increases towards the end of a questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 1b: Increasing response distortion towards the end of a questionnaire results in 
decreasing scale reliabilities as responses of the sample become more stereotypical (and 
therefore more equal) and less variable.  
 
 Referring to the findings of Seiwald (2002), who found that test-takers were more 
likely to fake their answers at the beginning rather than at the end of a questionnaire, we 
further assume that the adjustment of responses in questionnaires to an adopted faking 
good schema might require more concentration than referring to a self-schema. Therefore 
the ability to fake might decrease towards the end of an overlong questionnaire as fatigue 
effects might occur decreasing the required concentration or alertness. In contrast to 
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Hypothesis 1b, we assume that fatigue effects might result in increased scale reliabilities 
towards the end of a questionnaire because responses of the sample become less 
stereotypical (or equal) and more variable (as modal response categories are chosen more 
often). We therefore formulate a second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2a: Intentional response distortion decreases towards the end of an overlong 
questionnaire.  
Hypothesis 2b: Decreasing response distortion towards the end of a questionnaire results in 
increasing scale reliabilities as responses of the sample become more variable and less 
stereotypical.  
 
 Based on the fact that socially desirable responding seems to affect particular 
dimensions like Neuroticism, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & 
Levin, 1998), and the opinion that personality tests can provide substantial criterion 
validity when used in personnel selection if the measured traits are matched to the nature 
of the job (Goffin & Boyd, 2009), we formulate a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: If the assumed effects described in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 occur, 
they occur rather in a questionnaire that measures the big five dimensions than in a 
questionnaire with general job related contents.  
 
Method 
 An experiment within a selection procedure is presented to investigate the effects of 
item position on faking personality questionnaires with regard to the questionnaire length. 
The sample consists of soldiers in the Austrian Federal Armed Forces who applied for pilot 
training and went through a selection procedure. 
Sample  
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 All applicants were soldiers in the Austrian Federal Armed Forces who had applied 
for pilot training. A total of 84 applicants, 1 female and 83 male, between the age of 18 and 
23 filled out a paper-pencil questionnaire consisting of 516 items after an assessment of 
approximately 8 to 9 hours to test their cognitive abilities and personality traits. Their first 
language is German, their education levels varies from a compulsory education of 9 years 
(n = 11) and apprenticeship (n = 36) to general qualification for university entrance 
(n = 37).  
 
Preliminary stages 
 First of all, the requirements profile of the Department of Human Resources of the 
Austrian Federal Armed Forces was considered in order to ascertain the requirements the 
pilots were supposed to fulfil. The Department of Human Resources established the 
following personality traits to be of particular importance with regard to the requirements 
for pilots: achievement motivation, willingness to learn, mobility, sense of responsibility, 
decision-making ability, openness to contact, extraversion, ability to communicate ideas 
and feelings in a socially acceptable way, dominance, empathy as the ability to understand 
feelings and experiences of other people, aggression as the disposition to defend oneself 
against offences and unfairness (aggression in the sense of the absence of self-control is 
not desired), emotional stability and stress management (cognitive and behavioural ones).  
 Based on these requirements the German edition of the Personality Research Form 
(PRF; Stumpf, Angleitner, Wieck, Jackson, & Beloch-Till, 1984), a questionnaire that was 
already included in the assessment of pilots by the Department of Human Resources of the 
Austrian Federal Armed Forces, was enhanced with items from three additional personality 
questionnaires: the German edition of the Business-focused Inventory of Personality (BIP; 
Hossiep & Paschen, 2003), the German edition of the NEO Five Factor Inventory 
(NEO FFI; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), and the German edition of the NEO Personality 
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Inventory Revised (NEO PI-R; Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004). Hence, a personality 
questionnaire with 516 items was compiled for the sample of Study 1.  
 As the effects of questionnaire length or item position on faking tendencies (in the 
sense of social desirability) should be investigated, it needed to be decided, which scores 
with respect to the different questionnaire scales might be indicators of faking tendencies. 
According to the Department of Human Resources of the Austrian Federal Armed Forces 
the following scores are requested and may therefore be interpreted as indicators of faking 
good tendencies: 1) high scores of achievement motivation, willingness to learn, mobility, 
sense of responsibility, decision-making ability, openness to contact, extraversion, ability 
to communicate ideas and feelings in a socially acceptable way, empathy as the ability to 
understand feelings and experiences of other people, emotional stability, and stress 
management; 2) average scores of dominance, and aggression as the disposition to defend 
oneself against offences and unfairness; 3) low scores of aggression in the sense of the 
absence of self-control is not desired.  
 
Measures  
 According to the requirements profile items from the following personality 
questionnaires were used to put together an appropriate personality questionnaire.  
Business-focused Inventory of Personality (BIP) – German edition. The BIP 
(Hossiep & Paschen, 2003) is a work-based personality questionnaire that combines an 
assessment of work style and motivation. Fourteen scales arranged into four conceptual 
domains are measured with 210 items by responding to a rating scale with 6 categories 
(from “agree completely” to “disagree totally”): 1) “Occupational Orientation” assesses 
work specific motivation with three scales: Achievement Motivation, Power Motivation, 
Leadership Motivation; 2) “Occupational Behaviour” assesses the typical approach to work 
with three scales: Conscientiousness, Flexibility, Action Orientation; 3) “Social 
 14 
Competencies” describes the style of interacting with other people and contains five scales: 
Social Sensitivity, Openness to Contact, Sociability, Team Orientation, Assertiveness; 4) 
“Psychological Constitution” assesses how the demands made by a range of tasks at work 
impact on a person’s resilience and experience of emotional pressure, and contains three 
scales: Emotional Stability, Working under Pressure, Self-Confidence. Four additional 
scales can be generated from some of the above mentioned items: “Additional Index 
Mobility”, “Additional Index Orientation towards Leisure-Time”, “Additional Index 
Control Experience”, and “Additional Index Competitive Orientation”. The cronbachs 
alpha and split-half reliabilities of the BIP scales presented in the test-manual range from 
.72 to .91.  
NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO PI-R) – German edition. The NEO PI-R 
(Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004) is a personality questionnaire that measures the five major 
domains of personality with 240 items by responding to a rating scale with five categories 
(from “strong agreement” to “strong disagreement”, and the middle category “neutral”). 
Each domain (scale) is divided into six facets (subscales): 1) “Neuroticism” identifies 
individuals who are prone to psychological distress: Anxiety, Angry Hostility, Depression, 
Self Consciousness, Impulsiveness, Vulnerability; 2) “Extraversion” measures the quantity 
and intensity of energy directed outwards into the social world: Warmth, Gregariousness, 
Assertiveness, Activity, Excitement seeking, Positive Emotion; 3) “Openness to 
Experience” measures if someone actively seeks and appreciate experiences for their own 
sake: Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, Actions, Ideas, Values; 4) “Agreeableness” measures 
the kinds of interactions an individual prefers ranging from compassion to tough 
mindedness: Trust, Straightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance, Modesty, Tender 
mindedness; 5) “Conscientiousness” measures the degree of organization, persistence, 
control and motivation in goal directed behaviour: Competence, Order, dutifulness, 
Achievement striving, Self Discipline, Deliberation. According to the above mentioned 
 15
requirements profile only the subscales Angry Hostility (subscale of Neuroticism) and 
Compliance (subscale of Agreeableness) were chosen in addition to the NEO FFI 
described below. The cronbachs alpha reliabilities of these two subscales presented in the 
test-manual range from .69 to .79.  
NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO FFI) – German edition. The NEO FFI (Borkenau 
& Ostendorf, 1993) is a short version of the NEO PI-R that provides a brief measure of the 
five domains Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness. These five major domains of personality are measured with 60 items by 
responding to a rating scale with five categories (from “strong agreement” to “strong 
disagreement”, and the middle category “neutral”). The cronbachs alpha reliabilities of the 
NEO FFI scales presented in the test-manual range from .67 to .85.  
Personality Research Form (PRF) – German edition. The PRF (Stumpf, Angleitner, 
Wieck, Jackson, & Beloch-Till, 1984) is a personality questionnaire based on the 
personality theory of Murray (1938) that measures a set of traits important for 
psychological research as well as psychological assessment. 234 items with a dichotomous 
response format (“right” and “wrong”) measure fifteen scales: Achievement, Affiliation, 
Aggression, Dominance, Endurance, Exhibition, Harm avoidance, Impulsivity, Nurturance, 
Order, Play, Social Recognition, Succorance, Understanding. The cronbachs alpha 
reliabilities of the PRF scales presented in the test-manual range from .69 to .87.  
The final personality questionnaire for Study 1 comprises 39 scales and a total of 516 
items (210 items of the BIP, 60 items of the NEO FFI, 12 items of the NEO PI-R, and 234 
items of the PRF) presented with a rating scale with six categories. This response format 
was chosen to avoid response behaviour with a tendency to always choose the middle 
category, and to allow a more detailed self-report than for example a dichotomous response 
format does in order to avoid reactance (Karner, 2002).  
Procedure 
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 First, all applicants attended a psychological assessment by the Department of 
Human Resources of the Austrian Federal Armed Forces where their cognitive abilities and 
personality traits were tested. After an assessment of approximately 8 to 9 hours (including 
cognitive ability and achievement tests), they filled out the paper-pencil questionnaire 
consisting of a total of 516 items (of the BIP, NEO PI-R, NEO FFI, and PRF) by 
responding to a rating scale with six categories. None of the applicants received 
information about the requirements profile. The applicants were randomly assigned to the 
two experimental groups.  
 
Design 
 To test whether the questionnaire length or item position has any effects, 84 
participants completed a paper-pencil questionnaire with a total of 516 items composed of 
the items fro the BIP, NEO FFI, NEO PI-R and PRF in a unifactorial multivariate design.  
The questionnaire was divided into three parts that were combined into two different item 
orders to investigate the item positions: “Part 1 – Part 2 – Part 3” (Item Position B-N) and 
“Part 3 – Part 2 – Part 1” (Item Position N-B). Part 1 (129 items from the BIP – in the 
following labelled as “BIP1”) and Part 3 (60 items from the NEO PI-R, and 12 items of the 
NEO FFI) were varied to change the item position, and included 18 scales that were the 
most important ones with regard to the requirements profile. Part 2 (81 items from the BIP 
– in the following labelled as “BIP2” – and 234 items from the PRF) included the 
remaining 21 scales and was to be the constant middle part that was not varied. The item 
order within each of the three parts was not varied but held constant. Thereby, the original 
item order of the BIP, PRF, and NEO FFI was kept, while the items of the two NEO PI-R 
subscales were interspersed between the NEO FFI items with constant distance. The 
participants were randomly assigned to the two experimental groups: one group completed 
the questionnaire with the item position “B-N”, and one group completed the questionnaire 
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with the item position “N-B”. The experimental design (the distribution of the scales and 
items to the three parts) is given in Figure 1.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Results 
To investigate Hypotheses 1a and Hypothesis 2a a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted to compare means of the two experimental groups in regard to 
the main factor Item Position. To calculate the sample sizes needed to fulfil the a-priori 
given precision requirements (type-I, type-II-risk, and a relevant effect size) we used the 
program CADEMO (http://www.biomath.de). As a matter of fact we had to calculate the 
sample sizes according to ANOVA. With α = .05 and β = .20 an ANOVA is able to detect 
a mean difference of δ ≥ 2/3 σ (the standard deviation of each scale) by testing 37x2 = 74 
subjects. With 42x2 = 84 we had achieved/obtained/realised adequate sample sizes. 
Additional to a MANOVA we calculated the cronbachs alpha reliabilities of all scales of 
the BIP, NEO FFI, and NEO PI-R for each experimental group to investigate 
Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Results of the MANOVA 
 The means and standard deviations of all subtests in each experimental condition are 
given in Table 1. Box’s M-Test for testing the homogeneity of the variance-covariance 
matrix was significant (p = .048). To find out if this significance is due to particular 
dependent variables (questionnaire scales) because of heterogeneous variances, the 
Levene’s test was calculated for each scale. One scale of the BIP1 (Achievement 
Motivation) was disclosed to be significant in the Levene’s test (p = .033) and was 
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therefore excluded. Because the Box’s M-Test on the remaining scales was still significant 
(p = .018), we compared Pearson correlation coefficients of all dependent variables in 
order to detect any differences in scale covariances between the experimental groups. The 
greatest differences between the two experimental groups were shown by the correlation of 
the BIP scale Emotional Stability with the BIP scale Conscientiousness with correlation 
coefficients .310 and -.139, and by the correlation of the BIP scale Emotional Stability 
with the BIP scale Openness to Contact with correlation coefficients .604 and .093. After 
deleting the scale Emotional Stability Box’s M-Test was still significant (p = .010). Then, 
the NEO PI-R scale Angry Hostility was deleted next as it showed the next greatest 
difference between the two experimental groups by correlating with the BIP scale Working 
under Pressure with correlation coefficients -.789 and -.370. After deleting this scale Box’s 
M-Test proved to be non significant (p = .079). That is, the resulting F-values of the 
multivariate analysis of variance can be fairly interpreted.  
The MANOVA showed a significant effect of Item Position (p = .014; F = 2.218; 
Hypothesis df = 15; Error df = 68; η2 = .329). The separate invariate analyses of the each 
single scale showed that only one scale of the NEO FFI (Conscientiousness) revealed 
significantly different means between the two experimental groups (p = .031, F = 4.838, 
η2 = .056). See in Table 1 the respective means. In order to further investigate the factor 
Item Position on the BIP scale Achievement Motivation and the NEO PI-R scale Angry 
Hostility, which had to be deleted from the MANOVA, two-sample t-tests for unequal 
variances (Welch tests) were applied: no significant effect occurred (p = .489, p = .709) 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Cronbachs alpha reliability estimates 
 The cronbachs alpha reliabilities for all experimental groups are given in Table 2. 
The reliabilities of almost all questionnaire scales show a common trend: scales of the BIP, 
NEO FFI, and NEO PI-R which were applied towards the end of the questionnaire showed 
higher reliabilities than when they were applied at the beginning of the questionnaire. 
Except for the NEO FFI scale Agreeableness and the NEO PI-R scale Angry Hostility, 
whose reliabilities tended to be higher at the beginning than at the end of the questionnaire.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Interpretation 
The results of MANOVA provide evidence so that Hypothesis 2a is accepted, but 
Hypothesis 1a is rejected. Item position (questionnaire length) affected subjects’ responses 
according to one scale of the NEO FFI. If items of the NEO FFI were presented later in the 
questionnaire, subjects described a significantly lower conscientiousness than subjects who 
answered the same items at the beginning of the questionnaire (cf. Table 1). If the 
cronbach alpha reliability estimates are considered then the common trend that scale 
reliabilities tended to be higher at the end than at the beginning of the questionnaire 
supports Hypothesis 2b, excluding the NEO FFI scale Agreeableness and the NEO PI-R 
scale Angry Hostility, whose reliabilities tended to be higher at the beginning than at the 
end of the questionnaire, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1b. Overall, the results show that a 
fatigue effect might have occurred, decreasing the concentration or alertness, thereby also 
decreasing the applicants’ ability to adjust their responses in questionnaires to an adopted 
faking good schema.  
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Discussion 
 An experiment with a multivariate two-way design was conducted in order to 
investigate the influence of item position with regard to a questionnaire’s length on 
intentional response distortion. A questionnaire with 516 items was administered to 
applicants who had applied for pilot training in the Austrian Federal Armed Forces. The 
questionnaire was composed of items from the BIP, PRF, NEO FFI, as well as NEO PI-R, 
and was administered beginning either with items from the BIP and ending with items 
from the NEO FFI and NEO PI-R, or with the reversed item order (the items of the PRF 
were always positioned in the middle with regard to both item orders). The significant 
main effect of MANOVA provides evidence for Hypothesis 2a, but Hypothesis 1a is 
rejected. Item position (questionnaire length) affected subjects’ responses to the scale 
Conscientiousness in the NEO FFI. Subjects describe a significantly lower 
conscientiousness at the end of an overlong questionnaire than subjects who receive the 
same items at the beginning of a questionnaire. The findings resemble those of Seiwald 
(2002) who found that test-takers were more likely to fake their answers at the beginning 
rather than at the end of a questionnaire. One possible explanation for this finding might be 
a decreased alertness or concentration towards the end of the questionnaire as a result of 
fatigue effects, making it more difficult for test-takers to compare the item contents with a 
faking schema.  
 As the effects occurred only with respect to the NEO FFI scale Conscientiousness, 
while none of the BIP scales was affected by the item position, evidence for Hypothesis 3 
is provided. The big five dimensions seem to be more vulnerable to intentional response 
distortions than general job related dimensions. With that said, the findings are in line with 
the common literature that revealed that faking affects particular dimensions like 
Neuroticism, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). 
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 Of course, the fact that only the dimension Conscientiousness was affected and not 
any other big five dimension might also lead to the conclusion that the findings are only 
coincidental. But, we assume that the items of the dimension Conscientiousness might be 
even more transparent with regard to the measured content than items from other big five 
dimensions, making it more easy to choose socially desirable responses at the beginning of 
a questionnaire when concentration and alertness are still given. Additionally, the 
applicants had no information about the requirements profile and therefore no information 
as to what was desirable with regard to the job/training they had applied for. As test-takers 
who have knowledge about desirable behaviours with respect to the aspired job would be 
better able to fake their responses (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; 
Snell, Sydell, and Lueke, 1999), it might have been more difficult for the applicants in the 
current experiment to figure out how to respond in a desirable way with respect to other 
scales except the scale Conscientiousness. Because the scale Conscientiousness might have 
been more susceptible to intentional response distortion at the beginning of the 
questionnaire for the mentioned reasons, we assume that this scale was therefore also more 
prone to the fatigue effect at the end of the questionnaire, resulting in significant mean 
differences.  
Though, only the scale Conscientiousness revealed significant mean differences, the 
cronbach alpha reliability estimates for almost all questionnaire scales except two, provide 
support for Hypothesis 2b which partially supports Hypothesis 2a. As scale reliabilities 
tend to be higher at the end rather than at the beginning of the questionnaire it can be 
assumed that socially desirable response distortion decreases towards the end of the 
questionnaire as a result of decreased concentration or alertness (fatigue effect).  
The fact that the NEO FFI scale Agreeableness and the NEO PI-R scale Angry 
Hostility showed higher reliabilities at the beginning rather than at the end of the 
questionnaire could be interpreted as learning effects on the one hand, thereby showing 
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that it might have been easier for applicants to fit their responses to a faking good schema 
(Hypothesis 1b). However, on the other hand, these findings could be interpreted as a kind 
of frustration effect due to the overlong questionnaire which was applied additionally after 
an 8-9 hour long assessment (of course with breaks in between). When the means of the 
two experimental groups are compared it is evident that the mean of the scale 
Agreeableness was lower and the mean of the scale Angry Hostility was higher when these 
scales were applied at the end of the questionnaire than when they were applied at the 
beginning. This would tend to support the hypothesis that some kind of frustration 
occurred at the end of the questionnaire, rather as an expression of the actual emotional 
state than as an expression of faking tendencies.  
 
Limitations and implications for further research 
One limitation of the current study is that all participants were men, who had all 
applied for the same (pilot) training and who all came from the same institution (Austrian 
Federal Armed Forces). This makes the sample a very special one, and the findings might 
not apply to other groups, such as women, or other occupational groups. Future research 
should investigate if the same effects can be found in other samples. As faking is assumed 
to be a variable of individual differences (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; 
Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), we cannot maintain that all applicants distorted their 
responses to the same extend. Furthermore, it has to be considered that the applicants 
received no information about the requirements profile which might have decreased their 
ability to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; Snell, Sydell, and 
Lueke, 1999). Our hypothesis of fatigue effects decreasing the ability to fake by making it 
more difficult to fit responses to a faking schema should be ascertained in further research 
by measuring response latencies per item with a computer based questionnaire. In this way, 
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it could be investigated whether schema congruent responses are given faster at the 
beginning of a questionnaire rather than at the end.  
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Table 1:  
Means and standard deviations for all dependent variables (scales) in the experimental 
condition Item Position (2 experimental groups) 
 
 
Dependent Variable (Scale) 
Item Position B-N 
(BIP1 – NEO)
(n=42)
 Item Position N-B
(NEO – BIP1)
(n=42)
 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Achievement Motivation – BIP1 64.857 6.606 63.679 8.775
Conscientiousness – BIP1 63.869 8.651 64.286 10.163
Action Orientation – BIP1 65.881 8.502 62.845 9.092
Social Sensitivity – BIP1 53.441 6.612 52.381 8.048
Sociability – BIP1 59.524 8.170 59.714 9.105
Openness to Contact – BIP1 73.071 8.744 68.988 11.354
Assertiveness – BIP1 51.321 6.030 50.357 7.133
Emotional Stability – BIP1 68.452 8.577 66.798 9.479
Working under Pressure – BIP1 64.821 7.465 61.500 9.719
Additional Index Mobility – BIP1 10.000 2.024 9.595 2.480
Additional Index Orientation 
towards Leisure-Time – BIP1 
31.762 4.160 29.786 5.215
Neuroticism – NEO FFI 25.214 7.063 26.131 7.900
Extraversion – NEO FFI 55.131 6.990 55.369 6.402
Openness to Experience – NEO FFI 46.024 7.706 46.952 7.520
Agreeableness – NEO FFI 52.333 6.506 53.655 6.879
Conscientiousness – NEO FFI 61.738 6.420 64.619 5.552
Angry Hostility – NEO PI-R 20.060 4.575 19.643 5.578
Compliance – NEO PI-R 28.941 5.342 30.583 4.748
 31
Table 2: 
Cronbachs alpha reliability of the scales from the BIP, NEO FFI, and NEO PI-R for each 
experimental group  
 
 
Dependent Variable (Scale) 
Item Position B-N 
(BIP1 – NEO)
Item Position N-B
(NEO – BIP1)
Achievement Motivation – BIP1 .638 .802
Conscientiousness – BIP1 .776 .879
Action Orientation – BIP1 .823 .853
Social Sensitivity – BIP1 .677 .837
Sociability – BIP1 .667 .774
Openness to Contact – BIP1 .736 .877
Assertiveness – BIP1 .629 .740
Emotional Stability – BIP1 .667 .793
Working under Pressure – BIP1 
Additional Index Mobility – BIP1 .687 .910
Additional Index Orientation towards 
Leisure-Time – BIP1 
.443 .633
 Item Position N-B
(NEO – BIP1)
Item Position B-N
(BIP1 – NEO)
Neuroticism – NEO FFI .768 .799
Extraversion – NEO FFI .649 .795
Openness to Experience – NEO FFI .653 .719
Agreeableness – NEO FFI .726 .711
Conscientiousness – NEO FFI .793 .849
Angry Hostility – NEO PI-R .645 .510
Compliance – NEO PI-R .415 .625
 32 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Design 
 
Item Position B-N 
 
Experimental Group 1 
BIP1 (Part 1) 
129 items (item positions 1-129) 
Scales: Achievement Motivation, 
Conscientiousness, Action Orientation, 
Social Sensitivity, Sociability, Openness 
to Contact, Assertiveness, Emotional 
Stability, Working under Pressure, 
Additional Index Mobility, Additional 
Index Orientation towards Leisure-Time 
BIP2 (Part 2a) 
81 items (item positions 130-210) 
Scales: Power Motivation, Leadership 
Motivation, Flexibility, Team Orientation, 
Self-Confidence, Additional Index Control 
Experience, Additional Index Competitive 
Orientation 
PRF (Part 2b) 
234 items (item positions 211-444) 
Scales: Achievement, Affiliation, 
Aggression, Dominance, Endurance, 
Exhibition, Harmavoidance, Impulsivity, 
Nurturance, Order, Play, Social 
Recognition, Succorance, 
Understanding, Infrequency 
NEO FFI and NEO PI-R (Part 3) 
72 items (item positions 445-516) 
Scales NEO FFI: Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness 
Scales NEO PI-R: Angry Hostility, 
Compliance 
Item Position N-B 
 
Experimental Group 2 
NEO FFI and NEO PI-R (Part 3) 
72 items (item positions 1-72) 
Scales NEO FFI: Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness 
Scales NEO PI-R: Angry Hostility, 
Compliance 
BIP2 (Part 2a)
81 items (item positions 153) 
Scales: Power Motivation, Leadership 
Motivation, Flexibility, Team Orientation, 
Self-Confidence, Additional Index Control 
Experience, Additional Index Competitive 
Orientation 
PRF (Part 2b)
234 items (item positions 154-387) 
Scales: Achievement, Affiliation, 
Aggression, Dominance, Endurance, 
Exhibition, Harmavoidance, Impulsivity, 
Nurturance, Order, Play, Social 
Recognition, Succorance, 
Understanding, Infrequency 
BIP1 (Part 1)
129 items (item positions 388-516) 
Scales: Achievement Motivation, 
Conscientiousness, Action Orientation, 
Social Sensitivity, Sociability, Openness 
to Contact, Assertiveness, Emotional 
Stability, Working under Pressure, 
Additional Index Mobility, Additional 
Index Orientation towards Leisure-Time 
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Abstract 
The effects of varied test order on test performance within a computer test battery 
were investigated. An experiment was performed to determine whether completing objec-
tive personality tests sensu R. B. Cattell affects test performance in subsequent cognitive 
ability tests and vice versa. The sample consisted of managers of an industrial corporation 
(an automotive supplier) in “higher management positions” (business managers, depart-
ment chiefs, and team leaders) who attended an investigation of their professional poten-
tial which resembles a real selection situation. It was hypothesized that carry-over and 
priming effects, as well as fatigue and learning effects might occur. Results of a 
MANOVA showed a main effect of test order on objective personality tests, since “frus-
tration tolerance” decreased and “decisiveness” increased when objective personality tests 
were presented subsequent to cognitive ability tests, while cognitive ability tests were not 
affected by prior objective personality tests.  
 
Key words: context effects, test order, frustration tolerance, objective person-
ality tests, cognitive ability tests, selection, assessment 
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Introduction 
Context effects, especially concerning item order or item positions, are mainly in-
vestigated and reported in research involving interviews and questionnaires (Hartig, Höl-
zel, & Moosbrugger, 2007; Knowles, 1988; Knowles et al., 1992; Rost, & Hoberg, 1996). 
Fewer studies are addressed to task order of cognitive ability and achievement tests 
(Leary, & Dorans, 1985; Perlini, Lind, & Zumbo, 1998), and only a handful of studies 
deal with test order within test batteries (Baldinger, 2006; Földényi, Tagwerker-
Neuenschwander, Giovanoli, Schallberger, & Steinhausen, 1999; Eiselt, 1991). Models of 
information processing are sometimes used to explain order effects. Such effects occur as 
different orders may influence a four-stage process (interpretation, retrieval of informa-
tion, rendering a judgement, selection of a response) underlying response behaviour 
(Tourangeau, & Rasinski, 1988). This influence may not be limited to item order but may 
also extend to test order. In the following, order effects in personality questionnaires, as 
well as cognitive ability tests are presented to help determine what kinds of context effects 
due to test order might occur within a test battery. Furthermore, relevant studies focusing 
on test order are presented. But first, a short overview of different context effects is pro-
vided. 
 
Context effects 
An overview of different context effects is given by Smith (1992). In our opinion, 
mainly carry-over effects, priming effects, fatigue effects, and learning effects are the fo-
cus of interest in regard to different test orders, as they involve the transfer of prior con-
tent, meaning, or behaviour and influence subsequent reactions. While carry-over effects, 
priming effects, and learning effects are related to the contents of prior items or a prior 
experimental condition, position effects like fatigue effects or the increase of openness 
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during an interview (or the decrease of anxiety during a test situation) are not. Schwarz 
and Wyer (1983) assume that anchoring effects occur because responses are not always 
determined by mapping subjective beliefs directly on a response scale but by evaluating 
stimuli in relation to one another. This could be broadened to carry-over effects and prim-
ing effects as well. The occurrence of priming effects seems to be enhanced by subjects’ 
exposure to the priming objects through a direct, behavioural experience (direct priming), 
in contrast to indirect priming that does not include behavioural experience (Fazio, Pow-
ell, & Herr, 1983). Furthermore, different kinds of priming induced by different kinds of 
tasks may enhance different problem-solving strategies in subsequent tasks. La Rue and 
Olejnik (1980) showed that formal operational priming through previously presented ver-
bal seriation tasks enhanced formal operational strategies, thereby facilitating moral rea-
soning. In contrast, working on previously presented addition and subtraction tasks (con-
crete operational priming) led to lower scores in moral reasoning. Such effects due to the 
content of prior tasks might be expected in test batteries due to the content of tests as well.  
 
Context effects in personality and cognitive ability measures 
Although there are a lot of differences between personality and cognitive ability 
measures - for example the aim of the measure (attitudes versus abilities) or the used tech-
niques (questioning versus testing) – the same types of context effects seem to occur: 
foremost learning or fatigue effects. While learning effects in personality questionnaires 
are revealed by increasing item reliabilities towards the end of a questionnaire (Knowles, 
1988), learning effects in cognitive ability tests tend to result in higher test scores or lower 
item difficulties towards the end of a test (Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Moriarty Ger-
rard, 2007; Kubinger, 2009a). Fatigue effects due to later item positions in personality 
questionnaires result in more blanks towards the end of the questionnaire (Kraut, Wolfson, 
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& Rothenberg, 1975) while they lead to slowed down reactions or increased errors in cog-
nitive ability tests (Földényi, Tagwerker-Neuenschwander, Giovanoli, Schallberger, & 
Steinhausen, 1999); both response behaviours result in lower scores. A comparison of 
studies investigating effects of different item orders within personality questionnaires 
(mainly randomized item sequences versus homogeneous item blocks) shows that those 
studies which found effects often used questionnaires or scales that were not mainly fo-
cussed on job or achievement related contents, such as locus-of-control scales, anxiety in-
ventories, scales that measure extraversion, neuroticism and masculinity or symptom 
checklists (Franke, 1997; Knowles, 1988; Knowles, & Byers, 1996; Steinberg, 1994; 
Ortner, 2008). In contrast, questionnaires that measure academic self concept of achieve-
ment and ability (Rost, & Hoberg, 1996; Sparfeldt, Schilling, Rost, & Thiel, 2006), or job-
related contents (Baehr, 1953; Schriesheim, 1981; Schriesheim, Kopelman, & Solomon, 
1989) show weaker effects due to item order or no effect at all. 
 
Effects of test order 
The most interesting studies with respect to the current experiments are, of course, 
studies that focus on varied test sequences. Comparing a randomized with a blocked 
(items of the same scale are stringed together and presented in blocks) item order within a 
Rasch model fitting Big Five personality questionnaire and within an achievement motiva-
tion questionnaire revealed no effects, nor did the test order show any effects by varying 
these two questionnaires (Eisenhauer, 2008). Varying the sequence of cognitive ability 
tests (attention tests) and personality questionnaires no effects of personality question-
naires on cognitive ability tests were found when administered first, but two questionnaire 
scales (spontaneous aggressiveness, emotional lability) showed higher means when cogni-
tive ability tests were administered before the questionnaires (Hambros, 2002). Arranging 
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personality questionnaires after objective personality tests (experiment-based assessments 
of behaviour) did not affect the questionnaire scales, but the test score “decisiveness” of 
the objective personality test Work Styles (“Arbeitshaltungen”; Kubinger, & Ebenhöh, 
1996; adapted 2007) was significantly higher when administered after a personality ques-
tionnaire that measured job-related attitudes (Baldinger, 2006). The investigation of dif-
ferent orders of cognitive ability tests within a computer based test battery revealed the 
same response behaviour in each of the different test orders: increased working speed as 
well as a decreased number of right answers towards the end of the test battery (Eiselt, 
1991). These findings were ascribed more to self-reported motivation than to self-reported 
subjective fatigue, similar to findings of Ackerman and Kanfer (2009). Both fatigue and 
learning effects due to later positions in the test sequence were found by varying the order 
of subtests of an attention test battery (Földényi, Tagwerker-Neuenschwander, Giovanoli, 
Schallberger, & Steinhausen, 1999), thereby showing inconsistent results as a position 
later in the test sequence led to fatigue effects in some subtests but learning effects in 
other subtests. Tests that measure attention or memory seem to be particular vulnerable to 
fatigue effects, as they were also found in two subtests that measured memory and two 
subtests that involved attention by varying the sequence of a memory scale and an intelli-
gence test battery (Zhu & Tulsky, 2000). But these effects were only found in analysis of 
the single subtest; they caused no main effects and the effect sizes were rather small. 
Learning effects were also found by varying two test parts of a test measuring field de-
pendence-independence with figural item material (Kelleher, McRae, & Young, 1990); 
but the effects occurred only, when the test began with the more difficult part. Test order 
effects were found due to a randomized test sequence of tests that measured conceptual 
and procedural knowledge about decimal fractions which were interpreted as a lack of va-
lidity of these tests (Schneider & Stern, 2010). 
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Aim of the current experiment 
 Because of different reasons, such as organisational reasons (for example not all test 
are available on all computers), to avoid cheating, or to avoid a decrease of motivation if 
some test-takers realise that others are performing faster, the use of different test orders 
within test batteries is a common practice. But this practice is not well explored or proven 
to be without consequences for the test results, and there are barely studies that have in-
vestigated effects of test order regarding objective personality tests. Therefore, this paper 
presents an experiment with varied test orders with respect to so-called objective personal-
ity tests. Most previous studies were conducted with volunteers. Since it is of interest and 
of practical relevance to see how a subject’s performance in actual selection situations is 
affected by test order, the sample of the current experiment consists of subjects within pro-
fessional selection situations. It can be assumed that their motivation is consistent, as their 
goal was to perform well and thus to give their best.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Sample 
 The sample consists of 66 managers of an Austrian industrial corporation (an auto-
motive supplier) in “higher management positions” (business managers, department 
chiefs, and team leaders), who attended an investigation of their professional potential 
(job-related cognitive ability and personality dimensions) to find out if they are suited for 
their position, if they should be given a position without managerial responsibility, or if 
they have the potential to obtain a higher position within the corporation. In this respect, 
the testing situation resembles a personnel selection situation as degradation to a position 
without managerial responsibility was within the bounds of possibility. Only four of the 
participants were female; the age of the participants varied from 26 to 54 years.  
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Measures 
 To identify the requirements the managers had to meet, a requirement analysis was 
conducted. According to the resulting requirements profile which comprised particular 
cognitive abilities, aspects of personality, and management styles, a test battery using the 
following tests was arranged.  
 
Cognitive ability tests  
Adaptive Matrices Test (AMT) – German edition (Hornke, Etzel, & Rettig, 2007). 
The AMT is a reasoning test consisting of items that fit the Rasch model and which are 
presented in an adaptive mode.  
Intelligence Structure Test (IST 2000 R) – German edition (Liepmann, Beauducel, 
Brocke & Amthauer, 2007). The IST 2000 R is an intelligence test battery consisting of 11 
subtests that measure verbal (3 subtests), numerical (3 subtests), and figural intelligence (3 
subtests), as well as memory (2 subtests). For the current experiment, only the subtests 
measuring verbal intelligence and numerical intelligence were selected.  
 
Objective Personality Tests 
 Objective personality tests sensu R. B. Cattell (e.g. 1958) are experiment-based as-
sessments of behaviour which assess a personality construct by observing the subject’s 
behaviour when working on a performance or ability task, while the observation and regis-
tration of the behaviour is done via computer (Kubinger, 2009b). They could be described 
as individual computerised assessments, which oftentimes include computer simulations 
of job-related tasks. According to selection settings, objective personality tests have the 
advantage of being less fakable than personality questionnaires (Baldinger, 2006; Kubin-
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ger, 2009b), which, in contrast, are vulnerable to faking tendencies that particularly occur 
in real selection processes. 
 Work Styles – German edition (Kubinger & Ebenhöh, 2007). The test-battery con-
sists of three subtests. Subtest 1 (“comparing area sizes”) measures decisiveness, exacti-
tude, and reflexivity, Subtest 2 (“coding symbols”) measures proficiency level, aspiration 
level, target discrepancy, and frustration tolerance, and Subtest 3 (“distinguishing fig-
ures”) measures achievement motivation. 
 Resilience-Assessment: computer based Objective Personality Test Battery 
(BAcO-D) – German edition (Ortner, Kubinger, Schrott, Radinger, & Litzenberger, 2006). 
BAcO-D is a test battery that measures different kinds of job-related resilience, and con-
sists of six subtests. For the current experiment two of the six subtests were selected: the 
subtest “task collision” which measures one’s resilience given multiple simultaneous 
tasks, and the subtest “crisscrossed plans” which measures one’s resilience given thwarted 
plans.  
 ILICA – a simulation test to assess decisive behaviour – German edition 
(Möseneder & Ebenhöh, 1996). ILICA is a computer simulation test in German which 
measures self-management abilities. A leisure day is simulated for 30 minutes where ar-
rangements for a nearing holiday have to be made.  
 
Hypotheses 
 As certain context effects in questionnaires occur relating to the contents of prior 
questions, prior responses, or both (Smith, 1992), we hypothesize that similar context ef-
fects occur in test batteries due to test sequences. According to the findings of Fazio, Pow-
ell and Herr (1983) as well as La Rue and Olejnik (1980), we assume that the direct ex-
perience with different kinds of tests within a test battery might influence subjects’ per-
                         The effects of test order on test performance  
 
 10 
formance in subsequent tests. If a subject works, for example, on computer simulations 
(objective personality tests) that provoke different kinds of stress or frustration to measure 
resilience, this might have an influence on his/her performance in subsequent cognitive 
ability tests, or vice versa. Thus, we expect that test performance varies depending on dif-
ferent test orders. We therefore formulate the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The prior work on objective personality tests influences the subsequent per-
formance in cognitive ability tests. 
Hypothesis 2: The prior work on cognitive ability tests influences the subsequent perform-
ance in objective personality tests. 
 
Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental groups where the sequence 
of cognitive ability tests and objective personality tests was varied within a computer 
based test battery (see Figure 1). Experimental Group 1 completed objective personality 
tests first and cognitive ability tests subsequently (Test Order O), Experimental Group 2 
completed cognitive ability tests prior to the objective personality tests (Test Order C). 
The cognitive ability tests were presented in a fixed order (AMT – IST 2000 R) as well as 
the objective personality tests (Work Styles – BAcO – ILICA). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Results 
To investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted to compare means in test scores between the two experimental groups in 
regard to the main factor test order. With α = .05 and β = .20, a MANOVA is able to de-
tect a mean difference of δ ≥ 3/4 σ (the standard deviation of the test scores) by testing 
29x2 = 58 subjects. With 33x2 = 66 subjects, our sample size was designed adequately.  
 
Results of the MANOVA 
 The means and standard deviations of all subtests in each experimental condition are 
given in Table 1.  The two scores “target discrepancy” (Work Styles), and “target orienta-
tion” (ILICA) were deleted from the MANOVA successively as they caused inhomoge-
neities in the variance-covariance matrix and hence significant Box’s M-Tests (p = .044; 
p = .035). Afterwards, the Box’s M-Test proved to be not significant (p = .063). That is, 
the resulting F-values of the MANOVA can fairly be interpreted. The MANOVA showed 
a significant effect of test order (p = .045; F = 1.842; η2 = .450). Considering the inde-
pendently analysed test scores only two of them, “decisiveness” and “frustration toler-
ance”, reveal significantly different means between the two experimental groups (p = .00 
and p = .041). See the respective means in Table 1. In order to additionally investigate the 
factor test order on the scores “target discrepancy” and “target orientation”, which were 
deleted from the MANOVA, two-sample t-tests for unequal variances (Welch tests) were 
applied: no significant effect occurred (p = .480, p = .715). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Interpretation 
According to MANOVA the results provide evidence so that Hypothesis 2 is to be 
accepted, but this is not true for Hypothesis 1. While test order had no effect on subjects’ 
test scores in cognitive ability tests, test order influenced subjects’ test scores in the objec-
tive personality test Work Styles. Subjects who worked on the Work Styles subsequently to 
two cognitive ability tests (AMT and IST 2000 R, which last approximately 2.5 hours af-
ter the very beginning of test administration) showed a significantly higher decisiveness 
insofar as they responded more quickly to the stimuli and they developed a significantly 
lower frustration tolerance as their willingness to perform decreased after a false negative 
feedback (cf. Table 1).  
 
Discussion 
 The significant main effect of the factor test order in the MANOVA provides evi-
dence in favour of Hypothesis 2 and against Hypothesis 1. Subjects who worked on ability 
tests first and on objective personality tests second showed higher decisiveness and lower 
frustration tolerance in the objective personality tests than subjects who worked on objec-
tive personality tests first. These effects resemble those of Baldinger (2006), who showed 
a similar effect of test order on the score “decisiveness” when the Work Styles were ad-
ministered after personality questionnaires. Therefore, it seems that the test score “deci-
siveness” might be sensitive to test order effects irrespective of whether the Work Styles 
are administered after cognitive ability tests or personality questionnaires. Thus, this effect 
cannot be ascribed to the previously presented cognitive ability tests in particular. The in-
creased decisiveness might possibly show a fatigue effect in the sense that subjects might 
have been tired due to the previous tests and therefore might have wanted to finish the 
testing more quickly, especially in regard to subtests that presented very simple tasks like 
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comparing area sizes or coding symbols in the Work Styles. However, test order did not 
affect challenging tasks, which are to be found in the other tests. It seems as if subjects 
tended to work faster depending on the test length, a phenomenon obvious from the score 
“decisiveness”. A similar effect is described by Eiselt (1991), who found significant ef-
fects of test order on working time and test scores as working speed increased with pro-
gressing time while the number of correct answers decreased. In the current study, no dif-
ferences in subjects’ performance in the cognitive ability tests were revealed. Even if deci-
siveness increased, test order seems to have had no influence on the ability test scores 
(AMT, IST 2000 R).  
 Comparing our findings of the influence of test order on frustration tolerance to 
those of Hambros (2002), it seems very interesting that particularly contents potentially 
related to resilience show themselves to be vulnerable to order effects. The comparison of 
studies dealing with item order in personality questionnaires shows a similar picture, as 
the majority of order effects seem to be found foremost in questionnaires not mainly fo-
cussed on job- or achievement-related contents (cf. Knowles, 1988; Steinberg, 1994). 
Hence, one approach to explain our findings could be that test scores of personality ques-
tionnaires as well as test scores of objective personality tests assessing resilience seem to 
be more easily affected by test order than other test scores. 
 A second explanation for the lower frustration tolerance after working on cognitive 
ability tests might be the kind of frustration tolerance measured in the Work Styles. Frus-
tration is provoked through a social comparison in the form of faked feedback (within a 
simple symbol coding task) that others have achieved higher scores. After receiving this 
feedback, subjects are asked to predict their achievements in the next level. Those subjects 
who reduce their achievement prediction after receiving the faked feedback are classified 
as showing a lower frustration tolerance. As all subjects are characterised by higher job 
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positions (“higher management”), as well as higher levels of education, we suggest that 
success and high achievements might have been important for them, and that frustration 
provoked through social comparisons in combination with the previously administered 
cognitive ability tests (Experimental Group 2) might have enhanced the frustration effect 
of the Work Styles. This hypothesis must, of course, be proved by further research.  
 In summary, it seems that cognitive ability test scores are less vulnerable to test or-
der than objective personality test scores, or that the observed effects of test order occur 
only in tests or subtests with very simple tasks while more complex tasks are not affected. 
This effect is somewhat similar to the findings of Hambros (2002), who reported that pre-
viously presented cognitive ability tests had an influence on subsequent personality ques-
tionnaires while there was no reverse effect.  
 
Limitations and implications for future research 
The current study has a limitation that future research should address. The sample is 
very special as most participants were men (only four of the participants were female), and 
the participants were all managers in “higher management positions” of a particular indus-
trial corporation (an automotive supplier). Therefore, the findings might not apply to other 
groups, such as women, other occupational groups, or other positions within similar pro-
fessions. Although different test orders affected some of the tests scores, most test scores 
were not affected. Nevertheless, the revealed effects seem to be more complex and should 
be further explored. A comprehension of the possible interactions between sample, task 
type, content of the measurement, and the modality of specific simulations might reveal 
explanations for context effects in other measurements. It might also be interesting to find 
out more about what kind of simulations or tasks are vulnerable to context effects, espe-
cially in regard to the measurement of resilience. The current paper revealed that some 
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kinds of tasks measuring resilience were affected by varied test order (Work Styles) while 
others were not (BAcO-D). The reasons might be the above mentioned type of frustration 
provoked through social comparison, or the difficulty or complexity of tasks. Further re-
search should take this into consideration more precisely.  
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Table 1: 
Means and standard deviations for all subtests in each experimental condition (2 experi-
mental groups) with regard to the factor “test order” 
 
Dependent variable (test score) Test order O  Test order C 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
 
reasoning – AMT .445 .787 .447 .899 
verbal intelligence – IST 2000 R .155 .898 .277 .975 
numerical intelligence – IST 2000 R .536 1.000 .549 .957 
reflexivity – Work Styles .486 .923 .114 1.130 
exactitude – Work Styles .428 1.148 .594 .946 
decisiveness – Work Styles -.558 .651 .209 .776 
proficiency level – Work Styles .110 .673 .251 .534 
aspiration level – Work Styles -.014 .723 .052 .857 
frustration tolerance – Work Styles .595 .854 .205 .651 
target discrepancy – Work Styles -.4269 .74599 -.3105 1.27918 
main task – BAcO-D task collision  -.563 1.370 -.547 1.274 
efficiency of subsidiary task – 
BAcO-D task collision  
-.184 .936 -.227 .800 
quantity of subsidiary task – BAcO-
D task collision  
-.013 1.174 -.003 1.058 
perseverance – BAcO-D task colli-
sion  
-.521 1.109 -.824 1.159 
balance – BAcO-D task collision  -.019 1.703 -.056 1.626 
quantity – BAcO-D crisscrossed 
plans 
2.359 2.264 2.624 2.145 
speed – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans -.596 .772 -.472 .676 
abidance – BAcO-D crisscrossed 
plans 
.931 .420 .936 .507 
stray – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans .460 .995 .114 .847 
flexibility – ILICA -.289 .855 .452 .793 
target orientation – ILICA .871 1.013 .834 .789 
distractibility – ILICA -.022 1.000 .068 .778 
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Figure 1: Experimental design  
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6.1. Appendix 1 
 
 
 
1) Table 4, Paper 1 (Khorramdel & Kubinger, 2006): complete version 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for all scales by experimental condition  
(8 experimental groups) 
 
 
2) Table 1, Additional Study 
Means and standard deviations for all scales in each experimental condition  
(8 experimental groups) with regard to the factors Response Format, Response Time,  
and Instruction 
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Table 4 (Paper 1): 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for all scales by experimental condition  
(8 experimental groups) 
 
  No Warning  Warning 
    
 Dichotomous  Analogue  Dichotomous  Analogue 
        
Scale 
No 
Lim. Lim.  
No 
Lim. Lim.  
No 
Lim. Lim.   
No 
Lim. Lim. 
16.77 14.86 13.15 16.30 15.41 15.43  15.66 14.68extroversion 
(5.84) (6.03) (4.40) (5.24) (4.55) (7.26)  (5.15) (6.58)
7.82 9.67 11.55 8.55 9.29 9.43  8.88 9.68introversion 
(5.71) (5.65) (4.15) (4.89) (4.36) (6.79)  (4.97) (6.57)
10.05 10.05 12.50 11.40 11.65 9.95  10.88 10.68sensing 
(3.51) (4.82) (4.03) (3.17) (4.25) (4.91)  (4.08) (5.94)
7.14 7.57 6.50 6.35 6.33 7.67  7.25 7.58intuition 
(2.98) (3.63) (2.96) (2.56) (3.06) (3.92)  (3.37) (4.43)
10.45 9.57 10.00 11.05 9.43 9.43  8.53 9.47thinking 
(2.92) (4.37) (2.25) (2.50) (3.53) (2.68)  (3.11) (3.01)
6.95 7.52 7.25 6.10 7.61 7.86  8.47 8.11feeling 
(2.57) (3.50) (1.92) (2.36) (3.02) (2.13)  (2.86) (2.47)
10.73 11.19 10.55 10.70 10.63 10.19  10.00 10.89judging 
(2.99) (3.46) (2.82) (2.56) (3.30) (3.68)  (3.21) (3.43)
6.14 6.24 7.10 6.15 6.75 7.10  7.22 6.32perceiving 
(3.96) (3.83) (3.67) (3.57) (4.02) (4.33)  (4.29) (4.22)
1.18 2.76 2.65 1.40 2.25 3.05  2.75 1.68self-concept of 
own comp. (1.87) (2.43) (1.81) (1.27) (2.07) (3.13)  (1.97) (1.70)
2.14 1.90 2.15 1.65 2.43 2.71  1.72 1.89internality 
(1.36) (1.22) (1.35) (1.27) (1.72) (1.42)  (1.28) (1.56)
6.27 5.10 4.60 5.70 5.53 5.57  4.72 5.53powerful 
others control (1.49) (2.05) (2.06) (1.63) (2.10) (1.83)  (1.90) (2.20)
6.27 5.00 3.55 5.80 5.57 3.67  4.47 5.79chance control 
(1.83) (2.21)  (2.04) (1.74)  (1.79) (2.50)   (2.14) (1.58)
 
Note. Within each row, means are presented above and standard deviations presented 
below in parentheses. 
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Table 1 (Additional Study): 
Means and standard deviations for all scales in each experimental condition  
(8 experimental groups)  
 
  No Warning  Warning 
    
 Dichotomous  Analogue  Dichotomous  Analogue 
        
Scale 
No 
Lim. Lim.  
No 
Lim. Lim.  
No 
Lim. Lim.   
No 
Lim. Lim. 
19.90 16.60 16.10 16.80 15.57 18.63  17.23 18.60extroversion 
(4.17) (5.64) (2.84) (5.25) (4.80) (4.47)  (4.01) (3.02)
4.50 8.50 7.80 8.00 9.00 6.18  7.33 5.60introversion 
(3.74) (5.64) (2.89) (4.98) (4.47) (4.16)  (3.66) (2.87)
11.20 9.90 8.90 11.46 12.74 9.18  12.80 9.90sensing 
(3.01) (4.48) (3.90) (3.46) (4.35) (5.15)  (3.84) (5.70)
6.30 7.60 9.00 6.66 5.71 9.18  5.95 8.60intuition 
(2.35) (3.13) (2.49) (2.69) (2.87) (3.60)  (3.07) (4.16)
11.20 11.40 11.00 11.06 10.11 8.90  9.19 8.90thinking 
(2.85) (2.83) (5.18) (2.46) (3.37) (3.70)  (3.18) (2.37)
7.70 6.70 8.10 7.53 8.20 9.90  9.23 10.00feeling 
(2.83) (2.45) (4.55) (2.23) (3.03) (3.30)  (2.84) (2.05)
11.50 9.80 11.10 11.20 11.05 9.00  11.19 10.80judging 
(2.12) (3.55) (3.07) (2.27) (3.10) (2.64)  (3.02) (3.01)
5.50 7.60 6.80 5.20 6.31 8.81  5.66 6.30perceiving 
(3.02) (3.59) (3.91) (2.90) (3.78) (3.09)  (3.73) (3.77)
.50 1.50 2.00 1.13 2.37 1.72  2.57 1.20self-concept of 
own comp. (.70) (1.77) (1.94) (1.12) (2.19) (2.00)  (2.03) (1.03)
1.70 2.10 1.10 1.53 2.74 2.00  1.66 1.90internality 
(.48) (1.59) (1.10) (1.30) (1.66) (1.73)  (1.35) (1.44)
6.40 5.10 5.80 5.80 5.77 6.00  5.00 5.50powerful 
others control (1.17) (2.42) (1.98) (1.37) (2.17) (1.73)  (1.84) (1.84)
7.10 5.60 5.70 5.93 5.71 5.81  5.04 6.30chance control 
(.87) (1.83)  (2.05) (1.43)  (1.80) (1.53)   (1.96) (1.82)
 
Note. Within each row, means are presented above and standard deviations presented 
below in parentheses. 
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6.2. Appendix 2 
 
 
 
1) Paper 4:  
Khorramdel, L., & Kubinger, K. D. (submitted). The influence of different rating scales on 
impression management. Should we give um on rating scales? Journal of Personality 
Assessment. 
 
 
2) Paper 5:  
Khorramdel, L., & Frebort, M. (submitted). Test order effects: a one-hit-wonder? Trying to 
replicate the findings of Khorramdel and Frebort (2010). European Journal of 
Psychological Assessment. 
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Abstract 
 The influence of different rating scales on socially desirable response distortion was 
investigated by administering the Personality Research Form (PRF; Stumpf, Angleitner, 
Wieck, Jackson, & Beloch-Till, 1984) to 268 applicants with either a 6-point rating scale 
or a 2-point rating scale. It was hypothesised that a 6-point rating scale leads to less 
response distortion than a 2-point rating scale as it might be more difficult to adjust 
responses to a faking good schema. Results provide evidence of the advantages of the 6-
point rating scale and show that the type of response format might interact with item 
content and wording.  
 
 
Key words: faking good, impression management, personnel selection, 
response format, social desirability  
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Introduction 
 The investigation of intentional response distortions by giving socially desirable or 
job-related desirable answers (faking good or impression management) has kept a lot of 
researchers busy over the past few years (cf. Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Meanwhile an 
immense number of studies dealing with this topic have appeared. One reason for the 
growing interest in this topic might be the increasing interest from organizations to include 
personality questionnaires in their selection processes in order to find the most suitable 
applicants. Even if personality measures seem to have a low validity for predicting overall 
job performance, they may improve the validity of the selection process when combined 
with cognitive ability tests (Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 
2007a, 2007b) – of course, there is also the opinion that published personality tests yield 
useful validity estimates (Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007; Tett & 
Christiansen, 2007). Personality questionnaires are favoured measures in this respect 
because they complement other selection methods which measure the “capacity to perform 
aspect” (or can do aspect) by measuring the “choice to perform aspect” (or will do aspect) 
of job performance (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). But personality questionnaires seem to be 
particularly vulnerable to response distortions (Ziegler, Schmidt-Atzert, Bühner, & 
Krumm, 2007) because of their high transparency that often makes the measured construct 
evident to the test-taker (Furnham, 1986), who may in turn have a proclivity to present 
himself in a socially desirable way or in a way that is desirable with regard to the aspired 
job. It was in actual fact shown that personality questionnaire scales were affected by 
applicants’ response distortion while objective personality tests (experiment-based 
assessments of behaviour) were not affected, maybe because the computation of the test 
scores is not transparent to test-takers (Ziegler, Schmidt-Atzert, Bühner, & Krumm, 2007). 
 Some individuals are more capable of faking than others which leads to the 
assumption that fakability is a variable of individual differences (Mueller-Hanson, 
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Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Viswesvaran, & Ones, 1999), and individuals who have 
knowledge of the aspired job and the appropriate desired behaviours might be able to fake 
their responses better (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; Snell, Sydell, 
and Lueke, 1999). According to different variables that moderate faking behaviour (see 
also different models of impression management below) this behaviour occurs with 
different faking styles, for instance slight versus extreme faking (Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 
2007; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). Different models of impression management were 
proposed to explain the process underlying faking so as to support further research, and 
strategies were investigated in order to find possibilities of dealing with faking or 
suppressing it. Both efforts are described in the following. But first, the usefulness of 
personality questionnaires in personnel selection and the need for further research is 
discussed.  
 
Usefulness of personality questionnaires in personnel selection 
 A lively discussion about the usefulness of personality questionnaires in selection 
processes has been ongoing between researchers. Some researchers assume that socially 
desirable response distortions could be an intelligent adaptation to situations, socially 
adaptive, or an expression of social competence that could predict job performance 
(Marcus, 2003a, 2003b; Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 
2007a), a hypothesis not yet proven (Jackson Foldes, Ones, & Sinangil, 2006; Ones, 
Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001). It was shown rather 
that measures of self-monitoring and social desirability (impression management and self-
deception) did not function as performance predictors (Li & Bagger, 2006) or as predictor 
variables with respect to other criterion measures (e.g. interviews, role plays, group 
discussions, work samples, cognitive ability tests, in-tray exercise), but did also not serve 
as confounding variables (Li & Bagger, 2006). It has also been argued that intentional 
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response distortion cannot serve as a common predictor for job performance as applicants 
use different strategies and tactics of self-description, and that not every strategy or tactic 
is successful in every job (Kanning, 2003). Moreover, it has not yet been investigated, 
whether the use of fakable measures in personnel selection affects an organisation’s image, 
which in turn could have consequences on the availability of applicants or the attitude of 
incumbents towards the organisation (Kersting, 2004). Maybe an interesting finding with 
respect to the idea of using socially desirable response distortions to predict job 
performance is that social desirability (measured with a social desirability scale) seems to 
be related to self-esteem and emotional intelligence as they shared common variance, and 
that over-claiming is not correlated with social desirability, at least in a volunteer sample 
that is not comparable to samples in high-stakes assessments (Mesmer-Magnus, 
Viswesvaran, Deshpande, & Joseph, 2006).  
 There are studies (mostly meta-analyses) which provide evidence that intentional 
response distortions barely affect construct validity or criterion-related validity of self-
reported personality measures (Bradley & Hauenstein, 2006; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, 
Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001; Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992; 
Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Ones, 
Viswesvaran & Schmidt, 1993; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). Other studies have been able to 
show that criterion-related validity is affected at the high end of the predictor distribution 
and that rank order changes take place influencing which applicant gets hired (Ellingson, 
Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Mueller-Hanson, M., 
Heggestad, E. D., & Thornton, G. C., 2003; Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007; Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, & Levin, 1998; Winkelspecht, Lewis, & Thomas, 2006). There are also findings 
that show slightly lower reliabilities of the questionnaire scales in applicant samples than 
in non-applicant samples, and it was also shown that the underlying constructs of a 
questionnaire were measured differently across these samples harming the construct 
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validity (Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001). Hence, some researchers 
assume social desirability to be a serious problem if self-reported personality scales are 
used in selection (Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001; Winkelspecht, 
Lewis, & Thomas, 2006). 
Need for further research 
 If intentional response distortions in personality questionnaires do harm selection 
processes by preventing the selection of the appropriate applicants, alternative measures 
that are less susceptible should be used (Morgeson, Campion, Diboye, Hollenbeck, 
Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007a; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001), or 
response distortions should be suppressed or controlled. Even if faking would not decrease 
the usefulness of personality testing in personnel selection, their value could be increased if 
more would be known about the process underlying faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Models 
which try to define the underlying process are helpful but yet not fully developed and 
previously investigated strategies to deal with faking have revealed inconsistent results or 
have not permitted any general conclusions. Therefore, further studies that investigate 
different aspects of faking could provide helpful contributions.  
 In addition, the investigation of socially desirable response distortion could provide 
an important contribution to personality research and social theories.  
 
Models of impression management 
 Models, which try to explain the process which underlies intentional response 
distortion, describe faking behaviour as an interaction of the ability and motivation to fake 
(Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999), the opportunity to fake depending on the test-takers true 
score (McFarland & Ryan, 2000), the perception of the situation (belief in the importance 
of faking, perceived behavioural control and beliefs about subjective norms), and general 
personality characteristics like Conscientiousness and Emotional stability (McFarland & 
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Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006). A further model expanded 
these aspects by suggesting that faking is likely to vary depending on the specific nature of 
the personality item (instead of considering the entire personality test), and including the 
factor “perceived ability to fake” which is more relevant to the motivation or intention to 
fake than the true ability to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009).  
 Regarding the information processing, it is suggested that intentional response 
distortions rely on the comparison of the item content with an adopted schema (instead of a 
self-schema) like a schema of favourable impressions (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, 
Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992). Therewith, a systematic relationship between the 
presence of a schema and response time latencies is proposed. Thus, schema-congruent 
responses (e.g. socially desirable responses by adopting a fake good schema) are given 
faster than schema-incongruent responses (e.g. socially undesirable responses with regard 
to a fake good schema). But the resulting response latencies may also be influenced by 
item characteristics (item length, item ambiguity, item extremity, number of alternatives) 
and multiple person variables (reading speed, verbal ability, motor speed) (see also 
Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 1991). Furthermore, it was shown that test-takers who were 
instructed to fake good on a personality questionnaire used job stereotypes (or schemas) 
however with negative aspects removed, as well as stereotypes about general aspects of 
personality (Mahar, Coburn, Griffin, Hemeter, Potappel, Turton, & Mulgrew, 2006; 
Mahar, Cologon, & Duck, 1995). The latter was assumed because training test-takers had 
no impact on the use of stereotypes in contrast to test-takers who were not trained. These 
findings conflict with the assumption that the more knowledge persons have about the 
aspired job the easier it is for them to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 
2006; Snell, Sydell, and Lueke, 1999).  
 As even a small degree of the ability to fake combined with the motivation to do so, 
as well as a small degree of motivation to fake combined with the ability to fake can 
 8 
already lead to response distortion, an approach to reduce faking might be more successful 
if both ability and motivation to fake are considered (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Such an 
approach was attempted by Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006; see below).  
 
Strategies to deal with faking good 
 Strategies to deal with faking good, like the identification of response distortion 
(with the use of response time latencies or social desirability scales), the discouragement of 
test-takers from faking (with warning instructions that faking can be identified or will have 
negative consequences), or efforts to make personality questionnaires less fakable (by 
adjusting the response format, method of administration, or item positioning) have 
provided inconsistent results, and no general conclusions can be drawn for these 
adjustments as the effects may be influenced by many moderating variables (Dilchert, 
Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006). Strategies to make personality questionnaires less 
fakable have focused on aspects of how questionnaires are administered by adjusting the 
method of administration, the item positioning or the response format. In the following, 
strategies that imply the use of different response formats or that focus on item content 
shall be described in more detail as they are of interest for the current study.  
 Item content: Covert item contents or particular dimensions that have some positive 
as well as some negative aspects like extraversion (in contrast to dimensions that have 
almost only negative associations like neuroticism) are assumed to be more difficult to 
fake (Furnham, 1986). Reducing specific contents of items in personnel selection which 
are particularly relevant to a job (like reducing the college relevance of items within a 
college selection process) are supposed to make the items less fakable (Ramsay, Schmitt, 
Oswald, Kim, & Gillespie, 2006).  
 Response format: In contrast to items with a single-stimulus response format (rating 
scale), items with a forced-choice response format are assumed to minimize faking 
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tendencies, as they make it more difficult to respond desirably (Jackson, Wroblewski, & 
Ashton, 2000). These types of response formats may influence the perceived opportunity to 
fake, which in turn moderates the actual faking behaviour (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; 
Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). 
 Instructing test-takers to respond like applicants (fake good conditions), less faking 
tendencies were revealed by using binary and quartet forced-choice formats, as well as 
ipsative and partially ipsative forced-choice formats, while single-stimulus response 
formats were more vulnerable to response distortions (Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 
2000; Martin, Bown, & Hunt, 2002). Nevertheless, it has been shown that test-takers are 
able to distort their responses using a forced-choice format (Lammers & Frankenfeld, 
1999). The forced-choice format was additionally shown to be a better predictor of 
personality and job-related abilities in fake good conditions than the single-stimulus format 
(Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000; Wright & Miederhoff, 1999). It was also revealed 
that both types of response formats were susceptible to response distortions, that subjects 
with higher cognitive ability were able to distort their answers more by using the forced-
choice format than subjects with lower cognitive ability, and that a forced-choice response 
format was not better at retaining the rank ordering of individuals in comparison to a 
single-stimulus response format (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Heggestad, 
Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006). However, items with the forced-choice format 
showed higher construct validity under fake good conditions (Christiansen, Burns, & 
Montgomery, 2005). With respect to criterion-related validity no difference between these 
two response formats was revealed (Converse et al., 2008). As the samples in these studies 
consisted of volunteers (mostly students) the results still need to be demonstrated in real 
selection situations. 
 Some research suggests that using analogue scales (in which participants mark the 
extent of their agreement along a continuous line between two alternatives) as a response 
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format may be less prone to faking than a dichotomous (participants have to choose one of 
two alternatives) response format (Khorramdel & Kubinger, 2006; Kubinger, 2002; 
Seiwald, 2002). It has also been suggested that a dichotomous response format provokes a 
kind of reactance resulting in untypical or arbitrary responses that do not describe the 
subjects’ true character (Karner, 2002).  
 A combination of different approaches shown by Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006) 
revealed not only the advantage of an analogue scale in contrast to a dichotomous response 
format (main effect of the factor response format in MANOVA), but also interaction 
effects of the factors response format and speed. A limited response time (per 
questionnaire page) led to less socially desirable responses than no time limit but only in 
combination with an analogue scale, while the reverse effect occurred by using a 
dichotomous forced-choice format. Considering the fact that single-stimulus (or normative) 
items as well as forced-choice items were used, either presented with an analogue scale or 
dichotomous (and regarding the findings about forced-choice response formats in other 
studies) it seems interesting that the effects occurred only in questionnaire scales with 
single-stimulus items, while no effects occurred in scales with forced-choice items. It 
might therefore be assumed that items with a single-stimulus response format (or rating 
scale) are less susceptible to faking when presented as an analogue scale rather than 
dichotomously. However, these two presentation types did not affect response behaviour 
when items were of a forced-choice-type format.  
 
Aim of the current experiment 
 
 As single-stimulus items are mostly used in personnel selection because of their 
normative qualities, and because fewer costs are incurred with respect to their construction 
(compared to forced-choice formats), one aim of the current experiment is to find out if the 
susceptibility of items with a single-stimulus response format can be decreased by using 
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particular presentation modes. Another aim is to provide a contribution to personality 
research and social theories by investigating the interaction of variables that might 
moderate response behaviour. The current paper therefore investigates the effects of 
different presentation types of items with a single-stimulus response (or normative) format 
on socially desirable response distortions in personnel selection. The normative items are 
presented either with a 6-point rating scale (with 1 = disagree totally to 6 = agree 
completely) or dichotomously with a 2-point rating scale (with 1 = wrong and 2 = right).  
 
Hypothesis 
 According to the findings of Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006) we expect that, 
similar to an analogue scale, the 6-point rating scale is less vulnerable to socially desirable 
response distortion than a 2-point rating scale (when normative items are used) as it is 
more difficult to figure out what degree of agreement is socially desired. Additionally, both 
the 6-point as well as the 2-point rating scales do not allow evasive responses as they have 
no middle category. Furthermore, we assume that test-takers’ ability to adjust their 
responses in a questionnaire to an adopted faking good schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; 
Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992) increases when a 2-point rating scale is used 
because it is easier to give stereotypical responses, while a 6-point rating scale might force 
test takers to consider their responses more precisely. Therefore, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Normative items presented with a 6-point rating scale are less susceptible to 
socially desirable response distortion than with a 2-point rating scale. 
 
Additionally, we formulate the null hypothesis and a second alternative hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Normative items presented with a 6-point rating scale are not less 
susceptible to socially desirable response distortion than with a 2-point rating scale. 
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Hypothesis 3: Normative items presented with a 2-point rating scale are less susceptible to 
socially desirable response distortion than with a 6-point rating scale. 
 
Method 
 An experiment within a selection procedure is presented to investigate the effects of 
different response formats of normative items (dichotomous rating scale versus rating scale 
with 6 response categories) on faking personality questionnaires. The sample consists of 
soldiers in the Austrian Federal Armed Forces who had applied for a pilot training and 
underwent a selection procedure. 
 
Sample 
 All applicants were soldiers of the Austrian Federal Armed Forces who had applied 
for pilot training. The sample consists of 84 applicants from another experiment, to which 
we refer as Study 1 in the following, and 184 applicants who were tested in the customary 
selection setting of the Federal Armed Forces. The current experiment is therefore a quasi 
experiment as the applicants were not randomly assigned to the experimental groups, 
however it can be assumed that there are no considerable differences between the 
applicants as they had applied all for the same training and come from the same institution. 
Furthermore, all applicants had undergone a pre-selection process in the Austrian Federal 
Armed Forces, before they applied for the training. In the following we refer to this quasi 
experiment as Study 2. The applicants of Study 1 filled out a paper-pencil questionnaire 
with a rating scale with six categories. The applicants of Study 2 filled out 234 items of the 
same questionnaire but this time a computer based version with a dichotomous rating scale. 
The data of the 184 applicants (Study 2) were provided by the Department of Human 
Resources in the Austrian Federal Armed Forces. Their first language is German, their 
education levels varies from a compulsory education of 9 years and apprenticeship to 
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general qualification for university entrance. Finally, the sample consists of a total of 268 
applicants.  
 
Measures 
The following personality questionnaire was already a fixed part of the selection 
procedure in the Department of Human Resources and therefore used in Study 2, in order 
to investigate the effect of response-type formats on intentional response distortion: 
Personality Research Form (PRF) – German edition. The PRF (Stumpf, Angleitner, 
Wieck, Jackson, & Beloch-Till, 1984) is a personality questionnaire based on Murray’s 
personality theory (1938) that measures a set of traits important for psychological research 
as well as psychological assessment. 234 items with a dichotomous response format 
(“right” and “wrong”) measure fifteen scales: Achievement, Affiliation, Aggression, 
Dominance, Endurance, Exhibition, Harm avoidance, Impulsivity, Nurturance, Order, 
Play, Social Recognition, Succorance, Understanding. The cronbachs alpha reliabilities of 
the PRF scales, presented in the test-manual, range from .69 to .87.  
 
Design 
Experimental group 1: The 84 applicants from Study 1 received the 234 PRF items 
with a 6-point rating scale (with 1 = disagree totally to 6 = agree completely) embedded in 
a paper-pencil questionnaire that also comprised 210 items from the BIP (Business-focused 
Inventory of Personality, German edition; Hossiep & Paschen, 2003), 60 items from the 
NEO FFI (NEO Five Factor Inventory, German edition; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), and 
12 items from the NEO PI-R (NEO Personality Inventory Revised, German edition; 
Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004). This questionnaire was administered with two different 
item orders (with respect to the items from the BIP, NEO FFI, and NEO PI-R), whereas the 
positions of the PRF items were always held constant (in the middle of the questionnaire).  
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 Experimental group 2: The 184 additional applicants for the current Study 2 received 
a computer version of the PRF with a dichotomous or 2-point rating scale (with 1 = wrong 
and 2 = right), and without the items from the other questionnaires.  
Procedure 
 First, all applicants attended a psychological assessment carried out by the 
department of Human Resources of the Austrian Federal Armed Forces, where their 
cognitive abilities and personality traits were tested. After an assessment of approximately 
8 to 9 hours (including cognitive ability and achievement tests), they filled out either the 
paper-pencil questionnaire by responding to a rating scale with six categories, or the 
computer based questionnaire with a dichotomous rating scale. None of the applicants had 
received any information about the requirements profile. It was not possible to randomly 
assign the applicants to the two experimental groups, but it can be assumed that there are 
no nameable differences between the applicants (see the description in the text “Sample” 
above). To be able to compare the two experimental groups in our analysis, the 6-point 
rating scale was scored dichotomously, so that marks on one side indicated only agreement 
or disagreement.  
 
Preliminary stages for the interpretation of the results 
 According to Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) and Levashina and Campion (2006), 
individuals who have knowledge of the aspired job and the appropriate desired behaviours 
would be able to fake their responses better. As the applicants in our study had not 
received any information about the job requirements, the findings of a few faking studies 
that used the German edition of the PRF were considered in order to find out which scores 
from the PRF might show faking tendencies (with regard to the different questionnaire 
scales). According to a study from Stumpf and Steinhart (1981) who used the German 
edition of the PRF to investigate the effects of faking-good and faking-bad instructions on 
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a sample of soldiers and officers in training with the German Armed Forces, the following 
findings can be reflected upon: 1) faking-good instructions led to increased scores in the 
PRF scales Achievement, Affiliation, Dominance, Endurance, Exhibition, Nuturance, 
Order, Social Recognition, Succorance, and Understanding, and to decreased scores in the 
PRF scales Aggression, Harm avoidance, Impulsivity, and Play, in contrast to faking-bad 
instructions or standard instructions; 2) faking-bad instructions led to decreased scores in 
the PRF scales Achievement, Affiliation, Dominance, Endurance, Exhibition, Nurturance, 
Order, Social Recognition, Succorance, and Understanding, as well as to increased scores 
in the PRF scales Aggression, Harm avoidance, Impulsivity, and Play, in contrast to 
faking-good instructions or standard instructions. Altogether, faking-bad instructions led to 
higher differences in the scores than faking-good instructions. Rather similar effects were 
found in studies that used the English version of the PRF (Braun & Asta, 1969; Braun & 
Constantini, 1970; Hoffmann, 1968; Hoffmann & Nelson, 1971; Holden & Jackson, 1981) 
except for the scale Harm avoidance, where contrary results were found with respect to 
faking bad-instructions.  
 
Results 
To investigate the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted in order to compare the means of the two experimental groups 
in regard to the main factor Response Format. In order to calculate the sample sizes needed 
to fulfil a-priori given precision requirements (type-I, type-II-risk, and a relevant effect 
size) we used the program CADEMO (http://www.biomath.de); however, the sample sizes 
were calculated according to an ANOVA. With α = .05 and β = .20 an ANOVA is able to 
detect a mean difference of δ ≥ 2/3 σ (the standard deviation of each scale) by testing 
37x2 = 74 subjects. With 84 + 184 = 268 our sample sizes were adequate. To calculate the 
MANOVA in order to investigate hypotheses 1 to 3, the scores of the PRF scales of the 84 
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subjects from Study 1 first have to be shown not to be affected by the factor Item Order. If 
the scores are not affected by the item order, the data from Study 1 are equivalent to the 
data of the 184 subjects from the current Study 2. Hence, a MANOVA with the PRF scales 
as dependent variables and the main factor Item Position was conducted. In the following 
we refer to the MANOVA with the main factor Item Position as MANOVA 1 and to the 
MANOVA with the main factor Response Format as MANOVA 2. 
 
Results of the MANOVA 1 for the main factor Item Order 
 Box’s M-Test for testing the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrix proved 
to be not significant (p = .122). That is, the resulting F-values of multivariate analysis of 
variance can be fairly interpreted. The results of MANOVA 1 revealed no significant main 
effect of the factor Item Order on the PRF scales of the 84 subjects of Study 1 (p = .604; 
F = .886; η2 = .160). Therefore, the data proved to be equivalent to the data of the 184 
subjects from Study 2, thereby providing the necessary condition to conduct MANOVA 2. 
 
Results of the MANOVA 2 for the main factor Response Format 
The means and standard deviations of all subtests in each experimental condition are 
given in Table 1. Box’s M-Test for testing the homogeneity of the variance-covariance 
matrix was significant (p = .003). To ascertain whether this significance is due to particular 
dependent variables (questionnaire scales) on account of the heterogeneous variances, the 
Levene test was calculated for each scale. The five scales Achievement, Aggression, 
Order, Succorance, and Infrequency were disclosed to be significant in the Levene’s test 
(p = .009, p = .000, p = .040, p = .044, p = .022). After deleting these scales Box’s M-Test 
proved to be non-significant (p = .276). That is, the resulting F-values of the multivariate 
analysis of variance can be fairly interpreted. The MANOVA for testing the main effects 
of the factor Response Format shows a significant effect of the Response Format (p < .001; 
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F = 6.704; η2 = .207). The separate invariate analyses of each single scale showed 
significantly different means of the five scales Affiliation (p = .021), Endurance (p = .010), 
Harmavoidance (p = .017), Social Recognition (p < .001), and Understanding (p < .001) 
revealed significantly different means between the two experimental groups. See in Table 
1 the respective means. To additionally investigate the effect of the factor Response 
Format on the scales Achievement, Aggression, Order, Succorance, and Infrequency, 
which had to be deleted from the MANOVA, two-sample t-tests for unequal variances 
(Welch tests) were applied: while significant effects resulted for the scales Aggression, 
Order, Succorance, and Infrequency (p = .008, p = .008, p = .002, p = .027), no significant 
effect occurred in regard to the scale Achievement (p = .118). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Interpretation 
 The results of the MANOVA 2 support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3, but not 
Hypothesis 2. The factor Response format has a significant main effect on an applicant’s 
response behaviour. The independent analyses of the single scales show that nine scales of 
the PRF are affected by the factor Response format. The means of the experimental groups 
in each scale (see Table 1) are interpreted according to Stumpf and Steinhart’s findings 
(1981) in order to ascertain which response format may lead to fewer faking tendencies. 
Hence, higher scores in the scales Affiliation, Endurance, Order, Social Recognition, 
Succorance, and Understanding, as well as lower scores in the scales Aggression, and 
Harm avoidance may show faking tendencies in the sense of socially desirable response 
distortion when the two experimental groups are compared. Additionally, lower scores in 
the scale Infrequency might be an indicator for faking tendencies (Hoffmann, 1968) with 
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respect to the experimental design. Applicants who had been given the 2-point rating scale 
showed higher scores in the scales Affiliation, Endurance, Succorance, and Understanding, 
as well as lower scores in the scales Aggression, and Infrequency than subjects who had 
been given the 6-point rating scale. These results lead to the assumption that the 2-point 
rating scale provokes higher faking tendencies than the 6-point rating scale which seems to 
lead to fewer faking tendencies. It has to be noted that lower scores in the scale 
Infrequency may be interpreted as cooperative behaviour from the test-takers rather than as 
faking good. The opposite is the case with the scales Order, Social Recognition, and Harm 
avoidance, where a 2-point rating scale led to less socially desirable responses than the 6-
point rating scale. Applicants with a 6-point rating scale showed higher scores in the scales 
Order, and Social Recognition, as well as lower scores in the scale Harm avoidance.  
 
Discussion 
 A study (quasi experiment) of a multivariate two-way design was conducted in order 
to investigate the influence of two different single-stimulus response formats on socially 
desirable response distortion within a personnel selection: a 6-point rating scale (with 1 = 
disagree totally to 6 = agree completely) versus a 2-point rating scale (with 1 = wrong and 
2 = right). The aim was to find out whether the susceptibility of items with a single-
stimulus response format can be decreased by using particular presentation modes, and to 
provide a contribution to the research that deals with possible interactions of variables that 
might moderate response behaviour. The significant main effect of MANOVA supports 
Hypothesis 1 as well as Hypothesis 3, but not Hypothesis 2. The factor Response Format 
affected an applicant’s response behaviour in nine scales of the PRF. According to the 
means in the scales Affiliation, Endurance, Succorance, Understanding, and Aggression, 
applicants showed less socially desirable responses when they responded with a 6-point 
rating scale than when responding with a 2-point rating scale. These findings resemble 
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those of Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006) who were able to show that normative items 
were less fakable when applied with an analogue scale than with a 2-point rating scale. It 
might be more difficult for applicants to adjust their responses to an adopted faking good 
schema (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992) when a 6-
point rating scale is used. The same results are disclosed with regard to the scale 
Infrequency, but the lower scores in this scale may be interpreted as cooperative behaviour 
from the test-takers rather than as faking good.  
 The means of the scales Order, Social Recognition, and Harm avoidance showed that 
the opposite effect occurred as a 2-point rating scale led to less socially desirable responses 
than the 6-point rating scale. Upon closer inspection of the content of the items of these 
three scales, it seems that these items were more transparent than items from the other PRF 
scales. The scale Harm avoidance includes a lot of items comprising adventures and risks 
that are considered as daily routines in the Federal Armed Forces or for pilots (e.g. going to 
a foreign country, parachuting, working with dangerous instruments or machines, or 
fighting forest fires). It is a similar case when it comes to the scales Order (e.g. making 
plans, hanging up clothes, arranging things, attaching importance to one’s appearance) and 
Social Recognition (e.g. the importance of prestige, image or reputation, as well as 
acceptance). As transparent item contents, or items with contents that are of particular 
importance to a specific job are supposed to be more fakable (Furnham, 1986; Ramsay, 
Schmitt, Oswald, Kim, & Gillespie, 2006), we assume that the items of these three scales 
were highly vulnerable to faking tendencies, and that not even the 6-point rating scale 
could help to make what is socially desirable less transparent. Of course, this only explains 
why the 6-point rating scale was not less fakable, but not, why the 2-point rating did not 
fulfil our expectations. What is noticeable, apart from the item content regarding the scales 
Order, Social Recognition, and Harmavoidance, is that a lot of the appropriate items 
comprise extreme phrases like “never”, “always” or “almost always”, “by no means”, or 
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“inexcusable”. In combination with the transparent item contents these extreme phrases 
might have led to some kind of reactance when applicants had to respond with a 2-point 
rating scale, in the sense that some statements were refused that may have possibly been 
affirmed if they had been presented with more moderate answer possibilities (that is for 
example provided with the 6-point scale). In this respect, we assume that the decreased 
socially desirable responses are not to be interpreted as decreased fakability but rather as 
an underestimation of the actual trait loading.  
 In summary, the 6-point scale seems to be a better solution for use in personality 
questionnaires in personnel selection than the 2-point rating scale, as less socially desirable 
response distortion was revealed in most of the PRF scales. But this might not be true for 
all scales as this effect seems to be bound to the scale or item content. We assume that the 
kind of response format interacts with the item content and that items should be developed 
or used (with regard to their content) very carefully. We also assume that a 2-point rating 
scale not only enhances faking tendencies, but might also harm the measurement. Finally, 
we have to note that the fact that the 6-point scale showed less socially desirable responses 
in most scales does not mean that no intentional response distortion occurred.  
 According to the models of impression management which describe faking 
behaviour as an interaction of different variables (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & 
Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006), and the findings of 
Khorramdel and Kubinger (2006) on the combined effect of response format and time limit 
on faking tendencies, we suggest that the effects of a 6-point rating scale or an analogue 
scale on intentional response distortion might be accentuated by other variables, or might 
enhance their effects. At least, our experiment was able to show once more that the kind of 
response format has a moderating effect with respect to intentional response distortion.  
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Limitations and implications for further research 
 In fact we assume that the combination of the job-specific and transparent item 
contents with the extreme phrases might have lead to reactant response behaviour when the 
2-point rating scale was applied, but this remains only an assumption and further research 
might find other or better explanations. Further research might also pay more attention to 
the effects of the combination of different questionnaire presentation types on response 
behaviour, as well as the interaction of such variables with the item content and item 
wording. The findings of the current study are of course limited by the sample, which is 
very unique as all participants were men, who had all applied for the same (pilot) training 
and who all came from the same institution (Austrian Federal Armed Forces). Therefore, 
the findings might not apply to other groups, such as women, or other occupational groups, 
so future research should investigate if our results can also be found in other samples. 
Furthermore, our experiment was only a quasi experiment as we were not able to assign the 
sample randomly to the experimental groups. Confounding variables might have occurred 
which we were ultimately not able to control.  
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Table 1:  
Means and standard deviations for all dependent variables (scales) in the experimental 
condition Response Format (2 experimental groups) 
 
 
Dependent Variable (Scale) 
2-Point 
Rating Scale
(n=184)
 6-Point 
Rating Scale
(n=84)
 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Achievement 13.516 1.406 13.149 1.918
Affiliation 14.353 2.180 13.673 2.298
Aggression 4.321 2.132 5.238 2.783
Dominance 12.342 2.832 13.036 2.745
Endurance 13.669 2.204 12.893 2.445
Exhibition 10.158 2.992 10.768 2.638
Harm avoidance 3.745 2.633 2.905 2.675
Impulsivity 4.913 2.610 4.726 2.251
Nurturance 11.717 2.306 11.649 2.426
Order 12.147 3.163 13.155 2.724
Play 9.761 3.117 9.321 2.862
Social Recognition 8.163 2.949 9.631 2.610
Succorance 7.283 2.583 6.310 2.270
Understanding 9.837 2.721 8.411 3.060
Infrequency .457 .660 .691 .846
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Abstract 
The findings of Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted für publication 2010) about de-
creased “frustration tolerance” and increased “decisiveness” using objective personality 
tests sensu R. B. Cattell administered after cognitive ability tests (Experiment 1) were in-
vestigated once again. The same experiment was performed to investigate the effects of a 
varied test order of a computer based test battery on the test performance of managers. 
While Experiment 1 included persons in “higher management positions”, the current ex-
periment (Experiment 2) deals with incumbents of the same Austrian industrial corpora-
tion (an automotive supplier) who were in “lower positions” (shift foremen and machinery 
adjusters) but still had managerial responsibilities. They too attended an investigation of 
their professional potential which resembles a real selection situation. The results of Ex-
periment 1 could not be replicated; no main effect of test order occurred, but there was an 
effect for a single test score: subjects who worked on cognitive ability tests subsequent to 
objective personality tests showed a significantly lower “memory” than subjects who 
worked on cognitive ability tests before objective personality tests. The results of the two 
experiments are discussed with respect to subjects’ differences in cognitive ability, 
achievement motivation, and resilience, and with respect to differences in the test batter-
ies. 
 
 
Key words: context effects, test order, frustration tolerance, objective person-
ality tests, cognitive ability tests, selection, assessment 
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Introduction 
The influences of different contexts on response behaviour and test performance 
have received considerable attention over the past years, and are of course an iteressting 
and important contribution to psychological research. Context effects are mainly investi-
gated with respect to item and task order in questionnaires (Hartig, Hölzel & Moosbrug-
ger, 2007; Knowles, 1988; Knowles et al., 1992; Rost, & Hoberg, 1996) and cognitive 
ability and achievement tests (Leary & Dorans, 1985; Perlini, Lind & Zumbo, 1998). Con-
sidering that context effects occur as different orders may influence all stages of informa-
tion processing underlying response behaviour (interpretation, retrieval of information, 
rendering a judgement, selection of a response; see Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988), it can 
be concluded that this influence may pertain to different test orders as well. Particular 
carry-over effects, priming effects, fatigue effects, and learning effects might take place in 
regard to different test orders, as they involve the transfer of prior content, meaning, or 
behaviour and influence subsequent reactions. Regarding some of the few studies that fo-
cus on varied test sequences, it seems that varying the order of personality questionnaires 
has no effects on response behaviour (Eisenhauer, 2008) while cognitive ability tests af-
fect responses on particular scales (spontaneous aggressiveness, emotional lability) of a 
personality questionnaire when administered first (Hambros, 2002). Increased working 
speed and a decreased number of correct answers towards the end of a test were found by 
varying test sequences of different cognitive ability tests (Eiselt, 1991); subjective self-
reported motivation was made responsible while self-reported subjective fatigue had no 
effect. Learning effects as well as fatigue effects were found due to later positions in the 
test sequence by varying the sequence of tests and subtests that measured attention and 
memory (Földényi, Tagwerker-Neuenschwander, Giovanoli, Schallberger, & Steinhausen, 
1999; Zhu & Tulsky, 2000). But results were either inconsistent or the effect sizes were 
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rather small. Learning effects were also found with respect to the test order of a figure test 
measuring field dependence-independence when the more difficult subtest was adminis-
tered first (Kelleher, McRae, & Young, 1990). Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted für pub-
lication 2010) found that administering cognitive ability tests before objective personality 
tests increased the test score “decisiveness” and decreased the test score “frustration toler-
ance” of the objective personality test Work Styles (“Arbeitshaltungen”; Kubinger, & 
Ebenhöh, 2007), while there was no reverse effect. Equal effects were found for the test 
score “decisiveness” of the Work Styles when this test was administered after a personality 
questionnaire (Baldinger, 2006) in contrast to the administration before the questionnaire 
where no effects were found. A basical model for the explanation of context effects is of-
ferd by Schwarz, Hippler and Noelle-Neumann (1992), who argue that order effects (in 
dimensional sets of response alternatives) depend on a complex interaction of serial posi-
tion, presentation mode, item attributes (e.g. plausibility, complexity, and extremity of the 
wording), and respondents’ ability and motivation, as described by the elaboration likeli-
hood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Considering the factor of respondets’ ability, it 
was found that response-order effects were greater among respondents with less cognitive 
sophistication, which led to the suggestion that response-order effects are the result of in-
adequate memory search and superficial response alternative evaluation (Krosnick, 1992). 
It was also shown that individuals differ in cognitive evaluation processes depending on 
their cognitive complexity (O’Keefe, Delia, & O’Keefe, 1977). Subjects with higher cog-
nitive complexity were shown to organize information at a higher level than individuals 
with lower cognitive complexity, who had less flexible schemas (O’Keefe, Delia, & 
O’Keefe, 1977) but were better able to integrate conflicting stimulus information into their 
concepts. Nevertheless, apart from order effects, these subjects (with high and low cogni-
tive complexity) did not differ in their impression evaluations (toward a stimulus person) 
                         Stability of test order effects  
 
 5
despite their different cognitive processes. Finally, the appearance and the extent of con-
text effects might additionally, or sometimes even primarily, be influenced by subjects’ 
motivation (Hippler, & Schwarz, 1987). Most of the studies focusing on order effects did 
not consider these variables and hence did not provide a satisfying explanation of order 
effects.  
 
Aims of the current experiment 
 An experiment investigating the effects of varied test orders with respect to so-called 
objective personality tests is presented. The use of different test orders within test batteries 
is a common practice because of different reasons, such as organisational reasons (for ex-
ample not all test are available on all computers), to avoid cheating, or to avoid a decrease 
of motivation if some test-takers realise that others are perform faster. But this practice is 
not well explored or proven to be without consequences for the test results. The aim of the 
current experiment is to investigate if the findings of Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted 
für publication 2010) can be replicated. A further aim was to find out if there are any sig-
nificant effects of changed test order due to subjects’ differences in cognitive ability and 
achievement motivation. Therefore, the sample of the current experiment (Experiment 2) 
consists of persons with a lower level of education compared with the sample of the ex-
periment of Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted für publication 2010) (Experiment 1), as-
suming that this lower ecucational level is, in general, accompanied by lower cognitive 
abilities or lower achievement motivation.  
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Materials and Methods 
Sample 
 As in Experiment 1, the sample of the current experiment (Experiment 2) consists of 
64 incumbents of an Austrian industrial corporation (an automotive supplier) with mana-
gerial responsibilities – this time in “lower positions” within the corporation hierarchy 
(shift foremen and machinery adjusters), in contrast to the “higher management positions” 
of the subjects in Experiment 1 (business managers, department chiefs, and team leaders). 
Again, the subjects attended an investigation of their professional potential (job-related 
cognitive ability and personality dimensions) to find out if they are suited for their posi-
tion, if they should be given a position without managerial responsibility, or if they have 
the potential to obtain a higher position within the corporation. In this respect, the testing 
situation resembles a personnel selection situation as degradation to a position without 
managerial responsibility was within the bounds of possibility. None of the participants 
were female; the age of the participants varied between 22 to 56 years.  
 
Measures  
Similar to Experiment 1, a requirement analysis was conducted to be able to identify 
the requirements the participants had to meet in their everyday work. The resulting re-
quirements profile (which comprised particular cognitive abilities, aspects of personality, 
and management styles) differs only marginally from the one in Experiment 1. According 
to this profile an almost equal test battery was arranged. In contrast to Experiment 1, the 
AMT (Adaptive Test of Matrices – German edition; Hornke, Etzel, & Rettig, 2007) was 
replaced by the SPM (Standard Progressive Matrices – German edition; Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 2008), and the two subtests verbal and numerical intelligence of the IST 2000 R 
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(Intelligence Structure-Test – German edition; Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Am-
thauer, 2007) were supplemented with the subtest memory.  
 
Cognitive ability tests  
Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) – German edition (Raven, Raven, & Court, 
2008). The SPM is a reasoning test where items are presented conventionally: ascending 
from easy to hard (in contrast to the adaptive presented items of the AMT). The SPM dif-
ferentiate better between persons with lower abilities as it comprises more items that are 
more likely to be solved than the items of the AMT.  
Intelligence Structure Test (IST 2000 R) – German edition (Liepmann, Beauducel, 
Brocke, & Amthauer, 2007). The IST 2000 R is an intelligence test battery consisting of 
11 subtests that measure verbal (3 subtests), numerical (3 subtests), and figural (3 subtests) 
intelligence, as well as memory (2 subtests). For the current experiment, only the subtests 
measuring verbal intelligence, numerical intelligence, and memory were selected.  
 
Objective Personality Tests 
 Objective personality tests sensu R. B. Cattell (e.g. 1958) are experiment-based as-
sessments of behaviour which assess a personality construct by observing the subject’s 
behaviour when working on a performance or ability task, while the observation and regis-
tration of the behaviour is done via computer (Kubinger, 2009).  
 Work Styles – German edition (Kubinger, & Ebenhöh, 2007). The test-battery con-
sists of three subtests. Subtest 1 (“comparing area sizes”) measures decisiveness, exacti-
tude, and reflexivity, Subtest 2 (“coding symbols”) measures proficiency level, aspiration 
level, target discrepancy, and frustration tolerance, and Subtest 3 (“distinguishing fig-
ures”) measures achievement motivation. 
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 Resilience-Assessment: computer based Objective Personality Test Battery (BAcO-
D) – German edition (Ortner, Kubinger, Schrott, Radinger, & Litzenberger, 2006). BAcO-
D is a test battery that measures different kinds of job-related resilience, and consists of 
six subtests. For the current experiment two of the six subtests were selected: the subtest 
“task collision” which measures one’s resilience given multiple simultaneous tasks, and 
the subtest “crisscrossed plans” which measures one’s resilience given thwarted plans.  
 ILICA – a simulation test to assess decisive behaviour – German edition 
(Möseneder, & Ebenhöh, 1996). ILICA is a computer simulation in the German language 
which measures self-management abilities. A leisure day is simulated for 30 minutes, dur-
ing which time arrangements for a nearing holiday have to be made.  
 
Hypotheses 
Primary hypotheses  
 As in Experiment 1, we expect that test performance varies depending on different 
test orders. We therefore formulate the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The prior work on objective personality tests influences the subsequent per-
formance in cognitive ability tests. 
Hypothesis 2: The prior work on cognitive ability tests influences the subsequent perform-
ance in objective personality tests. 
 
Secondary hypotheses  
 Corresponding to the model of Petty and Cacioppo (1986), as well as that of 
Schwarz, Hippler and Noelle-Neumann (1992), we hypothesise that effects of test order 
might occur depending on differences in subjects’ cognitive ability and motivation, if the 
findings of Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted für publication 2010) cannot be replicated.  
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Design 
 The same design was tested as in Experiment 1. Participants were randomly as-
signed to two experimental groups where the sequence of cognitive ability tests and objec-
tive personality tests was varied within a computer based test battery. Group 1 completed 
objective personality tests first and cognitive ability tests afterwards (Test Order O: Work 
Styles – BAcO – ILICA – IST 2000 R - SPM), Group 2 completed cognitive ability tests 
prior to the objective personality tests (Test Order C: IST 2000 R – SPM – Work Styles – 
BacO - ILICA). The cognitive ability tests were presented in a fixed order (SPM – IST 
2000 R) as were the objective personality tests (Work Styles – BAcO – ILICA).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Results 
Primary Hypotheses 
The main factor test order was investigated by conducting a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). A MANOVA is able to detect a mean difference of δ ≥ 3/4 σ (the 
standard deviation of the test scores), with α = .05 and β = .20, by testing 29x2 = 58 sub-
jects. With 32x2 = 64, our sample size was designed adequately.  
 
Results of the MANOVA 
The means and standard deviations of all subtests in the respective experimental 
condition are given in Table 1. The Box’s M-Test for testing the homogeneity of the vari-
ance-covariance matrix regarding all test scores was not significant (p = .250), indicating 
that the resulting F-values of MANOVA can fairly be interpreted. The MANOVA showed 
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no significant effect of test order (p = .351; F = 1.138; η2 = .396), a result echoed in the 
univariate results for all scales except the score “memory” of the IST 2000 R. For this 
score subjects of Group 1 showed lower scores than subjects of Group 2 (p = .041; see the 
respective means in Table 1). Because the test scores “verbal intelligence” of the IST 2000 
R as well as “efficiency of subsidiary task –task collision”, “flexibility”, and “distractibil-
ity” of ILICA revealed significant results in the Levene’s test (p = .010, p = .014, p = .002, 
p = .049), Welch tests were applied to investigate possible effects of test order. No signifi-
cant effects were revealed (p = .318, p = .870, p = .705, p = .696). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Interpretation 
The results of the MANOVA do not provide support for Hypothesis 2 or for Hy-
pothesis 1. The factor test order had no main effect on subjects’ test performance: previ-
ously presented cognitive ability tests did not influence test scores of subsequently pre-
sented objective personality tests, nor was the reverse true. Apart from this, independent 
analysis of the single test scores showed that test order influenced only the test score 
“memory”; subjects who worked first on objective personality tests and subsequently on 
cognitive ability tests showed lower memory scores.  
 
Sample differences 
 To test our above mentioned assuption that the lower level of education of Experi-
ment 2 might be accompanied by lower cognitive abilities or lower achievement motiva-
tion compared to Experiment 1 as well as the secondary hypotheses, we used Welch tests 
to compare the two samples in regard to those test scores that were not significantly af-
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fected by the varied test order (with respect to the significant findings in Experiment 1). It 
was revealed that the two samples differ significantly in the scores “verbal intelligence” 
(p < .001), “numerical intelligence” (p < .001), “aspiration level” (p = .032), “target dis-
crepancy” (p = .016), and “quantity – crisscrossed plans” (p = .004). The two samples dif-
fer significantly in the score “reasoning” (p < .001) as well. But as noted in the description 
of the measures (see above), different measures (AMT and SPM) were used in Study 1 
and Study 2 to test reasoning. Therefore, this difference must be interpreted very carefully 
and with reservation. According to the mean scores, the sample of Experiment 1 showed 
higher cognitive abilities (verbal intelligence, numerical intelligence), had higher aspira-
tion levels, and lower target discrepancies in comparison with the sample of Experiment 2. 
The lower target discrepancy means that subjects of Experiment 1 were better able to es-
timate their achievement. But they also showed lower scores in “quantity – crisscrossed 
plans” than subjects of Experiment 2, which means that fewer subjects of Experiment 1 
reached the target in the labyrinth task, showing less resilience when their plans were 
thwarted. The means and standard deviations for all scores that significantly differ be-
tween the two samples are given in Table 2.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 1 (Khorramdel, & Frebort, accepted für publication 
2010) could not be replicated in the current experiment (Experiment 2). No significant 
main effect of the factor test order was revealed in the MANOVA, providing no evidence 
for Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2. Working on cognitive ability tests did not lead to higher 
decisiveness or lower frustration tolerance in the Work Styles as it did in Experiment 1. 
Similar to the findings of Zhu and Tulsky (2000), test order influenced only the test score 
“memory”, which could be interpreted as a slight fatigue effect, and which might be as-
cribed more to the test length than to the previously presented objective personality tests. 
Subjects who worked on cognitive ability tests after objective personality tests showed 
lower scores than subjects who worked on cognitive ability tests first. The differences we 
found between the two samples regarding their cognitive abilities, aspiration levels, and 
resilience (in regard to crisscrossed plans) provide evidence for our secondary hypothesis, 
which assumes that effects of test order might occur depending on differences in subjects’ 
cognitive ability and motivation. Subjects in Experiment 1 showed higher cognitive abili-
ties and higher aspiration levels but were less resilient when their plans were impeded than 
subjects in Experiment 2. According to Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2006), persons with 
high achievement tend to have medium to high aspiration levels and realistic self-
estimations in regard to their achievements, something that is shown in Experiment 1 (see 
“Sample differences” above). It can be assumed that the subjects of Experiment 1 are less 
resilient when their plans do not work out because they have a high aspiration level and 
success is important to them, while subjects in Experiment 2 might be more resilient be-
cause success is less important to them (which does not mean that it is not important to 
them at all). Additionally, the frustration effect of the Working Styles is provoked through 
a social comparison in the form of faked feedback (within a simple symbol coding task) 
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that others have achieved higher scores. Success and high achievements, and therefore so-
cial comparisons through which both are reflected, might have been more important to 
subjects of Experiment 1. The combination of this importance with the kind of frustration 
provoked could explain the significantly lower frustration tolerance that only occurred in 
Experiment 1, as we theorized in Khorramdel and Frebort (accepted für publication 2010). 
Regarding the effects due to the score decisiveness, that occurred only in Experiment 1 as 
well, it seems interesting, that the sample of Baldinger (2006), whose findings about the 
score decisiveness of the Work Styles we were able to replicate in Experiment 1, was also 
characterised by a higher educational level. 
 Comparing Experiment 1 with Experiment 2 with respect to the applied measures 
could provide another possible explanation for our different findings. The almost identical 
test batteries differ in one point: different matrices tests were applied. This could be one 
important explanation for the different findings in the two experiments. The sample in Ex-
periment 1 received the adaptive AMT, where the item difficulty is adjusted depending on 
the subject’s ability, and the sample in Experiment 2 received the SPM, where items are 
presented conventionally, ascending from easy to difficult. Through the AMT, subjects 
had to deal with more difficult items than the subjects who worked on the SPM. Thus, the 
adaptively presented items might have caused higher exertion and therefore intensified the 
provoked frustration effect of the Work Styles. That adaptive testing has an effect on sub-
jects' motivation is shown by Frey, Hartig and Moosbrugger (2009). They revealed that 
the test-taking motivation (measured with a questionnaire) of subjects who worked on an 
adaptive version of a concentration test was significantly lower than the test-taking moti-
vation of subjects who worked on a non-adaptive version; this can be ascribed to a per-
ceived lower probability of success. 
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 Altogether, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1) Test order might only affect 
particular kind of subjects or samples as it affected particular scores (“decisiveness”, 
“frustration tolerance”) only in a sample with higher cognitive abilities and status that ad-
ditionally showed higher aspiration levels and lower resilience. 2) This effect of test order 
occurs only in subtests with very simple tasks (like Work Styles), while more complex 
tasks (like AMT, SPM, IST 2000 R) are not affected. 3) There might be a different influ-
ence of the two matrices tests SPM and AMT on the score frustration tolerance of the 
Work Styles because the AMT is an adaptive test and therefore tends to consist of more 
difficult items than the SPM. The adaptive items might cause higher exertion and there-
fore intensify the frustrating situation in the Work Styles.  
 
Practical implications  
 Our findings were inconsistent as the results of Experiment 1 could not be replicated 
in Experiment 2. Depending on the kind of sample and the kind of measures, order effects 
may or may not occur. When in doubt, the effect of different test sequences should not be 
neglected. Particularly in psychological assessments when test scores of applicants are 
compared in order to identify the most qualified ones – the test order of test batteries com-
prising objective personality tests or comparable computer simulations should be held 
constant for all participants. On the other hand, if particular effects (such as the extent of 
frustration tolerance) are intended, they might be controllable if more were known about 
test order effects.  
 
Limitations and implications for future research 
 Our results showed that the revealed context effects of Experiment 1 were not rep-
licable in Experiment 2. This may be due to the different matrices tests used (an adaptive 
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versus a conventional one) or to the different composition of the samples, as subjects in 
Experiment 1 were more highly educated, had higher cognitive abilities, higher aspiration 
levels, and held higher job position than subjects in Experiment 2. As context effects seem 
to depend on the kind of sample, the effects revealed in Experiment 1 might not be gener-
alized to other ability tests or personality measures. Further research should focus system-
atically on the composition of the samples and the content of the items (or tests) used. A 
comprehension of the possible interactions between sample, task type, content of the 
measurement, and the modality of specific simulations might reveal helpful explanations 
for context effects. Our assumption of the effects of the different matrices tests (AMT, 
SPM) should be investigated separately from other moderating variables (such as differ-
ences in motivation or cognitive ability). Furthermore, it would also be interesting to in-
vestigate possible order effects by varying the order of different objective personality 
tests; their order was held constant in the current experiment. The current study has a limi-
tation that future research should address. The sample is very special as most participants 
were men (only four of the participants were female), and the participants were all manag-
ers in “higher management positions” of a particular industrial corporation (an automotive 
supplier). Therefore, the findings might not apply to other groups, such as women, other 
occupational groups, or other positions within similar professions.  
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Table 1: 
Means and standard deviations for all subtests in each experimental condition (2 experi-
mental groups) with regard to the factor “test order” 
 
Dependent variable (test score) Test order O Test order C 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Reasoning – AMT -.119 .770 .001 .598 
Verbal intelligence – IST 2000 R -1.135 1.501 -.798 .948 
Numerical intelligence – IST 2000 R -.398 .915 -.201 .772 
Memory – IST 2000 R -.524 .852 -.113 .714 
Reflexivity – Work Styles .104 .983 .155 .852 
Exactitude – Work Styles .393 1.112 .416 .993 
Decisiveness – Work Styles -.380 .685 -.239 .742 
Proficiency level – Work Styles .358 .745 .395 .617 
Aspiration level – Work Styles -.405 .707 -.146 .846 
Frustration tolerance – Work Styles .231 .807 .131 .700 
Target discrepancy – Work Styles .091 1.148 .092 .828 
Main task – BAcO-D task collision  -.037 1.004 -.134 1.087 
Efficiency of subsidiary task – BAcO-D 
task collision 
-.380 .918 -.418 .640 
Quantity of subsidiary task – BAcO-D 
task collision  
-.330 1.145 -.039 1.049 
Perseverance – BAcO-D task collision  -.072 1.018 -.472 1.207 
Balance – BAcO-D task collision  .805 1.909 .233 1.642 
Quantity – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans 3.270 1.419 3.560 .906 
Speed – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans -.268 .978 -.265 .802 
Abidance – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans .885 .672 .895 .556 
Stray – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans .422 1.060 .366 .890 
Flexibility – ILICA -.221 1.108 -.315 .573 
Target orientation – ILICA .523 1.026 .670 .773 
Distractibility – ILICA .136 1.088 .060 .714 
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Table 2: 
Means and standard deviations for all scores that (according to the Welch test) differ sig-
nificantly between the two samples of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2  
 
Dependent variable (test score) Sample –
Experiment 1
 Sample –
Experiment 2
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation
Mean Standard 
deviation
Verbal intelligence – IST 2000 R .219 .925 -.990 1.246
Numerical intelligence – IST 2000 R .525 .964 -.344 .851
Aspiration level – Work Styles -.012 .822 -.312 .787
Target discrepancy –  Work Styles -.333 1.074 .099 .977
Quantity – BAcO-D crisscrossed plans 
2.449 2.222 3.362 1.278
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